Creating a new declaration of rights : a critical reconstruction of earth jurisprudence's global legislative framework
- Authors: Lenferna, Georges Alexandre
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Universal Declaration , Rights , Earth , Environment , Ethics , Environmental law, International -- Research , Environmental law, International -- Philosophy , Environmental ethics -- Research , Nature conservation -- Law and legislation -- Research , Jurisprudence -- Research , Law -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2704 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001979
- Description: This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2013
- Authors: Lenferna, Georges Alexandre
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Universal Declaration , Rights , Earth , Environment , Ethics , Environmental law, International -- Research , Environmental law, International -- Philosophy , Environmental ethics -- Research , Nature conservation -- Law and legislation -- Research , Jurisprudence -- Research , Law -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2704 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001979
- Description: This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2013
Ethics and complexity : exploring the significance and application of complexity thinking in ethical theory with special reference to the graphic novel Watchmen
- Authors: Lochhead, Hayley
- Date: 2011
- Subjects: Philosophy -- Complexity , Ethics , Moore, Alan, 1953- Watchmen
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:8384 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1447 , Philosophy -- Complexity , Ethics , Moore, Alan, 1953- Watchmen
- Description: The current era, or postmodern context, is characterized by an overwhelming amount of anxiety concerning humanity’s future, tied to a general perception of the postmodern context as one that is defined by ‘crisis.’ This anxiety-provoking sense of crisis is, I believe, the product of a much more significant destabilization of the paradigmatic base upon which the human worldview is established. The period that extends from the Newtonian era to the late Twentieth Century has been informed by what Edgar Morin calls a ‘paradigm of simplicity’ in terms of which the universe was understood as a perfectly knowable, deterministic system. Following a series of revolutionizing discoveries throughout the Twentieth Century, however, it has come to light that this deterministic paradigm is no longer suitable as a way of understanding the universe. Instead, a ‘paradigm of complexity,’ in which the universe is understood as a complex, self-organizing system that is never totally knowable, has been posited by thinkers such as Morin and Paul Cilliers. Further, both of these thinkers, among others, argue that the acknowledgment of complexity is an inherently ethical matter, since complex systems (such as human communities) present one with difficult choices to make in uncertain situations, rather than determinate sets of rules to follow. This study aims to show that a complexity view of the human lifeworld, does not cast the uncertainty of humanity’s future as a threatening cause of anxiety and dread, but offers us a valuable opportunity for growth, adaptation and the creation of new ethical values. Certainly, an inability to come to grips with this new paradigm has led to desperately reactionary measures on the part of some to secure a semblance of the stability and control that the ‘paradigm of simplicity’ made normative. As a result, the complex reality of the human lifeworld is negated in favour of the misleading belief in the certainty and security provided by a particular metanarrative. By contrast, Jacques Lacan’s fecund poststructuralist theory of subjectivity and Jacques Derrida’s poststructuralist logic offer useful heuristics for the navigation of complexity thinking that neither mistakenly negate moments of uncertainty, anomaly and paradox for the sake of certainty, nor swing to the opposite, equally unacceptable, extreme of absolute relativism. Poststructuralist logic points to the notion of a ‘complexity ethics’ which issues a challenge to the idea, stemming from the ‘paradigm of simplicity’, that it is ever possible for agents to adopt an uncompromised ethical stance. The upshot of this is to argue that it is essential for contemporary humans to learn to live with ethical uncertainty, paradox, compromise, contamination and other figures of complexity, rather than search for an impossible certainty, since this strategy leads to more realistic, moderate, and therefore less dangerous, ethical reasoning. Good popular culture texts, such as the graphic novel Watchmen, which represent the reality of a complex human lifeworld, have the power to communicate these rather difficult philosophical ideas concerning the complexity of the human lifeworld to a wide audience in a very accessible format. An analysis of the varying ethical stances taken by certain characters demonstrates, in concrete terms, just how precisely the novel confirms the poststructuralist argument concerning inescapable ethical contamination. Thus, it is with recourse to such texts that one might begin to answer more concretely the questions, ‘what does complexity imply for ethical theory?’ and ‘what might an ethics for the complex lifeworld entail?'.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2011
- Authors: Lochhead, Hayley
- Date: 2011
- Subjects: Philosophy -- Complexity , Ethics , Moore, Alan, 1953- Watchmen
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:8384 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1447 , Philosophy -- Complexity , Ethics , Moore, Alan, 1953- Watchmen
