Consumerism, authenticity and African communalism

Smook, E https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4226-6029

Title: Consumerism, authenticity and African communalism
Creator: Smook, E https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4226-6029
Subject: Consumption (Economics)
Subject: Authenticity (Philosophy)
Subject: Philosophy, African
Date: 2022-09
Type: Doctoral theses
Type: text
Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10353/23958
Identifier: vital:62022
Description: Let me state, from the outset, that the issues raised below may be considered from various vantage points – Capitalism, Marxism, etc. However, this thesis is an endeavour to account for the loss of authenticity due to the most salient features of the consumer paradigm, which is the manufactured object, the production line and the proliferation of said objects. True relationships, or shall we say authentic dialogue, is based upon a difference of viewpoints – or epistemic distance – between the interlocutors. This difference of opinion, it may be argued, allows for a cognitive jostling between the subjects involved and represents, as it were, the reciprocal back and forth movement of ideas that betokens actively engaged dialogue. Crucial, then, to true, and by extension authentic, relationships is an epistemic distance steeped in variegated, heterogeneous points of view. For it is in sharing the differences in our points of view or interpretations of the world that we may start a dialogue far removed from each other and then sustain said dialogue in an attempt to reconcile our differences. The continuation of the dialogue, then, depends upon difference. Without the latter difference, the conditions of true dialogue, which is also a marker of authentic relationships, the need for sustained debate is forfeited and the dialogue ceases to serve a purpose – for the subjects involved in the intellectual jostling and exchange of ideas may already anticipate the thoughts of the other. In so anticipating the thoughts of the other, what is brought to the fore is not the ideas of the other, and by extension the other’s existence distinct from mine, but rather my own existence and thoughts. Were I and the other to share a constellation of beliefs, I am left with only that which I already believe in and so only with my own thoughts. The other’s differing opinion is crucial to their appearing to me as an element discreet and distinct from me. For if the other’s being is in essence of the same ilk as mine – and with that I mean if the other’s points of view and adopted systems of praxis mirror mine – we are like trees in a forest. The existence of collective nouns attests to this latter remark; we are prone to see the forest, not the similar trees that constitute it. Now the question arises as to the constitution of the self; what is it that makes up the character and nature of a person and how, if at all, may subjects be said to differ epistemically? According to Sartre, the ego is a transcendent object for consciousness, meaning that it exists out there in the world just like other objects. This is the case because consciousness is essentially empty. Recall Sartre’s famous claim that existence precedes essence, which in turn means that consciousness, or the ego, is filled up inchmeal with contents outside itself. In other words, that with which we are engaged constitutes the contents of consciousness. Repeated exposure to certain objects, or phenomena, brings about the cultivation of states and qualities – these, as it were, constituting the ego in the end. Moreover, these states and qualities, as arisen from repeated exposure to like phenomena, will instil in the subject a certain proclivity for a certain manner of action under specific conditions. As such, having been presented with something disagreeable many times over, a state of repulsion might gain a foothold in my ego regarding the phenomenon in question. This in turn will dictate how I act in the presence of said phenomenon or any other phenomena that include, adumbrationally, some of the qualities of the original phenomenon. As such, then, my actions are reflections of the states that I experience in the presence of certain objects or phenomena and, it may be argued, reflexively represent the world around me as that which constitutes my ego. The facticity of the world, then, has a great bearing upon the manner in which I perceive and engage the world. However, claims Sartre, facticity is but one side of the coin. The world and its meaning are constituted by what Sartre calls brute meaning. This refers to the fact that meaning is a matter of public opinion and does not precede the phenomenon or object itself – the latter being, in essence, but a bare, pliable, monstrous mass of being-in-itself. Due to this occurrence of meaning being man made, we are in a unique position of freedom. We are, he further claims, capable of transcending these brute meanings, enabling us to avail ourselves of the objects or phenomena in question in a bespoke manner. Freedom to choose how we interact with and interpret the world is thus the ontological ground of choice. We have, on the one side, the world in its undifferentiated state – being-in-itself – and on the other