The onus of proof and presumption of innocence in South African bail jurisprudence
- Authors: Makasana, Velile
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Criminal procedure -- South Africa , Bail -- South Africa , Detention of persons -- South Africa , Criminal law -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10186 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1020911
- Description: The South African criminal justice process is such that there is an inevitable lapse of time between the arrest of the offender and his or her subsequent trial. The pre-trial incarceration presents a special problem. Between the arrest of the accused and release, the accused is being deprived of his or her liberty in circumstances where no court of law has pronounced him or her guilty. The right to bail is well entrenched in South African criminal justice system both in the Constitution Act and Criminal Procedure Act. Bail is always in the form of contract between the State and the accused, even though at times it may be opposed by the State. In the past the legal position based on the case law was that the presumption of innocence in bail proceedings operated in favour of the applicant even where it was said that there was a strong prima facie case against him or her. This position has slightly changed in that the courts in bail applications are not concerned with guilt, but that of possible guilt only to the extent that it may bear on where the interests of justice lie in regard to bail. The onus of proof in bail applications, other than Schedule 5 and 6 offences is borne by the State. Where Schedule 5 or 6 is applicable the onus is on the applicant. There are different requirements between schedule 5 and 6 that must be met by the applicant before release on bail is granted. In Schedule 5 offences the bail applicant must satisfy the court that the interests of justice permit his or her release. In determining whether the interests of justice permit the release of a particular applicant on bail, the courts are guided by the provisions of section 60(4) to (9) inclusive of section (11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In such determination the courts must also take into account of section 60(60)(a) to (g) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In Schedule 6 offences there are two requirements namely: the exceptional circumstances and the interests of justice. The term “exceptional circumstances” does not have a closed definition. Both requirements must be established by means of written or oral evidence to the satisfaction of the court before bail may be granted. As pointed out above, the State may still oppose the release on bail of the applicant. It is now accepted in bail applications that ordinary circumstances may in particular context be blended with exceptional or unusual elements. In such cases the court is expected to apply its independent evaluation of evidence in order to determine whether the exceptional circumstances in the interests of justice permit the release on bail. Similarly to the South African bail jurisprudence the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognises a right of the arrested person to apply for the interim release. It also recognises the need to establish exceptional circumstances for such release. The South African bail jurisprudence recognises the right to bail, and places reasonable and procedural limitations founded on the constitutional values and interests of justice. There are still practical challenges that need to be addressed as a results of the stringent requirements in section 60(11)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act that relate to Schedule 5 and 6. It is therefore recommended that there is a need for the following: 1. Legislative intervention that will regulate and limit the time spent on investigations where bail has been refused. 2. Legislative intervention that will provide for an automatic review procedures in Schedule 5 or 6 offences where bail is refused on grounds that the interests of justice do not permit the release of the applicant on bail or for failure to prove exceptional circumstances. It is submitted that this may assist in reducing refusals of bail based on mistaken understanding of the law or facts or irregularities that may be prejudicial to the applicant or the administration of justice; or 3. Legislative intervention that will make it mandatory for a court that refuses to grant bail to reconsider its decision after a certain period in future provided that the trial has not been commenced with, in order to determine whether further incarceration is necessary or proportionate to the offence. It is submitted that this may assist the court to enquire into unreasonable delays on investigations or changed circumstances of the applicant in order to enable the court to reconsider its previous decision if necessary. This may further assist in offences where it is foreseeable that the trial court is likely to pass a partly or wholly suspended sentence in case of conviction. For example some cases fall within the scope of Schedule 5 by virtue of a previous conviction on Schedule 1 or release on bail on a Schedule 1 offence. The above recommendations may directly or indirectly contribute in balancing the scales of justice during the bail proceedings and its aftermath. These may contribute to the reduction of high numbers of the in custody awaiting trial prisoners while not compromising the current bail procedures.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2013
- Authors: Makasana, Velile
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Criminal procedure -- South Africa , Bail -- South Africa , Detention of persons -- South Africa , Criminal law -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10186 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1020911