- Description: The current era, or postmodern context, is characterized by an overwhelming amount of anxiety concerning humanity’s future, tied to a general perception of the postmodern context as one that is defined by ‘crisis.’ This anxiety-provoking sense of crisis is, I believe, the product of a much more significant destabilization of the paradigmatic base upon which the human worldview is established. The period that extends from the Newtonian era to the late Twentieth Century has been informed by what Edgar Morin calls a ‘paradigm of simplicity’ in terms of which the universe was understood as a perfectly knowable, deterministic system. Following a series of revolutionizing discoveries throughout the Twentieth Century, however, it has come to light that this deterministic paradigm is no longer suitable as a way of understanding the universe. Instead, a ‘paradigm of complexity,’ in which the universe is understood as a complex, self-organizing system that is never totally knowable, has been posited by thinkers such as Morin and Paul Cilliers. Further, both of these thinkers, among others, argue that the acknowledgment of complexity is an inherently ethical matter, since complex systems (such as human communities) present one with difficult choices to make in uncertain situations, rather than determinate sets of rules to follow. This study aims to show that a complexity view of the human lifeworld, does not cast the uncertainty of humanity’s future as a threatening cause of anxiety and dread, but offers us a valuable opportunity for growth, adaptation and the creation of new ethical values. Certainly, an inability to come to grips with this new paradigm has led to desperately reactionary measures on the part of some to secure a semblance of the stability and control that the ‘paradigm of simplicity’ made normative. As a result, the complex reality of the human lifeworld is negated in favour of the misleading belief in the certainty and security provided by a particular metanarrative. By contrast, Jacques Lacan’s fecund poststructuralist theory of subjectivity and Jacques Derrida’s poststructuralist logic offer useful heuristics for the navigation of complexity thinking that neither mistakenly negate moments of uncertainty, anomaly and paradox for the sake of certainty, nor swing to the opposite, equally unacceptable, extreme of absolute relativism. Poststructuralist logic points to the notion of a ‘complexity ethics’ which issues a challenge to the idea, stemming from the ‘paradigm of simplicity’, that it is ever possible for agents to adopt an uncompromised ethical stance. The upshot of this is to argue that it is essential for contemporary humans to learn to live with ethical uncertainty, paradox, compromise, contamination and other figures of complexity, rather than search for an impossible certainty, since this strategy leads to more realistic, moderate, and therefore less dangerous, ethical reasoning. Good popular culture texts, such as the graphic novel Watchmen, which represent the reality of a complex human lifeworld, have the power to communicate these rather difficult philosophical ideas concerning the complexity of the human lifeworld to a wide audience in a very accessible format. An analysis of the varying ethical stances taken by certain characters demonstrates, in concrete terms, just how precisely the novel confirms the poststructuralist argument concerning inescapable ethical contamination. Thus, it is with recourse to such texts that one might begin to answer more concretely the questions, ‘what does complexity imply for ethical theory?’ and ‘what might an ethics for the complex lifeworld entail?'.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2011
The artistic path to virtue
- Authors: Sher, Gavin
- Date: 2007
- Subjects: Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2732 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370 , Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Description: Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2007
- Authors: Sher, Gavin
- Date: 2007
- Subjects: Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2732 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370 , Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Description: Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2007
The motivating force of moral beliefs
- Authors: Vos, James Antony
- Date: 2005 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2729 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003804 , Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Description: I investigate the issue of whether or not one's holding a moral belief is sufficient to motivate one to act as that belief prescribes. I argue that rational persons who hold a moral belief that is also a 'self-referential belief' will form a desire to act as that belief prescribes and thereby be motivated to act on the moral belief. I argue for this claim by, firstly, showing that the demand that moral judgements must be intrinsically motivating, Internalism, should only apply to rational persons, that is, the link between moral judgement and motivation can be broken in cases of irrationality. Secondly, I argue against the Humean claim that one cannot rationally form a desire simply because one believes that one ought to have that desire. This claim requires an investigation into a variety of views of Practical Reason and an argument concluding that Practical Reason is broader in scope than the Instrumentalist or Humean allows. I undertake this task in chapter 2. Thirdly, I argue that believing that I ought to perform a certain action will give me an internal commitment to perform that action, insofar as I am rational. I argue that an internal commitment is a form of desire. Once I recognise that I have a moral belief and an internal commitment, I will be motivated to act as that belief and commitment prescribe. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2005
- Authors: Vos, James Antony
- Date: 2005 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2729 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003804 , Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Description: I investigate the issue of whether or not one's holding a moral belief is sufficient to motivate one to act as that belief prescribes. I argue that rational persons who hold a moral belief that is also a 'self-referential belief' will form a desire to act as that belief prescribes and thereby be motivated to act on the moral belief. I argue for this claim by, firstly, showing that the demand that moral judgements must be intrinsically motivating, Internalism, should only apply to rational persons, that is, the link between moral judgement and motivation can be broken in cases of irrationality. Secondly, I argue against the Humean claim that one cannot rationally form a desire simply because one believes that one ought to have that desire. This claim requires an investigation into a variety of views of Practical Reason and an argument concluding that Practical Reason is broader in scope than the Instrumentalist or Humean allows. I undertake this task in chapter 2. Thirdly, I argue that believing that I ought to perform a certain action will give me an internal commitment to perform that action, insofar as I am rational. I argue that an internal commitment is a form of desire. Once I recognise that I have a moral belief and an internal commitment, I will be motivated to act as that belief and commitment prescribe. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2005
