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FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**TERRORISM AS A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR TO STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA: A
CASE STUDY OF AL-SHABAAB.**

BY

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**A Dissertation Submitted In Fulfilment of the Requirements for a Master of Social
Science Degree in Political Studies**

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ABSTRACT

This study is an investigation of terrorism as a contributory factor to state failure in Somalia with specific reference to Al-Shabaab, using Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory. It utilises both primary and secondary sources of data. The study found out that Somalia had been a failed state even before the birth of Al-Shabaab. However, the activities of Al-Shabaab perpetuated state failure in Somalia. These activities included bombings, small arms attacks, executions, siege, kidnappings, hijackings and looting. The study also found out that Al-Shabaab regularly conducted incursions in neighbouring countries and all these activities destabilised Somalia politically and perpetuated state failure. However, the study also found out that there were other factors that contributed to Somalia's state failure some of which were clan rivalry, civil war, warlordism, piracy, poverty and religion. Despite all these, the study noted that there were various actors involved in containing the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab. These actors included the Transitional Federal Government, Kenya, the African Union, the United Nations and the United States. The study recommends that dialogue between the TFG, the clan structures and Al-Shabaab is the most viable path to sustainable peace in Somalia.

DECLARATION

I, Sitembiso Irene Ndlovu, student number 201407671, hereby declare that the study is my own work and that all sources from which information was obtained have been acknowledged by means of complete referencing. The research project has not been submitted at any university for a similar or any other degree.

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Signature

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Date

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DEDICATION

To my late parents whose words of encouragement and inspiration still lingers on. To the Ndlovu family, for the support rendered throughout this journey.

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ACRONYMS

AFRICOM -Africa Command

AMISOM- African Union Mission to Somalia

ARPCT -Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism

AU- African Union

CIA-Central Intelligence Agency

CJTF-HOA-Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa

DOD-Department of Defence

DOS -Department of State

ENDF- Ethiopia National Defence Force

GNC-General National Congress

GWOT- Global War on Terror

ICU - Islamic Courts Union

IED- Improvised Explosive Device

IGAD- Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGASOM- Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission in Somalia

ISIS - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

KDF- Kenya Defence Force

MEND- Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

R2P- Responsibility to Protect

SNA- Somali National Army

TFG- Transitional Federal Government

TCC's- Troop Contributing Countries

U.N- United Nations

U.S-United States

UNICEF- United Nations Children's Emergency Fund

Unmas- United Nations Mines Action Services

UNSC- United Nations Security Council

VNSA - Violent Non-State Actors

WHO- World Health Organization

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Africa is a continent that has been devastated by conflicts mostly erupting as a result of internal issues such as ethnic marginalization, small arms proliferation, religion, bad governance and corruption (Hoeffler, 2012:563). Primary causes of conflicts have been consequences of both national and international factors. Kadende-Kaiser (2005:23) states that “International factors include the consequences of the Cold War and its aftermath, as well as the globalisation and liberalisation of the world economy”. This has created political and economic insecurity in the continent. Kadende-Kaiser (2005:23) further identifies national factors, and these include “discriminatory political processes, skewed resource distribution, centralised and highly personalised forms of governance, corruption and mismanagement”. All these factors have played a role in erupting conflicts in Africa that have either destabilised states or led to complete collapse.

The nature of a state is essential to understanding state failure. This is because the discussion on failed states largely rests on the idea of statehood. Weber, in Jackson et al (1982:2), describes the state as “a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organization, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population including all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction”. The state should have various institutions which consist of the bureaucracy, military, police and the courts. Weber upholds law and order and advocates for the protection of human rights which is a prerequisite for a good state (Weber 1964:155). However this has not been the case with Africa; most states either lack one or two of the prerequisites or

have failed altogether. African countries that lack these prerequisites have been deemed as failed states.

Africa has quite a number of countries that have been regarded as failed states. Countries like Sudan, Chad, and Cote d'Ivoire have once been regarded as failed states (The Fund for Peace, 2011:6). Though there are several characteristics of failed states, a key determinant often used to establish state failure is when a state has lost control over parts of its territory. Other attributes of failed states include the incapacity to provide sound public services, and the failure to interact with other states as a full member of the international community (Hough et al 2015:113). State failure has to be taken seriously as the consequences are not only felt at the national level of the state itself but at a regional and international level too. Though failed states are usually considered as a safe haven for terrorist groups to flourish, at times, it is often the activities of terrorist groups that make a state ungovernable and consequently leads to failure. Kenya and Cameroon, for example, have had stable and functional states until the activities of terrorist groups are threatening the stability of these countries.

Terrorism is a concept with contentious definitions. Kapitan (2003:48) defines terrorism as "the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of such, directed upon civilians in order to achieve political objectives". On the other hand, Weinberg (2005:7) sees terrorism as "a tactic employed violently in the course of pursuing a goal, which in most cases is political". Terrorism includes unlawful acts intentionally carried out to incite fear and terrorize inhabitants or a government in order to achieve political ends (Haas et al,

2013:526). All scholars deem it as an act of violence with political motives. Terrorism cannot be explained using a distinct causal factor; common causes of terrorism have been identified. For example ideology, religion and poverty, among other causes, lead to terrorism (Muhula, 2013:44). Franks (2006:1) argues that “terrorism has become the plague of the 21st century and has seemingly penetrated all quarters of international society, especially in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and the subsequent war on terrorism”. There has been a rise in the number of Islamist terrorists in Africa. Islamic influence has been dangerous in its expansion and supply of funds and weapons to different ethnic groups and factions that are already in conflict (Botha et al, 2005:2).

The resurgence of Religious Fundamentalism, in particular the Islamic movement supports strict adherence to the Quran teachings and Islamic law. This has led to the formation of radical Muslim factions which are striving to have a new international order where Sharia law prevails. Africa has endured an increase in terrorist attacks which stemmed mostly from civil unrest or regional wars as African radical groups resorted to terrorism with the aim of achieving economic, political, religious or social goals. Some African countries have poor socio-economic state of affairs and some have military regimes that use oppressive measures to consolidate their authority (Botha et al, 2005:3). Such state of affairs and type of governance usually leads to mass dissents which in turn erupt into conflicts. In such situations conflicts arise and terrorist groups infiltrate and thrive in such places. Newman (2007:475) notes that “most destructive terrorist groups are based in countries which have weak governance, weak or failed

state capacity and poor service delivery”. Terrorist activities include abducting, killing and staging armed attacks. For example, Boko Haram in Nigeria known for abducting and killing, claimed responsibility for abducting school girls and has killed over 2,000 people within the first quarter of 2014 alone. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and Libya known for staging armed attacks was responsible for the attack on the US consulate which left four people dead including the US Ambassador (Deutsche Welle, 2014).

The Horn of Africa, Somalia in particular, has experienced its fair share of terrorist activities. Rotberg (2004:131) describe Somalia as “the model of a collapsed state: a geographical expression only with borders but with no effective way to exert authority within those borders”. Since the fall of military leader, General Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has been devoid of an effective government and has become an uncontrollable and failed state. Somalia has made international headlines for over two decades. The country has been host to civil wars due to clan rivalry. This led to humanitarian catastrophe and state failure, making the country a prospective safe asylum for Islamist terrorists (Simpson, 2012:10). The country plays host to Al-Shabaab, which is one of the most violent terrorist groups in Africa.