- Description: The South African criminal justice process is such that there is an inevitable lapse of time between the arrest of the offender and his or her subsequent trial. The pre-trial incarceration presents a special problem. Between the arrest of the accused and release, the accused is being deprived of his or her liberty in circumstances where no court of law has pronounced him or her guilty. The right to bail is well entrenched in South African criminal justice system both in the Constitution Act and Criminal Procedure Act. Bail is always in the form of contract between the State and the accused, even though at times it may be opposed by the State. In the past the legal position based on the case law was that the presumption of innocence in bail proceedings operated in favour of the applicant even where it was said that there was a strong prima facie case against him or her. This position has slightly changed in that the courts in bail applications are not concerned with guilt, but that of possible guilt only to the extent that it may bear on where the interests of justice lie in regard to bail. The onus of proof in bail applications, other than Schedule 5 and 6 offences is borne by the State. Where Schedule 5 or 6 is applicable the onus is on the applicant. There are different requirements between schedule 5 and 6 that must be met by the applicant before release on bail is granted. In Schedule 5 offences the bail applicant must satisfy the court that the interests of justice permit his or her release. In determining whether the interests of justice permit the release of a particular applicant on bail, the courts are guided by the provisions of section 60(4) to (9) inclusive of section (11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In such determination the courts must also take into account of section 60(60)(a) to (g) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In Schedule 6 offences there are two requirements namely: the exceptional circumstances and the interests of justice. The term “exceptional circumstances” does not have a closed definition. Both requirements must be established by means of written or oral evidence to the satisfaction of the court before bail may be granted. As pointed out above, the State may still oppose the release on bail of the applicant. It is now accepted in bail applications that ordinary circumstances may in particular context be blended with exceptional or unusual elements. In such cases the court is expected to apply its independent evaluation of evidence in order to determine whether the exceptional circumstances in the interests of justice permit the release on bail. Similarly to the South African bail jurisprudence the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognises a right of the arrested person to apply for the interim release. It also recognises the need to establish exceptional circumstances for such release. The South African bail jurisprudence recognises the right to bail, and places reasonable and procedural limitations founded on the constitutional values and interests of justice. There are still practical challenges that need to be addressed as a results of the stringent requirements in section 60(11)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act that relate to Schedule 5 and 6. It is therefore recommended that there is a need for the following: 1. Legislative intervention that will regulate and limit the time spent on investigations where bail has been refused. 2. Legislative intervention that will provide for an automatic review procedures in Schedule 5 or 6 offences where bail is refused on grounds that the interests of justice do not permit the release of the applicant on bail or for failure to prove exceptional circumstances. It is submitted that this may assist in reducing refusals of bail based on mistaken understanding of the law or facts or irregularities that may be prejudicial to the applicant or the administration of justice; or 3. Legislative intervention that will make it mandatory for a court that refuses to grant bail to reconsider its decision after a certain period in future provided that the trial has not been commenced with, in order to determine whether further incarceration is necessary or proportionate to the offence. It is submitted that this may assist the court to enquire into unreasonable delays on investigations or changed circumstances of the applicant in order to enable the court to reconsider its previous decision if necessary. This may further assist in offences where it is foreseeable that the trial court is likely to pass a partly or wholly suspended sentence in case of conviction. For example some cases fall within the scope of Schedule 5 by virtue of a previous conviction on Schedule 1 or release on bail on a Schedule 1 offence. The above recommendations may directly or indirectly contribute in balancing the scales of justice during the bail proceedings and its aftermath. These may contribute to the reduction of high numbers of the in custody awaiting trial prisoners while not compromising the current bail procedures.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2013
Comparing child justice legislation in South Africa and South Sudan
- Authors: Teny, Jamual Peter Malual
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: Children -- Legal status, laws, etc , Criminal law -- South Africa , Criminal law -- Sudan
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10187 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1020941