In defence of moral objectivity
- Authors: McKaiser, Eusebius
- Date: 2003 , 2013-05-23
- Subjects: Ethics , Objectivity
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2740 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007599 , Ethics , Objectivity
- Description: This thesis examines the problem of moral objectivity, which is constituted by the ontological, epistemological and motivational challenges. It gradually develops an account of moral objectivity that has the dual function of dealing with the enemies of moral objectivity as well as giving a positive account of what moral objectivity is. It establishes these aims by arguing for the following theses. The first set of arguments show that relativist theories of ethics provide us with no forceful grounds for being sceptical about moral objectivity. The second set of arguments deepens the response to those who are sceptical about moral objectivity. It does so by showing in greater detail how rationality plays a substantive role in our practical deliberation, our notion of agency as well as our reactive attitudes. These arguments provide further reasons why we should have faith in the possibility of developing an adequate account of moral objectivity. The last set of arguments provides the positive account of moral objectivity. This positive account ends with the discussion of a paradigmatic moral fact that gives full expression (to the features of moral objectivity that have been articulated and defended.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
- Authors: McKaiser, Eusebius
- Date: 2003 , 2013-05-23
- Subjects: Ethics , Objectivity
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2740 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007599 , Ethics , Objectivity
- Description: This thesis examines the problem of moral objectivity, which is constituted by the ontological, epistemological and motivational challenges. It gradually develops an account of moral objectivity that has the dual function of dealing with the enemies of moral objectivity as well as giving a positive account of what moral objectivity is. It establishes these aims by arguing for the following theses. The first set of arguments show that relativist theories of ethics provide us with no forceful grounds for being sceptical about moral objectivity. The second set of arguments deepens the response to those who are sceptical about moral objectivity. It does so by showing in greater detail how rationality plays a substantive role in our practical deliberation, our notion of agency as well as our reactive attitudes. These arguments provide further reasons why we should have faith in the possibility of developing an adequate account of moral objectivity. The last set of arguments provides the positive account of moral objectivity. This positive account ends with the discussion of a paradigmatic moral fact that gives full expression (to the features of moral objectivity that have been articulated and defended.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
Desert
- Authors: Harper, Sean Julian
- Date: 2000
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2710 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002840 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Description: This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2000
- Authors: Harper, Sean Julian
- Date: 2000
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2710 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002840 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Description: This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2000
Freedom in the thought of John Locke and John Stuart Mill
- Authors: Omer-Cooper, John David
- Date: 1958
- Subjects: Locke, John, 1632-1704 , Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873 , Liberty , Ethics , Free thought , Autonomy (Psychology)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2746 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1012989
- Description: Recent history has abundantly justified J. S. Mlll's theory that the power of soclety over the indivldual is llkely to increase without limlt If lt was not prevented. One of the most obvlous phenomena of our times has been the rise of the so-called totalltarlan systems of government; states that treat the lndlvldual as a being wlth no other end but the servlce of the state and which are prepared to use the advanced technlques which modern scientific research has made available to them to mould the individual as the perfect tool of the system.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1958
- Authors: Omer-Cooper, John David
- Date: 1958
- Subjects: Locke, John, 1632-1704 , Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873 , Liberty , Ethics , Free thought , Autonomy (Psychology)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2746 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1012989
- Description: Recent history has abundantly justified J. S. Mlll's theory that the power of soclety over the indivldual is llkely to increase without limlt If lt was not prevented. One of the most obvlous phenomena of our times has been the rise of the so-called totalltarlan systems of government; states that treat the lndlvldual as a being wlth no other end but the servlce of the state and which are prepared to use the advanced technlques which modern scientific research has made available to them to mould the individual as the perfect tool of the system.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1958
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