Al-Shabaab or ‘the youth’ was formed as a radical offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which in 2006 controlled Mogadishu. Things began to change, however, in 2006. In that year, the ICU unexpectedly took control of Mogadishu and much of southern and central Somalia. The ICU was overthrown a few months later by an Ethiopian military intervention supported by some domestic players and the U.S. Since then, militant

Islamism has gained an additional drive in the country (Fergusson, 2013:14). The Ethiopian attack on Somalia in December 2006 was the defining moment in the expansion and radicalization of Al-Shabaab. First, it supplied Al-Shabaab with the opportunity to draw on innate Somali resentment towards Ethiopia to recruit thousands of nationalist volunteers (Wise, 2011:1). Secondly, the invasion forced Al-Shabaab to take on an effective guerrilla-style operational strategy as a way of defying Ethiopian advance into the South (Menkhaus et al, 2010). Wise (2011:2) further notes that “by forcing the Islamic Courts Union leaders who had exerted a level of moderating influence on Al-Shabaab to flee Somalia, the invasion allowed the group to become even more radical”. It changed the group from a moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical faction in the Horn of Africa.

1.2 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

This study is motivated by the need to comprehend the role played by Al-Shabaab in perpetuating state failure in Somalia.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Al-Shabaab is an Al-Qaeda affiliated group fighting to create an Islamic state in Somalia. It has incorporated parts of the Sharia law with the indigenous Somali justice system (Harmony Project, 2006:29). Al-Shabaab’s presence in the country has challenged the government’s monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force, destabilized the state and perpetuated an already failed state. Though Somalia was already a failed state prior to the formation of Al-Shabaab, it appears that the activities

of the group and its continuous expansion are the key drivers to the perpetuation of state failure in the country. Hansen (2013:3) states that “Al-Shabaab is today a large and heterogeneous organization, in which recruits are motivated by a variety of factors such as financial gain, fear, clan grievances and a quest for justice through Sharia legislation”. Al-Shabaab has been expanding and in the process of growth has been radicalizing and recruiting more members, mostly targeting the youth who are victims of unfulfilled political and economic expectations (Clapper, 2014:77). The group has consolidated its position as the most influential rebellious group and ostracizing them has only perpetuated more violence.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- How have the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab perpetuated state failure in Somalia?
- What other factors are responsible for the perpetuation of state failure in Somalia?
- What have been the responses by actors to contain the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab?

1.5 AIM OF THE STUDY

The main aim of the study is to investigate how the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab have been contributory factors to state failure in Somalia.

1.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of the study are the following:

- To analyse how terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab have perpetuated state failure in Somalia.
- To explore other factors responsible for the perpetuation of state failure in Somalia.
- To discuss the responses by actors to contain the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study is beneficial to students and researchers as it contributes to the literature on terrorism with specific reference to Al-Shabaab in Somalia. To enhance the significance of this study, copies will be submitted to the University of Fort Hare library and a soft copy will be uploaded to the university's institutional repository. This will ensure easy access for students and researchers.

1.8 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This study is limited to selected activities of Al-Shabaab and its role in the perpetuation of state failure in Somalia. These selected activities will be further limited to those that occurred between 2006 and 2015 when Al-Shabaab was formed. This time-frame is important so as to determine the impacts which the group has had on state failure in Somalia.

1.9 METHODOLOGY

1.9.1 Methods of Data Collection

This was a qualitative study that captured a holistic description of events regarding the activities of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. This methodology read into data that was more textual in nature rather than data in numbers (Hennink et al, 2011:08). For this study a combination of secondary and primary sources was used. Hair et al (2008:22) stipulates that “secondary research refers to the use of historical data structures of variables previously collected and assembled for some research problem or opportunity other than the current situation. Primary research involves the use of information collected specifically for the current research problem”. Primary sources included official government reports like white papers, foreign policy documents on humanitarian crisis in Somalia and media reports. Secondary sources included textbooks like *Weak States, State failure and terrorism* and *Religion, Politics and International Relations*. Also, articles in journals like *Journal of Conflict and Resolution*, *Journal on Human Rights* and *International Intervention and State-building*.

1.9.2 Method of Data Analysis

The method of analysis for this study was explanatory as well as analytical. It helped in understanding terrorist acts carried out by Al-Shabaab that have perpetuated state failure in Somalia and the responses from actors in containing the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab. Explanatory analysis allowed the researcher to build explanations on gaps found or explanations that are in confirmation with the theory or contradict it (Ritchie,

2003:215). Employing explanatory as well as analytical method helped to rid any possible bias that might have arisen from sources used. It helped to present the data within an analytical framework and to determine how plausible the theory of Clash of Civilizations was. To fully determine how plausible the theory of Clash of Civilization was, content and documentary analysis was incorporated. Nieuwenhuis (2010:101) affirmed that “content analysis is a systematic approach to qualitative data analysis that identifies and summarizes message content”. It referred to the analysis of books, news reports, journals etc.

Content analysis is an inductive and repetitive process where one looks for similarities and differences in content that would substantiate or infirm a theory. Bryman (2004:542) states that content analysis “comprises a searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed”. Terrorist activities were analysed and also databases like the Global Terrorism Index were used to identify trends of attacks as this helped substantiate the findings of the study. Document analysis entails the studying of accessible documents to comprehend substantive content or clarify deeper meanings. Documentary analysis was important for this study because events could not be investigated by observation or questioning (Ritchie, 2003:35). Documentary analysis involved the studying and reviewing of secondary sources and was relevant to this study because it helped in getting relevant information that was used in validating the study at hand. Not analysing existing information would have left some loopholes in the study, thus it was imperative to use documentary analysis.

1.9.3 Ethical Considerations

The main ethical issue observed throughout this study was to guard against plagiarism. This was accomplished through desisting from copying others' works without acknowledgement. Therefore, for this study the researcher surrounded all words verbatim with quotation marks, paraphrased texts and acknowledged authors whose works were consulted.

1.10 ORGANISATION OF THE FINAL REPORT

Chapter One provided the introduction as well as the background of the study. The statement of the problem, research questions, aim and objectives were discussed followed by significance of the study, scope of the study and description of the research methodology applied in the study.

Chapter Two provided a comprehensive literature review on issues pertaining to terrorist activities, impact of terrorism on political and economic stability of states which led to state failure by including secondary data from journals, books and articles which gave insights on what was already written on the topic. Also it incorporated and discussed the theoretical framework on which the study was premised.

Chapter Three explored how terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab perpetuated state failure in Somalia.

Chapter Four explored the factors responsible for the perpetuation of state failure in Somalia.

Chapter Five discussed the responses by actors to contain the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab.

Chapter Six provided the conclusion and recommendations on the study.

1.11 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

This chapter provided a brief background to the study at hand. It also included the rationale of the study which explained why the research topic was worthy of study. Statement of the problem was included as it gave a description of the problem that is addressed. Research questions that are related to the aim of the research were clearly stated. The aim of the study explained what the major goal of the study at hand is. Objectives of the study were stated and they summarized what the study seeks to achieve. The significance of the study showed how the research would be of benefit to other people and the scope of the study was stated. Under methodology the methods of both data collection and analysis are stated and explained. Ethical considerations and the final organisation of the report is outlined. The next chapter will focus on literature review paying attention on prevalence of terrorism in Africa, impact it has on political and economic stability of states. It will give an insight on state failure and its general causes. Lastly it will look at the theoretical framework “Clash of Civilizations” on which this thesis will be premised.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Literature review provides a background for the research undertaken. This study depends on what others have done before and literature review helps contextualise the study and creates a gap for the study at hand (Ridley, 2012:no page). Thus this chapter through reviewing literature seeks to outline the prevalence of terrorism in Africa. Also it will look at the impact it has had on the political and economic stability of states. It will give an insight on state failure and its general causes. Lastly it will look at the theoretical framework “Clash of Civilizations” on which this thesis will be premised. The theory basically talks of how religion and ethnic differences is now at the forefront of politics and how people identify themselves based on religion and ethnicity. It attests that most present-day conflicts are as a result of religious clashes.