- Description: The legal framework and legislation governing the rights of the children have become of great concern in modern societies, particularly, in the area of criminal justice and human rights. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child are basic international and regional conventions regulating the rights of the children and include how to deal with children in conflict with the law. States parties to these conventions are required to take appropriate measures, which includes enactment of legislation to give effect to these rights. Legislative instruments must address the following issues: The principle of the best interest of the child; the age of criminal responsibility; restorative justice; diversion; and the trials of children in conflict with the law. The above-mentioned instrument require and emphasise the use of an alternative approach in respect of the children who are in conflict with law. In this research a comparative approach is used to compare the South African and South Sudanese child justice legislative instruments. The legislative instruments pertaining to child justice in both countries are set out and compared. It is concluded that the South African legislative instruments are more aligned to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Recommendations and proposals are made to enact to adopt in South Sudan new legislative measures and provisions aim to afford more protection to children in conflict with the law and to strike a better balance between rights of a child and victim of crimes.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
- Authors: Teny, Jamual Peter Malual
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: Children -- Legal status, laws, etc , Criminal law -- South Africa , Criminal law -- Sudan
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10187 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1020941
- Description: The legal framework and legislation governing the rights of the children have become of great concern in modern societies, particularly, in the area of criminal justice and human rights. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child are basic international and regional conventions regulating the rights of the children and include how to deal with children in conflict with the law. States parties to these conventions are required to take appropriate measures, which includes enactment of legislation to give effect to these rights. Legislative instruments must address the following issues: The principle of the best interest of the child; the age of criminal responsibility; restorative justice; diversion; and the trials of children in conflict with the law. The above-mentioned instrument require and emphasise the use of an alternative approach in respect of the children who are in conflict with law. In this research a comparative approach is used to compare the South African and South Sudanese child justice legislative instruments. The legislative instruments pertaining to child justice in both countries are set out and compared. It is concluded that the South African legislative instruments are more aligned to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Recommendations and proposals are made to enact to adopt in South Sudan new legislative measures and provisions aim to afford more protection to children in conflict with the law and to strike a better balance between rights of a child and victim of crimes.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
Innovations introduced into the South African criminal justice by the child justice Act 75 of 2008
- Jokani, Mkhuseli Christopher
- Authors: Jokani, Mkhuseli Christopher
- Date: 2011
- Subjects: Children -- Legal status, laws etc. -- South Africa , Juvenile justice, Administration of -- South Africa , Criminal law -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10176 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1571 , Children -- Legal status, laws etc. -- South Africa , Juvenile justice, Administration of -- South Africa , Criminal law -- South Africa
- Description: The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 has brought about some new elements in the South African Criminal Justice system in cases involving children in conflict with the law. The changes require that children in conflict with the law should be treated differently from adult accused persons. The Act is now regarded as a Criminal Procedure for children in conflict with the law. In other words the emphasis is on ensuring that children are diverted away from the formal Criminal Justice provided that children acknowledge responsibility. One of the elements that is introduced by the Act is the Preliminary Inquiry that is an informal, pre- trial procedure that must be held in respect of every child that is alleged to have committed an offence. The role of the Presiding Judicial Officer is very active during this stage because he is the one that takes charge of the proceedings and the role of the Prosecutor and the Legal Representative is very minimal. The purpose of the Preliminary Inquiry is in the main to determine whether a child in conflict with the law could be diverted if the provisions of section 52 (1) of the Act are complied with. Preliminary Inquiry if properly used will have possible benefits for the South African Criminal Justice system in that cases involving children will be timeously be finalised and the turn around time for criminal cases in general will possibly improve. Same will translate in the confidence of the citizens being improved in the Justice system. The second element that is introduced by the Act is formalised diversion into the Criminal Justice System. Diversion had for a number of years before the coming into operation of the Child Justice Act been used in South Africa but it was informal. The diversion that is envisaged by the Act is restorative in nature in that the Act seeks to involve the child offender, the victim, the community members to collectively identify and address harms, needs and obligations through accepting responsibility, making restitution, taking measures to prevent recurrence of the incident and promoting reconciliation. Restorative Justice is not a new invention in the South African legal system it is a return to traditional patterns of dealing with conflict and crime that had been present in different cultures throughout human history. Restorative Justice has been understood as Ubuntu in the African context. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission demonstrated the benefits of restorative justice in dealing with conflicts that had a potential of setting the country alight. Restorative Justice has evolved in South Africa throughout different historical epochs up to the current legal conjuncture. It has now been endorsed with success in precedent setting cases in the High Courts of the Republic and the Child Justice Act has now fully institutionalised it into the Criminal Justice system. One hopes that it will be extended beyond cases involving children in conflict with the law but to adult accused persons. Various pieces of legislation attempt to endorse the principles of restorative justice but are not as comprehensive as the Child Justice Act. There are 4 instances where a matter may be diverted in terms of the Act: (i) By a Prosecutor in terms of section 41; (ii) Diversion at Preliminary inquiry; (iii) Diversion before the closure of state case at trial; (iv) At any time during trial but before judgement. There are 2 diversion options that are provided by the Act that is level one diversion option in respect of schedule 1 offences and level 2 diversion options in respect of schedule 2 and 3 which are much more serious. The Act further entrenches Family Group Conference as well as Victim Offender Mediation which are restorative justice mechanisms. The legal consequences of diversion are that when the child has successfully complied is equivalent to an acquittal. The last element is the multi sectoral approach to crime fighting in that all role players should work together in dispensing justice to children in conflict with the law. The days of working in silos are now over because everybody has a role to play and there has to be collaboration at all levels. The Act entrenches the public private partnerships particularly in helping to rehabilitate and reintegrate children to society. The Act provides for the establishment of One Stop Child Justice Centres. The purpose is to promote cooperation between government departments, non governmental organisations and civil society to ensure integrated and holistic approach in the implementation of the Act. The Act further provides for the development of the National Policy Framework by the Departments of Justice and Constitutional Development, Social Development, Correctional Services, South African Police Services, Education and Health within 2 months of the commencement of the Act. The purpose is to ensure uniform, coordinated and cooperative approach by all government departments, organs of state and institutions in dealing with matters of child justice and enhance service delivery. This study seeks to examine the innovations brought about by the Child Justice Act into the South African Criminal Justice System. The study further explores the possible benefits that may accrue to the Criminal Justice System because of Preliminary Inquiry, Restorative Justice and the Multi Sectoral Approach to crime.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2011
- Authors: Jokani, Mkhuseli Christopher
- Date: 2011
- Subjects: Children -- Legal status, laws etc. -- South Africa , Juvenile justice, Administration of -- South Africa , Criminal law -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10176 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1571 , Children -- Legal status, laws etc. -- South Africa , Juvenile justice, Administration of -- South Africa , Criminal law -- South Africa
- Description: The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 has brought about some new elements in the South African Criminal Justice system in cases involving children in conflict with the law. The changes require that children in conflict with the law should be treated differently from adult accused persons. The Act is now regarded as a Criminal Procedure for children in conflict with the law. In other words the emphasis is on ensuring that children are diverted away from the formal Criminal Justice provided that children acknowledge responsibility. One of the elements that is introduced by the Act is the Preliminary Inquiry that is an informal, pre- trial procedure that must be held in respect of every child that is alleged to have committed an offence. The role of the Presiding Judicial Officer is very active during this stage because he is the one that takes charge of the proceedings and the role of the Prosecutor and the Legal Representative is very minimal. The purpose of the Preliminary Inquiry is in the main to determine whether a child in conflict with the law could be diverted if the provisions of section 52 (1) of the Act are complied with. Preliminary Inquiry if properly used will have possible benefits for the South African Criminal Justice system in that cases involving children will be timeously be finalised and the turn around time for criminal cases in general will possibly improve. Same will translate in the confidence of the citizens being improved in the Justice system. The second element that is introduced by the Act is formalised diversion into the Criminal Justice System. Diversion had for a number of years before the coming into operation of the Child Justice Act been used in South Africa but it was informal. The diversion that is envisaged by the Act is restorative in nature in that the Act seeks to involve the child offender, the victim, the community members to collectively identify and address harms, needs and obligations through accepting responsibility, making restitution, taking measures to prevent recurrence of the incident and promoting reconciliation. Restorative Justice is not a new invention in the South African legal system it is a return to traditional patterns of dealing with conflict and crime that had been present in different cultures throughout human history. Restorative Justice has been understood as Ubuntu in the African context. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission demonstrated the benefits of restorative justice in dealing with conflicts that had a potential of setting the country alight. Restorative Justice has evolved in South Africa throughout different historical epochs up to the current legal conjuncture. It has now been endorsed with success in precedent setting cases in the High Courts of the Republic and the Child Justice Act has now fully institutionalised it into the Criminal Justice system. One hopes that it will be extended beyond cases involving children in conflict with the law but to adult accused persons. Various pieces of legislation attempt to endorse the principles of restorative justice but are not as comprehensive as the Child Justice Act. There are 4 instances where a matter may be diverted in terms of the Act: (i) By a Prosecutor in terms of section 41; (ii) Diversion at Preliminary inquiry; (iii) Diversion before the closure of state case at trial; (iv) At any time during trial but before judgement. There are 2 diversion options that are provided by the Act that is level one diversion option in respect of schedule 1 offences and level 2 diversion options in respect of schedule 2 and 3 which are much more serious. The Act further entrenches Family Group Conference as well as Victim Offender Mediation which are restorative justice mechanisms. The legal consequences of diversion are that when the child has successfully complied is equivalent to an acquittal. The last element is the multi sectoral approach to crime fighting in that all role players should work together in dispensing justice to children in conflict with the law. The days of working in silos are now over because everybody has a role to play and there has to be collaboration at all levels. The Act entrenches the public private partnerships particularly in helping to rehabilitate and reintegrate children to society. The Act provides for the establishment of One Stop Child Justice Centres. The purpose is to promote cooperation between government departments, non governmental organisations and civil society to ensure integrated and holistic approach in the implementation of the Act. The Act further provides for the development of the National Policy Framework by the Departments of Justice and Constitutional Development, Social Development, Correctional Services, South African Police Services, Education and Health within 2 months of the commencement of the Act. The purpose is to ensure uniform, coordinated and cooperative approach by all government departments, organs of state and institutions in dealing with matters of child justice and enhance service delivery. This study seeks to examine the innovations brought about by the Child Justice Act into the South African Criminal Justice System. The study further explores the possible benefits that may accrue to the Criminal Justice System because of Preliminary Inquiry, Restorative Justice and the Multi Sectoral Approach to crime.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2011
An evaluation of the constitutionality of the common law crime of criminal defamation
- Authors: Fischer, Carl Frederich
- Date: 2008
- Subjects: Libel and slander -- South Africa , Common law -- Evaluation , Criminal law -- South Africa , Criminal procedure -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10171 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/749 , Libel and slander -- South Africa , Common law -- Evaluation , Criminal law -- South Africa , Criminal procedure -- South Africa
- Description: The challenge in the law of defamation lies in finding the appropriate balance between the two competing rights of freedom of expression and an unimpaired reputation. From Roman and Roman-Dutch law into the modern era, criminal and civil defamation have been very closely linked. The elements and defences are substantially alike. There were several calls prior to 1994 for the abrogation of criminal defamation. Now that the right to an unimpaired reputation, as part of the right to human dignity, and the right to freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, quo vadis the crime of criminal defamation? The Supreme Court of Appeal has recently granted a petition for leave to appeal against convictions for criminal defamation on this very point: is the offence constitutional. Due to the paucity of criminal defamation precedent, the copious civil law precedent concerning civil defamation must be analysed to determine what view the Supreme Court of Appeal will adopt. Prior to 1994 the right to an unimpaired reputation has trumped freedom of expression. Since then, the two leading decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court have ameliorated this situation slightly, according freedom of expression more weight. Claiming the previous common law position was incorrect, they claim the present common law position is constitutionally sound. Thus the Constitution has in essence had no effect to date upon the balancing of competing rights in the law of defamation. Both courts have erred in according the right to freedom of expression too little weight. This may be due to three judicial errors. Firstly, they have under-appreciated that the values of dignity, equality and freedom fortify and are fortified by the right to freedom of expression. Aspects of dignity such as self-actualisation, self-governance and an acceptance that humans have intrinsic worth are heavily reliant on freedom of expression, particularly political expression. Secondly, while political expression lies at the core of freedom of expression, reputation lies nearer the periphery of the right to dignity. Rights at the core ought to trump competing but peripheral rights. Thirdly, erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate. Unless they too are protected, unacceptable self-censorship occurs. The correct approach is as a matter of policy, particularly