Creating a new declaration of rights : a critical reconstruction of earth jurisprudence's global legislative framework
- Authors: Lenferna, Georges Alexandre
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Universal Declaration , Rights , Earth , Environment , Ethics , Environmental law, International -- Research , Environmental law, International -- Philosophy , Environmental ethics -- Research , Nature conservation -- Law and legislation -- Research , Jurisprudence -- Research , Law -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2704 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001979
- Description: This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration
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- Date Issued: 2013
Equality, resources and primary goods: Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls on the currency of egalitarianism
- Authors: May, Simon James Peter
- Date: 1996
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Dworkin, R M , Law -- Philosophy , Law -- Political apsects , Equality , Justice , Jurisprudence
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2714 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002844 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Dworkin, R M , Law -- Philosophy , Law -- Political apsects , Equality , Justice , Jurisprudence
- Description: In this thesis I compare the work of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls within the context of the 'equality of what?' debate. I argue that the Rawlsian paradigm offers a much more flexible defence of a resourcist approach to egalitarianism than Dworkin's theoI)' of' equality of resources'. I argue that Dworkin's fundamental distinction between persons and circumstances is flawed because it involves commitment to a view of the person which belongs in the realm of' comprehensive moral doctrines', rather than in the realm of a political theory of justice. I also argue that an alternative distinction between choice and luck, expressed in the 'luck-neutralising aim' of egalitarianism, is inappropriate since it too involves transgressing political constraints on theories of justice. Rawls's utilisation of primary goods in his theory of justice is supported by considerations derived from the work of Thomas Scanlon. The schematic picture of relative urgency which Scanlon advances provides the rationale for the use of primary goods, and also allows us to discriminate . between compensation for handicaps and compensation for expensive tastes. Scanlon's schematic picture also frees the utilisation of primary goods from criticisms raised by Amartya Sen. Lastly, I discuss arguments advanced by Susan Hurley which enable an interpretation of Rawls's original position device which is independent of the luck-neutralising aim. Her arguments are extended as a criticism of Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market.
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- Date Issued: 1996