2.2 PREVALENCE OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA

Africa is a continent that has 54 states. About a third of these states have been troubled by violent conflicts, which in turn have robbed Africa of developmental potential and the right to exercise democracy. It is a continent that is affected mostly by violent conflicts which have had a toll on the different ethnic groups it houses. It has also affected the political affairs and the economies of most states. With the dawn of globalization and the liberalization of the world economy, Africa has failed to take the helm of the 21st century. Africa has been more prone to violent conflicts with most of them entrenched on colonial conflicts. The continent has fought different wars ranging from liberation struggles to the current war on terror which has no defined boundaries and above all not an African stirred war. Africa’s colonial wars had less blood purges as compared to the

post-colonial wars fought all in the name of war on terror (Zezeza, 2008:1). Apart from colonial conflicts being deemed as the root cause to more conflicts on the continent, terrorism has also found its way into the fray. Terrorism has stirred conflicts between and within states, affecting the political and economic stability of states. This has ultimately led some states to be weak and some to be termed as failed states.

As stated in the previous chapter, terrorism is a concept with contentious definitions in international law. Kapitan (2003:48) defines terrorism as “the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of such, directed upon civilians in order to achieve political objectives”. On the other hand Weinberg (2005:7) sees terrorism as “a tactic employed violently in the course of pursuing a goal, which in most cases is political”. Terrorism includes unlawful acts intentionally carried out to incite fear and terrorize inhabitants or a government in order to achieve political ends (Haas et al, 2013:526). Despite the differences on how terrorism is defined there seems to be a convergence on what qualifies an act as terrorism. Almost all scholars deem it as an act of violence with political motives.

Donatella (2013:40) is of the opinion that “terrorism is one form of political violence, distinguished by the fact that it is meant to impress a watching audience and often involves random attacks on civilians, including ordinary people in public places as well as government bureaucrats”. Terrorism is a deliberate act that is strategically chosen by non-state actors and facilitated by supportive states (Crenshaw, 2014:4). Historically, terrorist activities have been carried out by non-state actors against states in order to force the states to give in to the demands of the terrorists (McRaven, 1996:335).

The September 11, 2001 twin bombing marked the most destructive attack by a non-state actor which prompted the launching of the War on Terror. The use of acts of terrorism to accomplish a group's goal is by no means a new phenomenon, and over the years numerous groups have used terrorism as a technique to achieve their goals. The United Nations (2004) states that "perpetrators of terrorism can be both state and non-state actors and placed emphasis on attacks on civilians and non-combatants, noting that terrorism flourishes in conditions of poverty, inequality, oppression, humiliation, conflict and occupation". Among non-state actors there are terrorists and other types which include Militias, an armed force operating under the guidance of a factional leader within failing states (Williams, 2008:10).

Insurgencies which according to Williams (2008:12) are "an organized armed political struggle whose goal may be seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government". Criminal organizations and Youth gangs, these are groups that seek to maximize their profits from their activities like drug and human trafficking (Williams, 2008:15). Lastly Terrorists are organizations that use violence to seek political change (Williams, 2008:14).

Africa has witnessed the growing and wide spreading of terrorism on the continent. Terrorism is one of the critical features that are dominant in intra and interstate wars that have affected most African states. Forest et al (2011) reiterate what Crenshaw mentioned that "terrorism was not an isolated phenomenon for African states or the region more broadly". Africa is being scathed by terrorism and is still grappling with it. The continent has its own distinct indigenous collection of violent non-state actors like

the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Islamic State (ISIS) in Egypt and Tuaregs in Mali, among others that are terrorists.

Boko Haram originated from northeast Nigeria, embracing an extreme form of Islam, taking advantage of ostracism and poverty in this region of the oil rich country. A series of deadly clashes with government took place and in 2009 the group instigated a violent insurgency which left thousands dead and parts of the country in rubble. Over the years the group has heightened attacks, seizing towns and villages, taking hundreds captive (Alfred, 2015). Hesterman (2014:37) mentions that "Boko Haram tactics became more sophisticated and it started using suicide bombers. The bombing of the UN building in Abuja 2011 marked the departure of the group's exclusive focus on domestic attacks". A relentless stream of suicide bombings has terrorized cities around the country, many of them using women and young girls who may be forced into carrying out these attacks (Alfred, 2015). These terror attacks have wreaked havoc, affected the economy and led others to live miserable lives.

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is a group that originated from northern Uganda in 1987 and is a ruthless, small and armed group. It operated mainly in the remote areas of Uganda, Central African Republic and Southern Sudan before shifting its operations to Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006 (Arieff et al, 2015:1). Forest et al (2011) believe that "LRA operates as an ideological apocalyptic Christian group; its modus operandi has been to use violence or the threat of violence to intimidate and instil fear in the Ugandan people". The group has carried some atrocious acts, for instance between December 2008 and January 2009, LRA callously and without remorse killed more than 865 civilians and abducted 160 children in DRC. Machetes and axes were used to hack

their victims to death and clubs were also used to crush their skulls (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Human Rights Watch (2009) reported that “LRA waited until the time of Christmas festivities to carry out their devastating attacks, apparently choosing a moment when they would find the maximum number of people all together. The killings occurred not just in Congo but also in parts of Southern Sudan”. The concurrent nature of the attacks as well as the similar means used to slay their victims insinuated that the directive came from a central command structure. The ability of LRA to strike in two different countries at the same time signifies how prevalent terrorism is in Africa.

Tuaregs of Mali constitute 10 per cent of the population and have constantly protested of being marginalised by their government. This minute group of people have been the major source of instability in Mali and also played a role in Libya’s instability. Tuaregs longing for political and cultural recognition made them launch an offensive attack against their government which prompted civilians to flee the country. Tomoyla et al (2015:81) ascertained that “Tuaregs began an insurgency in 2012 shortly after returning from fighting Muammar Gaddafi in Libya using weapons they had smuggled from Libya”. Their return from Libya saw them coming in with large catchments of arms and ammunition, which made it easier for them to revolt.

Tuaregs carried out dozens of ambushes as well as suicide bombings and also made use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and landmines. These actions mainly targeted Malian and French troops though at times civilians would be caught up in the crossfire too (Human Rights Watch, 2015). IED’s attacks triggered a climate of fear for civilians as it killed and wounded some of them. Such widespread terrorist events being

witnessed in Africa show the prevalence and ongoing spread of terrorism in the continent.

2.3 Causes of Terrorism

As mentioned earlier on, terrorism is the use of violence against civilians to achieve political, social or religious goals (Kapitan, 2003:48). African countries have experienced and are still experiencing high levels of terrorism which have been linked to varying factors. For example, a high unemployment rate of the youth to be precise living in a country marred by administrative corruption creates a sense of helplessness and despair. It provokes hostile behaviour of violent repression which turns into organised aggression that targets people, institutions or the state (Mohammed, 2015). Below are some identified causes of terrorism in Africa.

2.3.1 Resource curse

African countries rich in oil or natural resources are failing to make the best out of them, they are less wealthy and are not competently run. These states have often shown poor economic performance compared to those without natural resources, like Japan, Korea etc. which are peninsulas with practically no exportable natural resources (Frankel, 2012:18). This phenomenon is known as the “resource curse”. Shaffer (2012:2) defines resource curse as “a tendency of natural-resource-exporting countries to underperform economically, have non-democratic governments as well as poor governance, and a higher propensity for involvement in conflicts”. It is more common in Africa. The abundance of natural resources has been beneficial for Africa to a certain degree, but it has also had ramifications for the continent. Access to oil has played a strategic role in

the ability to determine the viability of terrorist movements (Obi, 2013:60). These resources have seen the coming in of foreign investors as well as terrorist organizations. It is even worse if resources are located in conflict zones because it prolongs the duration of conflicts.