regarding political expression, to balance the competing rights with one’s thumb on the free expression side of the scales. This seems the trend of the European Court of Human Rights in recent cases In Canada, an offence punishing libel made intentionally but without knowledge of its falsity was recently ruled unconstitutional. On the other hand, another offence punishing libel made with knowledge it was false, videlicet punishing the intentional publication of defamatory lies, was ruled constitutional. Criminal defamation clearly infringes upon the right to freedom of expression. For this infringement to pass constitutional muster it must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. It fails the limitation test due to the lack of proportionality between its objective in protecting the right to an unimpaired reputation and the harm it does to the right to expression. There are three reasons: firstly the “chilling effect” of imprisonment, over and above pecuniary damages, unacceptably stifles free debate. Secondly, it may punish even the truth, yet protect a falsehood, since the truth per se is not a defence. An undeserved reputation is thus more highly valued than the publication of that truth. Finally there is a well-developed civil remedy that adequately protects the right to reputation of aggrieved persons. In the appeal concerning the constitutionality of the common law offence of criminal defamation, the Supreme Court of Appeal ought to find it unconstitutional.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2008
- Authors: Fischer, Carl Frederich
- Date: 2008
- Subjects: Libel and slander -- South Africa , Common law -- Evaluation , Criminal law -- South Africa , Criminal procedure -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10171 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/749 , Libel and slander -- South Africa , Common law -- Evaluation , Criminal law -- South Africa , Criminal procedure -- South Africa
- Description: The challenge in the law of defamation lies in finding the appropriate balance between the two competing rights of freedom of expression and an unimpaired reputation. From Roman and Roman-Dutch law into the modern era, criminal and civil defamation have been very closely linked. The elements and defences are substantially alike. There were several calls prior to 1994 for the abrogation of criminal defamation. Now that the right to an unimpaired reputation, as part of the right to human dignity, and the right to freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, quo vadis the crime of criminal defamation? The Supreme Court of Appeal has recently granted a petition for leave to appeal against convictions for criminal defamation on this very point: is the offence constitutional. Due to the paucity of criminal defamation precedent, the copious civil law precedent concerning civil defamation must be analysed to determine what view the Supreme Court of Appeal will adopt. Prior to 1994 the right to an unimpaired reputation has trumped freedom of expression. Since then, the two leading decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court have ameliorated this situation slightly, according freedom of expression more weight. Claiming the previous common law position was incorrect, they claim the present common law position is constitutionally sound. Thus the Constitution has in essence had no effect to date upon the balancing of competing rights in the law of defamation. Both courts have erred in according the right to freedom of expression too little weight. This may be due to three judicial errors. Firstly, they have under-appreciated that the values of dignity, equality and freedom fortify and are fortified by the right to freedom of expression. Aspects of dignity such as self-actualisation, self-governance and an acceptance that humans have intrinsic worth are heavily reliant on freedom of expression, particularly political expression. Secondly, while political expression lies at the core of freedom of expression, reputation lies nearer the periphery of the right to dignity. Rights at the core ought to trump competing but peripheral rights. Thirdly, erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate. Unless they too are protected, unacceptable self-censorship occurs. The correct approach is as a matter of policy, particularly regarding political expression, to balance the competing rights with one’s thumb on the free expression side of the scales. This seems the trend of the European Court of Human Rights in recent cases In Canada, an offence punishing libel made intentionally but without knowledge of its falsity was recently ruled unconstitutional. On the other hand, another offence punishing libel made with knowledge it was false, videlicet punishing the intentional publication of defamatory lies, was ruled constitutional. Criminal defamation clearly infringes upon the right to freedom of expression. For this infringement to pass constitutional muster it must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. It fails the limitation test due to the lack of proportionality between its objective in protecting the right to an unimpaired reputation and the harm it does to the right to expression. There are three reasons: firstly the “chilling effect” of imprisonment, over and above pecuniary damages, unacceptably stifles free debate. Secondly, it may punish even the truth, yet protect a falsehood, since the truth per se is not a defence. An undeserved reputation is thus more highly valued than the publication of that truth. Finally there is a well-developed civil remedy that adequately protects the right to reputation of aggrieved persons. In the appeal concerning the constitutionality of the common law offence of criminal defamation, the Supreme Court of Appeal ought to find it unconstitutional.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2008
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