A lover’s shame
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275692 , vital:55071 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9356-5"
- Description: Shame is one of the more painful consequences of loving someone; my beloved’s doing something immoral can cause me to be ashamed of her. The guiding thought behind this paper is that explaining this phenomenon can tell us something about what it means to love. The phenomenon of beloved-induced shame has been largely neglected by philosophers working on shame, most of whom conceive of shame as being a reflexive attitude. Bennett Helm has recently suggested that in order to account for beloved-induced shame, we should deny the reflexivity of shame. After arguing that Helm’s account is inadequate, I proceed to develop an account of beloved-induced shame that rightly preserves its reflexivity. A familiar feature of love is that it involves an evaluative dependence; when I love someone, my well-being depends upon her life’s going well. I argue that loving someone also involves a persistent tendency to believe that her life is going well, in the sense that she is a good person, that she is not prone to wickedness. Lovers are inclined, more strongly than they otherwise would be, to give their beloveds the moral benefit of the doubt. These two features of loving—an evaluative dependence and a persistent tendency to believe in the beloved’s moral goodness—provide the conditions for a lover to experience shame when he discovers that his beloved has morally transgressed.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275692 , vital:55071 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9356-5"
- Description: Shame is one of the more painful consequences of loving someone; my beloved’s doing something immoral can cause me to be ashamed of her. The guiding thought behind this paper is that explaining this phenomenon can tell us something about what it means to love. The phenomenon of beloved-induced shame has been largely neglected by philosophers working on shame, most of whom conceive of shame as being a reflexive attitude. Bennett Helm has recently suggested that in order to account for beloved-induced shame, we should deny the reflexivity of shame. After arguing that Helm’s account is inadequate, I proceed to develop an account of beloved-induced shame that rightly preserves its reflexivity. A familiar feature of love is that it involves an evaluative dependence; when I love someone, my well-being depends upon her life’s going well. I argue that loving someone also involves a persistent tendency to believe that her life is going well, in the sense that she is a good person, that she is not prone to wickedness. Lovers are inclined, more strongly than they otherwise would be, to give their beloveds the moral benefit of the doubt. These two features of loving—an evaluative dependence and a persistent tendency to believe in the beloved’s moral goodness—provide the conditions for a lover to experience shame when he discovers that his beloved has morally transgressed.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
Higher education, academic communities, and the intellectual virtues
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275647 , vital:55066 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12005"
- Description: Because higher education brings members of academic communities in direct contact with students, the reflective higher education student is in an excellent position for developing two important intellectual virtues: confidence and humility. However, academic communities differ as to whether their members reach consensus, and their teaching practices reflect this difference. In this essay, Ward Jones argues that both consensus-reaching and non-consensus-reaching communities can encourage the development of intellectual confidence and humility in their students, although each will do so in very different ways.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275647 , vital:55066 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12005"
- Description: Because higher education brings members of academic communities in direct contact with students, the reflective higher education student is in an excellent position for developing two important intellectual virtues: confidence and humility. However, academic communities differ as to whether their members reach consensus, and their teaching practices reflect this difference. In this essay, Ward Jones argues that both consensus-reaching and non-consensus-reaching communities can encourage the development of intellectual confidence and humility in their students, although each will do so in very different ways.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
The art of dying
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275722 , vital:55073 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2012.743217"
- Description: In this paper, I explore what Jean Améry calls the ‘aesthetic view of death’. I address the following three questions. To what extent, and how, do we take an aesthetic view of death? Why do we take an aesthetic view of death? Third, for those whose deaths are impending and have some choice over how they die—most prominently the elderly and the terminally ill—what would it mean for them to take an aesthetic view of their own impending deaths, and, in particular, what would it mean for them to act in the light of such a view?
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275722 , vital:55073 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2012.743217"
- Description: In this paper, I explore what Jean Améry calls the ‘aesthetic view of death’. I address the following three questions. To what extent, and how, do we take an aesthetic view of death? Why do we take an aesthetic view of death? Third, for those whose deaths are impending and have some choice over how they die—most prominently the elderly and the terminally ill—what would it mean for them to take an aesthetic view of their own impending deaths, and, in particular, what would it mean for them to act in the light of such a view?
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
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