One of the most important commodities in the world is oil, which centres chiefly in the new scramble for Africa. Africa has some of the biggest reserves of oil, minerals and gas. African countries that have large quantities of oil include Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Angola and Nigeria (Siad, 2013). The abundance of oil on the continent has had its cons for Africans because it has been used to finance terrorist groups. Nigeria has been at the forefront as a global target of opportunity. Though Africa has oil, most of these countries do not have adequate security measures sufficient to protect these facilities. Goldwyn et al (2004:14) state that “the coastal nations of Central/West Africa have no significant maritime security to protect oil rigs and facilities”. The ongoing conflicts in Nigeria’s Niger Delta can also be viewed from a resource curse viewpoint. The Nigerian elites as well as rebels alike are motivated by greed to benefit from oil. This oil curse bedevilling Nigeria has blocked the attainment of democracy and promoted violent conflicts, which have contributed to the prevalence of terrorism (Obi, 2013:72). The fact that some of these rich oil countries do not have security makes it easy for terrorists to permeate the countries for oil and minerals. The siphoning of natural resources has led to the prevalence of terrorism.

Natural resources of a country are supposed to be enjoyed by every class of the population, but this is not the case in most African countries with vast mineral resources. Due to the corruption, bad governance and lack of transparency in most

African states only those with political influence and a few of their close associates reap these benefits. The misuse of funds has caused most people in such countries to live below the poverty line. Hence, as a means of survival and insuring basic living most people have resorted to illegal means and armed conflicts to obtain what they believe is rightfully theirs. For example groups in oil rich countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Sudan and Chad etc. have been using terrorism and armed conflicts as a possible way to deal with their problems.

El –Khawas et al (2007:143) denote that “for example, different groups in Angola and Sudan have been using armed conflicts and terrorist activities as the only viable means to address their plights”. American companies that are involved in the searching and production of oil should help the countries that they are operating from to develop. Their assistance would encourage use of oil revenue in structuring sustainable institutions that would benefit all. El-Khawas et al (2007:143) further state that “U.S assistance would stifle those factors that often foster destitution and force individuals to see terrorist organizations as the only resort to their plight as well as promote sustainable development in Africa”.

On the other hand, an abundance of resources can also lure in terrorists as it will help sustain their existence. For example, DRC has a wide range of resources which include copper, diamonds, cobalt, petroleum, zinc, gold and coltan. DRC is home to the largest Coltan reserves which are used to make computer microchips. Exploitation of coltan by foreigners, rebels and government officials alike haunts DRC. The US has been one of the biggest buyers of coltan. Lalji (2007) says “US government extensively hoards stores of this mineral, and the US Department of Defence classifies coltan as a strategic

mineral”. Exploitation of this mineral requires no technology and mineral expertise; it has fast become prey to invading terrorist groups. Legitimate mining is often confused with illegal rebel operations and much of the coltan illegally stolen from DRC is already in electronics all over the world (Lalji, 2007). Hence the host of terrorist groups in DRC remains a lasting presence as they have found their own revenue generating base that helps sustain them.

2.3.2 Lack of education and poverty

Lack of education and poverty in some African states has seen the rise of terrorism especially in affected countries like Sudan, Mali, and Eritrea etc. Bloom (2010: 49) states that “policymakers in the US and elsewhere have long operated under the assumption that terrorism is by and large a by-product of poverty and a lack of education”. Not only do some Africans lack education but they are brainwashed using religion such that they end up failing to understand what is right and wrong. It is especially the youth that is most affected. Lack of education and poverty are always connected with unlawful acts. In Africa it is easy for terrorism to prevail because individuals that dwell in poverty stricken states are more likely to commit terrorist crimes if they have lower wages or less education (Krueger et al, 2003:121).

Illiteracy and poverty hasten the wide spread of terrorism hence to reduce the prevalence of terrorism in Africa, poverty and lack of education need to be addressed. Bloom (2010:49) actually validates this by saying “war on terror is also war on poverty and war against illiteracy which are presumed to exacerbate the conditions from which terrorism emerges”. Terrorists groups find it easy to recruit people from poor countries

and their targets are mainly the illiterate youth. Though the masterminds of terrorism are well educated they however use the illiterate to carry out their activities. Most illiterate youth are found in Africa, leading to the prevalence of terrorism in Africa. Poverty and terrorism are connected; some researchers believed that poverty encouraged terrorism. Cox et al (2009:33) assert that “domestically, economic deprivation was assumed to create fertile ground of unemployed, underemployed, and generally angry impoverished citizens from which to draw adherents and suicide bombers”. If people live in such economic conditions they will turn to terrorism to find solace. Lack of education and poverty in Africa are closely linked to terrorists’ outburst; thus they hasten the prevalence of terrorism on the continent.

2.3.3 Information Age

The Information Age has led to the revolution of information technology which has decreased the costs of communication. It also affects the economy and society. Economically it boosts states’ growth and socially it has brought people closer together through the use of the internet, cell phones etc. (Nye Jr, 2002:7). Information age has also changed the way information is disseminated. The most vital tool for disseminating information is the internet. The internet when used creatively can be used to build coalitions that share the same ideas, norms, ethics and values (Bailey, 2010:21). Information age has created change in our daily lives and it now can bring about faster resolutions to problems. Inversely it has caused more problems especially the prevalence of terrorism.

Information Age has prompted cyber warfare as well as cyber terrorism. Colarik et al (2008:13) define cyber terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated attacks by sub national groups or clandestine agents, or individuals against information and computer systems, computer programs, and data that result in violence against non-combatant targets”. Cyber terrorism is mainly used to instil fear and even harm anyone in the surrounding area. Cyber terrorism is meant to either cause serious losses or generate high publicity. Some terrorist groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been exploiting the cyberspace as their weapon of recruiting new members. They have used the internet to recruit more people successfully. Stories of men and women, Africans included, travelling to the Middle East to join ISIS have been making the headlines (Lohrmann, 2015). Apart from recruiting, the group has also been hacking websites.

Terrorism that occurred during the 1970's and 1980's was ideologically based and pursued identifiable goals. In the 1990's and beyond, terrorism has been dominated by Islamic fundamentalists who have more abstract and absolute intentions (Mair, 2005:52). Terrorist groups are no longer unified but now have vast networks that are largely autonomous. A good example is the Al-Qaeda that has functional networks in over 60 states and also shows the changes in terms of terrorist methods used (Mair, 2005:52). Scholars uphold that state of affairs in failed states welcomes terrorist networks, and terrorist organizations take advantage of the lack of power and disorganized circumstances.

Terrorist networks gain control over territory in a failed state and negotiate with the authorities of the failed state by providing them with services during time of conflict.

Absence of a central authority will allow terrorist groups to decide on any action, and they will not be legally responsible within that territory for any action they take (Ray et al, 2002:103). Moreover, terrorist groups locate failed states for their operations, because every state is entitled to its sovereignty and other powerful states cannot easily meddle in terrorist activities and cannot easily take counter- measures against them. Terrorists can build up support by using their resources to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of official state power, enabling terrorism to grow in Africa.

2.3.4 Rise of Arab nationalism versus Western universalism

The world at large has witnessed the rise of Arab nationalism which cannot be easily dismissed or ignored and is constantly at loggerheads with the Western universalism. Khalidi (1991: vii) defined Arab nationalism as “the idea that the Arabs are people linked by special bonds of language, history and religion, and their political organisation should in some way reflect this reality throughout the Arabic-speaking world”. Their aim as Arabs is to function with a high degree of cohesion regardless of one’s location. Scruton (2014:1) state that “Western universalism as Huntington calls it, sees the whole world in terms of values that have their origin, meaning, and natural climate in what is in fact only the small part of it”. Other scholars like Xie (2011:139) state that “Western universalism assumes simultaneously that all cultures are equal but Western culture is more equal than others, because, it alone has provided the language and place in which this equality of all cultures can be manifested and thought”. Western universalism upholds the superiority of Western culture over other non-Western cultures. The differences between Islamic and Western philosophy have had effects on the nature of

politics. It has also made people to be aware of their surroundings and other people. This conscientiousness in civilizations has led to the prevalence of terrorism in general.