the possibility to give this world a specific meaning in accordance with our intentions – being-for-itself. Freedom to choose, so construed, thus ontologically underlies the very fabric of our existence, hence the claim that we are condemned to be free. Choosing whether to continue along the path set out by our original factual condition or to transcend it and make of it something different altogether is thus not a choice at all, but the obligatory condition of the human condition. Once again, this is the case because consciousness, as per Sartre, is empty to start with and can only be filled with the contents of phenomena or objects in accordance with our intentional engagement of them. However, Sartre continues, this freedom of meaning and the fact that brute existents represent nothing more than the convergence of publicly ascribed meaning awaken in the subject a certain nausea – a nausea born of the fact that we, the people, are at every junction in a position where we have to choose the meaning of life. Determinism, thusly, does not exist and we are not only free to choose the meanings of our own lives, but are responsible for what our lives become. This realisation proves to be too much for most to stomach and leads them along a specific path of choice: over-identification with either their factual realities or with the possibility to transcend the latter. Either way, what they aim to achieve with this overidentification is the suppression of the nauseating reality that reality is nought but what we make it to be and we are thus responsible for what it becomes. Sartre calls this bad faith. Pandering to this proclivity towards bad faith, or alternatively, the propensity for overidentification with either side on the facticity/transcendence dichotomy, we find consumerism. The consumer paradigm delineates happiness as an objective ideal, attainable through the acquisition of specific markers of demonstrable happiness. At the same time, it also provides an answer to the nauseating reality that we, humans, are never fully determined beings, but find ourselves vacillating between our factual constraints and our transcendences thereof. It offers us the crystalised means of becoming this or that individual by way of populating our immediate and personal surroundings with signifiers of happiness. Considering, moreover, that a liberalist conception of human being clearly indicates that individuation of each subject is an important aspect of existence, authenticity in terms of rights emerge as a corollary of said individuation. Each individual, so construed, is given the opportunity, the right, to acquire said markers of happiness and individuation. Obtaining these, it may be argued, allows the individual two things: firstly, to quell the nausea that haunts our dualistic lives by concretising it altogether and so doing highlighting the factual side of things; and secondly, to become discreet and individuated subjects, authentic in their beings. However, the authenticity so begotten provides nought but a thin veneer of idiosyncrasy, as the markers of said authenticity are publicly available and so the same for everyone. The problem, thus, of self-individuation is resolved by providing the subject the means of over-identification with their factual realities whilst convincing them, the consumers, that the objects on offer will afford them a degree of happiness and set them apart from their fellow subjects. The unfortunate upshot of this is that subjects all avail themselves of the same set of objects in an attempt to quell the nausea that besets the individual plunged into an undifferentiated existence. We are here at the heart of the matter. Due to the proliferation of like objects throughout the life-world, a specific system of praxis is implied. So as to navigate the life-world and utilise the similar objects that populate it, consumers are driven towards shared ideologies and courses of action. Moreover, their intentions also converge, as they all seek to establish a web of objects around them that would bespeak their individuation and happiness. Where the life-world has become such a homogeneous landscape, it may be argued, in line with Sartrean thought, that the contents of consciousness would also be similar for all. And where the contents of consciousness is similar for all, we may argue that reasoning would be similar for all. It is at this point that dialogue breaks down, for there is nothing epistemically to separate interlocutors and therefore no differences of opinion to sustain true dialogue. If, as it was reasoned some pages prior, it is the case that sustained dialogue provides the predicate upon which authentic relationships are to be based, the collapse of this epistemic distance between consumers must then also lead to a collapse of authentic relationships.
Description: Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, 2022
Format: computer
Format: online resource
Format: application/pdf
Format: 1 online resource (225 leaves)
Format: pdf
Publisher: University of Fort Hare
Publisher: Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities
Language: English
Rights: University of Fort Hare
Rights: All Rights Reserved
Rights: Open Access

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