Arabs are of the view that Western ideologies have failed to promote the well-being of Arab societies. Western cultures consequently penetrated and eroded Islamic values, beliefs and practices in most Arabic states. The new political system where Western universalism is dominant has threatened the safety of Arabs (Nehme, 2003:64). Thus, the Arab world has taken it upon themselves to consolidate their beliefs, values, and practices, social and ethnic integrity. All they want is to Islamise Western modernity. The relations between the Arab and the West have always been antagonistic. Huntington (2007:183) noted that “some inter-civilization relations are more conflict prone than others, with the most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and the West”. Since the end of the Cold War, Islamism has risen and challenged the neo-liberal order which is entirely Western. Thus Mair (2005:53) is of the view that ‘the attractiveness of Islam as the only existing, comprehensive alternative model to the neo-liberal order, on the other hand, partly explains the rise of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism’. Religion to Arabs is now a force driving as an ideology for increased terrorism. Sub-Saharan Africa is being engulfed by the rising and spreading of terrorism which is mostly privatised violence. It is privatised violence because it is a conflict between the West and Muslims and not purely African.

The Arab nationalism versus Western universalism in Africa has been witnessed in the infighting in Nigeria. The fighting is between Boko Haram who are Muslim followers and Christians who embraced Western universalism. Nigeria is the most populous African country and houses the largest Muslims; about 65 million of the population are Muslims.

Boko Haram members find their identity and loyalty in religion, whereby Islamic values define them over ethnicity. Huntington (2007:98) talks of Islamic fundamentalist movement “as a way of coping with the experience of chaos, loss of identity, meaning and secure social structures created by the rapid introduction of modern social and political patterns, secularism, scientific culture and economic development”. This is the Western universalism being fought against by Boko Haram in Nigeria. They have taken out their anger on Christians. Tensions between Boko Haram and Christians are persistent, political rivalries are constant. At one point the U.S encouraged a former Christian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, to seek a third term in office and deny the northern region dominated by Muslims its right to lead. Not surprisingly, Osama Bin Laden also named Nigeria as a target for their Islamic revolution (Harbeson et al, 2009:296). We see Arab and Western leaders bringing their conflicts to Africa. Such incidences contributed to the prevalence of terrorism in Africa.

2.3.5 Remittance purposes

Terrorism in Africa has been a part of its history though its significance was raised after the September 11 attack when it was labelled as the “soft under-belly for global terrorism” (Hussein, 2015:7). A multiple of forces combined led Africa to be termed as a “soft-belly” for terrorism. These forces range from, chronic poverty, porous borders, and weak and failing states, political frustration, repression and religion. This creates an environment suitable for terrorism to thrive and offers terrorists physical and financial safe havens. Hussein (2015:8) further expounds that “the existence of financial safe havens allows an estimated US\$125 billion to move through informal remittances across the continent each year”. Since Africa is a poor continent, they depend on these

remittances for their sustainability. Terrorists find it easy to exploit the continent as both parties benefit. Terrorists work hand in hand with criminal syndicates in Africa as their financial bases. Hence terrorism is prevalent in Africa.

In order to generate more revenue they engage in kidnapping for ransom purposes and also carry out human trafficking, among other acts. Africa is an important arena for the widespread of terrorism because of its thriving illegal diamond trade taking place in the West (Aderemi, 2010:139). Aderemi (2010:139) states that “terrorist organizations including al-Qaeda were known to be clandestine patrons of these markets. It was reported that al-Qaeda has at least indirect clandestine networks with links to Muammar Qaddafi, the RUF in Sierra Leone and the then Liberian president Charles Taylor”. There is no way where terrorism could not have grown and expanded in Africa when its very own leaders partook in illegal dealings with these groups. They would benefit from the remittances they got from these shady dealings, allowing the expansion of terrorism.

2.4 IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF STATES

Terrorism is a notable threat to political and economic stability of states; it can weaken a country and forcibly make changes in the government (Lutz *et al*, 2014:525). Africa has experienced significant levels of terrorist activities and these have had intense consequences for the continent. African states are confronted by corruption, poverty, illiteracy and government’s inability to deal with terrorism. This has actually made regimes to fail in coming up with solutions to deal with these problems, contributing to instability. Terrorism can have an impact on electoral outcomes, voting behaviours of electorates and the entire government (Williams *et al*, 2012:3). The spreading of terrorism in Africa in the 1990’s saw countries like Algeria, Egypt and Sudan being

affected first. Terrorism in Algeria led to the annulment of their elections. Cilliers (2003:94) states that “tens of thousands of people died and several times this number were wounded, displaced from their homes or disappeared in the events that followed the cancellation of the 1992 elections in Algeria”. Thus terrorism does impact the stability of states because in the case of Algeria the state has been affected by civil wars since then.

Terrorists also try to change existing regimes in affected countries as a way of trying to foster their demands. In 1995 there were attempts to assassinate the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Al Itihad, a terrorist group, was blamed for the attack (Cilliers, 2003:94). It is clear that terrorists are capable of doing anything that would have them recognised even if it means destabilising states. Onuoha et al (2013) stipulates that “politics in Nigeria, especially electoral politics, is defined and approached by politicians as a do or die affair, or warfare”. Thus politicians become so desperate to consolidate power such that they recruit specialists in violence, terrorists to unleash terror on the civilians. Such acts greatly affect political stability and lead to state failure.

Globalization has also served the growth of terrorism and played a role in the political instability of states. It is globalization that diminished the importance of state boundaries and provided an environment for easy transportation of weapons. Since globalization there has been a proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa. Onuoha et al (2013) states that “out of approximately 500 million illicit weapons in circulation worldwide in 2004, it was estimated that about 100 million are in sub-Saharan Africa, with 10 million concentrated in the West African sub-region”. Unfortunately more than

half of these weapons are in the hands of non-state actors. In Nigeria the proliferation is mainly caused by the political dynamics of the state and is also compounded by globalization (Onuoha et al, 2013). The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has only fuelled terrorist activities which in turn have caused problems in having sustainable security.

Terrorist groups are at the centre stage of violent conflicts in Africa. Terrorism has only served to leave a trail of political instability in affected African states. Looking at Mauritania, which is amongst the fragile states, it is affected by political instability due to rising levels of insecurity emanating from violent extremism and cross-border terrorist activities (Boukhars, 2012:3). Mauritania directly shares a border with Algeria, Mali, and Senegal. Algeria and Mali are states that have experienced terrorism. Terrorism not only causes damage in countries where it is most active but neighbouring states are also victims of these acts. Mauritania's fragility also affects political stability of the region. Boukhars (2012:3) affirm that "the increasing reach and influence of organized crime in both state apparatuses and the suspected links between terrorist organizations and insurgent ethnic groups threaten to reverse fragile democratic gains and hard-won peace building progress in countries like Mali, Niger and Mauritania". The presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the country has played a pivotal role in the states' fragility. The AQIM in June of 2005 committed a fatal attack which killed 15 Mauritanian soldiers and wounded 39 in the north-eastern part (Boukhars, 2012:11).

For example, Boko Haram is an extremist Islamic group which has strong ties with Al-Qaeda. Boko Haram wishes to get rid of Western education and establish Sharia law in Nigeria (Oriyommi, 2011). The group has carried out some of the most heinous terrorist

activities. As mentioned before in 2011, August 26, Boko Haram was responsible for blowing up a car bomb at the UN head office in Abuja, killing 23 and injuring 81 people. In 2012 it carried out the worst single day attack killing approximately 185 people using bombs and guns (National Consortium, 2012). The group was in 2014 ranked fourth out of ten countries affected by terrorism by the Global terrorism index. The Global Terrorism Index (2014:19) states that “in 2013 alone the group killed about 1,587 people and claimed responsibility for 90 percent of terrorist acts in Nigeria”. Boko Haram operating in North Nigeria has been causing chaos, instilling fear in people and unleashing massive violence. Its presence has actually impacted the way Nigeria is being run. It has put the government to the test and is even affecting their economy immensely. The presence of Boko Haram has caused political instability by forcing mass movement of people who wish to settle in an area with less violence (Gillespie, 2015). An influx of these people into other provinces has only escalated ethnic tensions which destabilise the running of a state.

Prevalence of terrorism also impacts the economic stability of African states. It has hampered foreign investments and the tourism sector that usually generates more revenue for African countries. Terrorist activities impact negatively on economic sectors like tourism; agriculture etc., if a state suffers from terrorist attacks the likelihood is that there will be a drop in the above mentioned sectors. Terrorism costs that are incurred by states are categorised into two and these are primary or direct costs (loss of life, injury and damage to infrastructure) and secondary or indirect costs (disruptions to an economy because of terror which leads to increased security costs, changed

consumption patterns, decreased FDI, trade and tourism) (Global Terrorism Index, 2014:45). Countries facing terrorism have suffered the brink of failing economies. For instance the terrorist activities broke into civil wars that bedevilled Algeria, led to economic stagnation and unemployment crisis (Cilliers, 2003:94). Terrorist organizations usually have political objectives and to accomplish these goals they carry out attacks that will crumble a state's economic base.

Kydd et al (2006:50) is of the view that "attacks on economic targets can be part of an attrition strategy that is designed to wear down a government and reduce public support". Terrorists mainly target foreign investment in Africa because they are the easy targets and a source of economic base for Africa. Hence Lutz et al (2014:526) state that "foreign investments have been a logical target since it can contribute to employment, tax revenues and an improved economy". These attacks on foreign investments will forcefully make them to leave and once they do the concerned country's economy spirals downhill which impacts the stability of states. To make matters worse it becomes difficult for the state to attract new investors.

Governments always suffer more when terrorist attacks are carried out as they have to bear the financial burden of these acts which would have destroyed infrastructure or taken people's lives. Mostly a state's budget is always affected as funding ends up being diverted from its intended task (Global terrorism Index, 2014:46). This dampens the economic stability of states and halts progress too. A country's Gross Domestic Product decreases if FDI and trade are affected. Terrorism also forces companies and investors to spend more money since they have to raise salaries for employees who are at risk of working in countries or areas affected by terrorism. This subsequently leads to

companies shutting down and seeking investment opportunities elsewhere thus crumbling the economic stability of a state.

Also the proliferation of small arms and light weapons fuels terrorists who illicitly traffic natural resources such as oil and minerals. It negatively impacts economic stability of states causing a reduction in trade and direct foreign investment (Malam, 2014:262). Once investors flee, the economy crumbles. Gillespie (2015) states that “according to the World Investment report 2013, FDI flows into Nigeria dropped by 21% in just one year”. This affected Nigerian trading as some parts of the country were left with an economic depletion. Terrorism activities have significant costs on the government by using different methods like the destroying of infrastructure and limiting trade. Spill-over costs into neighbouring countries are also incurred as a result of terrorism. Unexpected expenditures are also incurred when funds have to be diverted for security measures (Enders, 2006:2).

Tourism is another economic sector that generates revenue for most African states and is also the targeted area by terrorists. Cilliers (2003:94) states that “58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians were massacred in Luxor, Upper Egypt in 1997, damaging that country’s vital tourist industry”. The attack in Egypt was followed by a 53 percent decline in tourist’s revenue (Gurr, et al, 2000:88). Tunisia also has been plagued by terrorist attacks and this has had negative impact on the economy. The country has no bulk oil reservoirs that can generate revenue which can safeguard its economy from terrorist shocks (Labidi, 2014). For instance, Labidi (2014) stated that “tourism is a pillar of the Tunisian economy, tourism revenues cover more than 50 percent of the country’s trade

deficit and employs 12 percent of the labour force”. Terrorists can intentionally target tourists so as to realize ideological goals and weaken the government.

In another recent terror attack which took place on the 26th of June 2015 on tourists in Tunisia, 38 people were left dead and 39 others wounded; amongst the dead were British, German, French and Belgian nationalities. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claimed responsibility (Smith-Spark et al, 2015). Earlier on an attack on tourists was carried out in Tunisia’s Bardo Museum where 21 people were killed with 17 of them being foreign nationals. The Islamic State (ISIS) declared they were responsible for the massacre in Bardo museum (Byrne et al, 2015). Such an attack has been a major blow on the country after its endeavours to resuscitate its economy since the end of the Arab Spring. Such attacks negatively affect the consumers spending patterns as they are forced to avoid some public spaces like touring sites that are prone to terrorist attacks. It reduces expenditure and lessens some economic activities from taking place. A terrorist attack on tourists leads countries to have more visa restrictive policies and this reduces the number of people who visit, reducing the income generated from tourism.

Terrorism in Africa has been deterrent to the economic stability of states; the availability of oil and gas on the continent has lured terrorism. The abundance of raw energy has been used by terrorist groups as a way of achieving their political goals and also to destroy the economy from inside. The Economist (2013) denotes that “on January 16 three dozen heavily armed Islamic extremists seized control of a gas plant in the Saharan desert taking 650 workers hostage. The hostage takers were said to have planned to blow up the pipelines, which would have meant a significant drop in Algeria’s exports”. An attack of this magnitude if successful causes more harm than good and the

consequences are felt more on an economic level and it puts strain on the government leading to both political and economic instability in Algeria.

Terrorism and the global war on terror changed the geopolitical landscape in Africa. Niger Delta has a deadly combination of poverty, joblessness, ostracism, environmental glitches and locals who see few benefits from oil production. This drove a militant uprising which not only caused havoc for the Nigeria's oil production but has also impeded the price of oil at an international level. Nigeria is amongst the world's oil producing countries, but terrorist acts by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have disabled the Delta and dropped the production by 25 percent. Boas (2007:8) denotes that "in April 2008, as a consequence of attacks on oil pipelines in Isaka and Abonema in Rivers state, oil prices crossed US\$117 a barrel for the first time". The group had nothing to lose and so they made it a point to destroy the oil facilities as this would coerce the government to meet their demands. The group's act greatly affected the economic stability of not only Nigeria but also other African states as oil prices rose and governments were forced to spend more than they had anticipated. A change in oil price affects the pricing of other basic commodities straining African economies that are already struggling.

2.5 STATE FAILURE

The term failed state was first coined by Zartman (1995:1) as "a situation where the structure, authority, law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new". The term 'failed state' implies that the fundamental functions of the state are not provided for due to various reasons like conflict or foreign intervention. Rotberg (2004: 5) points out that "failed states are tense, deeply conflicted,

dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions”. An idea of state failure has to be comprehended from a viewpoint of what a state is because, failed states are characterised by what they lack (Clapham, 2000). Weber in Draghici (1989:13) defines a state as “a human community that successfully claims for itself the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory with determined boundaries”. Migdal (1988:34) defined state as “an organization composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule-making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its ways”. Failed states have been reduced to breeding grounds of instability, mass influx and whose population can be easily killed and are above all exporters of terrorism.

In failed states government troops often fight armed forces and are also coupled with conflicts in their communities. A state that is failing has several traits; the most frequent trait is the loss of having direct power over its territory. Other attributes of failed states include the incapacity to provide sound public services, and the failure to interact with other states as a full member of the international community (Hough et al 2015:113). Authorities in a failed state face two or more revolts. There is no single route that leads to failure, in some instances states plummet into failure as a result of severe natural disasters, political instability or economic crisis. A leadership mistake across history also plays a role in causing state failure. Some leaders have with the aid of their cronies led their states either to collapse or showed possible collapse. Examples of such leaders include Somalia’s Siad Barre and Liberia’s Charles Taylor (Rotberg, 2005:22).

Failed states with weak structures are in no position to provide adequate security for their citizens. Sadly the Western world only shows interest to futile states when they terrorize the safety of industrialized countries like Afghanistan (Miller, 2012). Failed states are a result of different factors like political, economic, social and military. When a state has serious economic crisis it ends up having poverty issues too, this leads to internal disputes which ultimately weakens a state. If that state lacks international support from financial institutions it could possibly result in state failure. Politically, when people disagree with their government the end result is usually domestic wars and possible spill-overs to neighbouring countries (Halilovic et al, 2012:6). This can cause tensions between countries. In most situations main causes for state failure are linked with civil violence and the continuous rising of warring non-state groups.

Failed states have some common characteristics. Rotberg (2002) asserts the characteristics as “a rise in criminal and political violence; loss of control over their territory; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural hostilities; civil war; use of terror against their own citizens, weak institutions, corruption and declining levels of GDP per capita”. The road to state failure has no distinct cause but multiple facets that are either internally or externally brewed.

2.5.1 Causes of State Failure

State failure is not a new phenomenon; nations have been failing ever since the world was created. State failure is characterised by corruption, constant violence, greedy government etc. There is no universal cause to state failure, some states fail due to natural disasters. Others fail because of political exploitation whilst others fail due to

protests and dissenting behaviour from its citizens. Identified below are some of the general causes that lead to state failure in Africa.

2.5.1.1 Ethnic differences

An ethnic group is a group of people who identify themselves on the basis of having a common nationality or sharing of cultural traits, religion or language (Nwaogaidu, 2012:282). Brutal conflicts experienced in Africa between ethnic groups have been in existence throughout history. Ethnic differences have stirred violence that has led some African states to fail. For example Nigeria is a multi-ethnic state that is deeply marred by ethnic violence that has impeded the country from developing. Nwaogaidu (2012:282) says that “the struggle for scarce resources by different ethnic groups has compounded the ethnic discords, and increased the experiences of inequality differentials among ethnic groups; pushing some groups to mobilize themselves for economic and political struggles in Nigeria”. Such violence that erupts as a result of ethnic differences also leads states into collapsing or failure.

Having groups within a state that feel like they are being marginalised evokes violence which if not abated slowly but surely makes a state to fail. Regimes that once cared for their people have become partisan. Once the people feel marginalised they give up on the social contract that once unified them (Rotberg, 2002). In such scenarios the citizens are most likely to shift their loyalty to warlords causing anarchy and subconsciously promoting the rise and expansion of terrorist groups. Hence the end result will be state failure.

Internal conflicts seriously violate human rights; a failed state's civil wars may ignite extensive human rights violations that destabilize a country. Failed states are becoming one of the most significant causes of humanitarian disasters. Countries that would have suffered from internal war as a result of ethnic clashes suffer from the most humanitarian disaster as well as possible spill-overs to other countries for example, the Rwandan genocide that killed a lot of people due to ethnic conflicts between the Hutu's and the Tutsi's. The Rwandan genocide spilled over into the Democratic Republic of Congo because they had related tribal fault lines (Yoo, 2011:107). The consequences of civil wars continue for years after the war ends and the end result is always state failure.

2.5.1.2 Long-serving leadership

Long-serving leadership has become the order of the day in some African states. In some states leaders have clung to power such that the office of the presidency is now viewed as a lifetime career. African states that are under long-serving leadership have had to endure a type of leadership that is practiced in a way which amounts to a system of personal rule, and this has led to political instability and mass protests erupting. Okafor (2013:56) states that "leadership and political activities in Africa are carried out in a manner that amounts to a system of personal rule-an institution- less type of governance. A major consequence of this kind of personal politics in Africa has been relative political instability". Political instability has been experienced in countries like Libya, Rwanda, and Sudan etc. the masses have reacted to dictatorial leadership and took to the streets. If political instability is not contained, state failure is usually the end result.

For example Jose Eduardo dos Santos the President of Angola has also been in power for 36 years since 1979. Amutabi et al (2013:5) stipulate that “Eduardo dos Santos has instituted a dictatorship in which his word is law. He has consolidated power and controls a lot of money from oil”. Angolan citizens have endured stifled freedom of speech and press, torture from the police force, corruption by officials and impunity. The economy is in shambles whilst Jose Eduardo’s daughter Isabel is a multi-billionaire. Lamare (2013) notes that “according to the non-profit Human Rights Foundation, Jose dos Santos is considered to be one of Africa’s chief human rights violators and most corrupt tyrants”. With a leader like Dos Santos, the country has been suffering from a dwindling economy and is prone to fail.

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was one of the long-serving leaders; he ruled Libya for 42 years with an iron fist. When he assumed power in 1969, his fellow statesmen regarded him as the rightful candidate for the post; however he changed his leadership style and became the most brutal leader (Senauth, 2013). For the four decades that he was in power, Libya’s policies were based on Gaddafi’s ideologies (Blanchard et al, 2011: 6). He was so brutal that many people lost their lives, with the worst incident that took the lives of 1,200 prisoners in Tripoli. Eventually, people grew tired of Gaddafi’s dictatorship and revolted. Their revolt was inspired by the Arab Spring. The initial protest began modestly on 15 February 2011 as a local affair in Benghazi; it was there that a lawyer, Fathi Teibril, had been arrested for having the audacity to question the government’s account of what had occurred 15 years ago when 1,200 prisoners had been killed in prison in Tripoli. His attempt to get answers led to his arrest. People protested for his release and the authorities responded with water cannons, teargas and rubber coated

steel bullets as a way to disperse them (Tripp, 2013:63). The end result was resorting to taking arms up against Gaddafi.

Army units loyal to Gaddafi laid a blockade to the towns with tanks, artillery and air craft; these forces were much better equipped and trained than the rebels, and it meant the Libyan rebels stood little chance. The rebels and Gaddafi were engaged in a conflict that appeared to be a zero sum game; each recognized that the survival of one was only to be bought with the destruction of the other (Tripp, 2013:63). The rebels managed to capture and kill Gaddafi. The death of Gaddafi was supposed to bring stability in Libya. However, this has not been the case. It has brought rippling effects such that the post-Gaddafi state is doomed to fail. A General National Congress (GNC) was the elected body that emerged from the July 2012 election. It faced some challenges of rebuilding state institutions, boosting economic prospects, integrating the militias into a unified police or military force and securing its permeable borders (Gerges, 2014: 343). Consolidating the Libyan state has been a handful for those who took over. After the Libyan revolution there were security risks due to Libya's uncontrolled armed militias, which did not restrict their operations to within national borders. There were clashes between the militias themselves as well as between militias and government forces, thereby destabilizing and undermining the attempts of the post-Gaddafi state at nation building (El-Katiri, 2012).

The international community provided little help in trying to consolidate the Libyan post-Gaddafi state. Despite the support that anti-Gaddafi protestors received from NATO and the UN to topple Gaddafi, thereafter there was little material assistance to stabilize the post-Gaddafi state (Chivvis et al, 2014). Terrorist violence became a problematic issue

for the Libyan state, with groups such as Al-Qaeda having established bases in Libya after infiltrating its borders. The international community has observed the situation without intervening, under the guise of respecting Libyan sovereignty.

Major obstacles in consolidating the post-Gaddafi Libyan state are within Libyan borders, the lack of a capable national army has left Libya vulnerable to exploitation by international criminal and terrorist groups that are now active in the region. The substantial challenge in consolidating the post-Gaddafi state was that of ongoing socio-economic and political factors that led people in Libya to revolt against the Gaddafi regime in the first place. These socio-economic and political factors have not been improved and further serve to foment instability (El-Katiri, 2012). Already the country is showing signs of failure. All these events, if they are allowed to continue unabated, will plunge the country into a failed state.

Recently, Burkina Faso also ousted its long-serving leader President Blaise Compaore, who had ruled the country since 1987-2014. When he left office, he was now the longest-serving head of state in his country. During his time in office, he abused his incumbency powers. In 1991, major contending opposition parties boycotted the elections. The reason behind the boycott was lack of fairness and the brutality unleashed on citizens (Eizenga, 2015: 66). Similar incidences that had led to election boycotts saw Compaore being re-elected three consecutive times, 1998, 2005 and 2010. He had prior to these terms in office changed presidential limits. Compaore and his party also controlled the Judiciary.

Eizenga (2015:72) states that “under Compaore, Burkina Faso’s judiciary was weak, lacked independence and continuously ruled in favour of the government on constitutional provisions”. The judiciary arm should be impartial and hold all politicians and government officials accountable when they break the law. Instead in Burkina Faso, some clientelistic relationships helped form patronage networks that pervaded even the judiciary. Media coverage was also limited and there was widespread citizen repression. Presidential elections that were set for 2015, made thousands of people to protest. They were against Compaore having a fifth term in office (Hagberg, 2014). Compaore tried to forcefully amend the constitution and seek another term in office. His act escalated demonstrations until he was forced to resign in October of 2014. Compaore’s resignation ignited sparks for more instability. There were power struggles taking place and waves of violent unrest. There was uncertainty and confusion when different military leaders started claiming to be running the state. Curfews were put in place and borders were closed (Smith, 2014). The ongoing unrest is at risk of failing the state.

2.5.1.3 Corruption

Corruption has existed from time immemorial in all countries but has been common in Africa because of its abundance in natural resources. Despite its richness it still is the most underdeveloped continent due to corruption. Corruption in Africa became prevalent and serious when most of the nations had gained their independence. Worst corruption cases have been widespread in undemocratic dictatorial or long-serving leaderships post-independence. Jain (2001:73) defined corruption as “an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game”. The existence of checks and balance plays the role of decreasing

excessive leadership powers and also helps to reduce corruption. However this has not been the case in African states as corruption cases are on the rise with detrimental consequences.

For example, Marques de Morais (2012) attests that “the Angolan Presidency is the epicentre of corruption. Sonangol is the biggest company in the country and the state’s major source of revenue. Sonangol is the most important factor in ensuring the survival of President Dos Santos’s regime in the world of finance, politics and diplomacy as the main source of illegal self-enrichment for the top state officials”. The privatization of the presidency in Angola shows the way in which Dos Santos steadily weakened the state and its institutions to focus more power around himself. Such corruption as that in Angola plunged the country into failure despite its wealth in oil.

Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, also known as DRC, also plundered the country’s wealth; his regime that lasted from 1965-1997 was considered as one of the most corrupt on the continent. When he left office Mobutu had changed state structures into instruments that he used to plunder and enrich himself and his loyal followers. Mbaku (2010:51) attests that “Mobutu embezzled as much as U.S \$5 billion from a country that remains one of the poorest in the world”. During the reign of Mobutu corruption was so endemic that it swept over all the arms of government. Military officials appropriated resources meant for troops for their own use. Judges gave rulings on cases on the basis of one’s riches, social and or political status and not based on the evidence presented in court. Nearly all public servants with authority engaged in corruption to produce wealth for the elite (Mbaku, 2010:52). Mobutu had a large group of followers among the politicians and civil servants, with whom he shared the spoils of success. He went to the extent of

encouraging corruption which he deemed was a privilege for holding office, but he warned them not to take too much (Funderburk, 2012:9). For Mobutu to be able to control the populace he became a despot who relied on a one party system. He used censorship, intimidated, imprisoned, tortured and even executed the citizens. Mobutu and his government were described as a kleptocracy, society ruled by thieves (Funderburk, 2012:10). When he left power he subsequently left Zaire a failed state.

2.5.1.4 Neo-patrimonialism

Neo-patrimonialism entails the concentration of power, giving of personal favours and the mishandling of state resources. Gazibo (2012:2) articulates that “neo-patrimonialism refers to configurations where the state, while claiming to be modern, combines public and private norms. It is a system whereby rulers use state resources for personal benefit and to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population”. Neo-patrimonialism entails the lack of legal standards. Also public and private interests are always at loggerheads. There is the practice of nepotism in recruiting civil servants and government officials. Some African leaders prosper on chaos and disorder thus it causes their states to fail. Neo-patrimonialism portrays African states as having unusual political formations, failing to perform expected functions and lastly as criminal enterprises (Wai, 2012:131).

The practice of political patronage has led to the outlawing of the state which has served as an obstruction to the development of African countries. Most African states were functional when they were bestowed to them at independence but have since been lowered to dysfunctional entities subsequently leading them to state failure.

Rotberg (2002) denotes that “destructive decisions by individual leaders have almost always paved the way to state failure. Mobutu Sese Seko’s three plus decades of kleptocratic rule sucked Zaire dry until he was deposed in 1997”. Also in Sierra Leone, former president Siaka Stevens steadily ransacked the country during his leadership which ran from 1967-1985.

These leaders as patrimonialists, with the aid of their cronies approved and supported the greed of others, thus ruining their states and failing them. Neo-patrimonialism that is high in Africa has weakened state institutions through corruption and illegal business dealings. These activities have hastened the condition for weakness and instability, in turn leading to state failure (Wai, 2012:132). Neo-patrimonialism entails long serving leadership and the longer a leader clings to power the less innovative the government is, impacting on delivery of services which in turn slides the country into state failure.

2.5.1.5 Globalization

Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among people of different countries. States have withered because of globalization; both strong and weak states are now operating in this environment (Pfaller et al, 2005:1). Globalization has unlocked the doors, exposing the world into many security and societal dangers. It has offered both the good and bad effects of it. Globalization has in its positive effects opened a pathway whereby states and regions can now access health and food aid. Negatively it has opened a route where lethal weapons can be transported. Also it has contributed in societal displacement (Hailu, 2010:47). The negative effects had led some states to be

pariah states and some are not only pariah states but have actually plunged into failed states. Globalization has not been fairly beneficial to all countries.

It has been in some instances a significant contributory factor to poverty in developing countries especially in Africa. Mkandawire (2004:147) attests that “with globalization, state capacity has been severely eroded”. Most countries have been reduced to a level of dependency leading them to be more vulnerable and susceptible to state failure. State failure persists because it is functional to a particular group or groups and it is deliberately reproduced amid efforts of restoring the state. Globalization problematizes and weakens states in the sense that state boundaries are no longer relevant. Globalization has exposed African states to external forces and the leadership has lost direct control even if the states are regarded as sovereign (Pfaller et al, 2005:1). Globalization does lead to state failure that has permitted the coming in of external forces since countries can no longer control their borders the way they see it fit. Globalization has created a gateway for both good and bad things.

2.5.1.6 Popular uprisings

Popular uprising is an act of opposition using violent means, carried out by many people in one area of a country against those in power (Howard, 2010:16). Popular uprisings have been taking over Africa. The economic crisis that took place in the 1980's erupted popular discontent in most African states that were led by autocratic regimes. Uprisings have become so popular in Africa such that scholars like Gill et al (2013:61) have termed it “Africa's second independence”. This behaviour is shown by way of staging demonstrations or strikes. Howard (2010:16) hypothesizes that “occurrences of strikes,

demonstrations and riots will have an impact on the process of state failure”. African states become susceptible to state failure when they allow protests and acts of strike to destabilise the government and the state. Efforts to quell uprising acts also destabilises a state and can plunge it into failure in the sense that resources meant for the citizens are diverted to repressing such behaviour (Howard, 2010:16). The world depends on states to protect its territories and limit anarchy from spreading. Thus if a state has failed it does not only threaten stability in its territory but also affects stability on a global scale. State failure in Africa is seen as more of a self-inflicted crisis (Kreijen, 2004:2). Apart from being an inflicted crisis, it results in spill-overs and state failure to countries that would have succumbed to popular uprisings.

For example the 2011 Arab Spring saw popular uprisings in the North and these affected countries like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. These uprisings in the named countries had something in common, and that was regimes that had ruled for over two decades prior 2011. There was no possibility of changing these regimes through conducting democratic elections (Mbeki, 2015:x). The uprisings affected the political and economic well-being of these states. This wave of uprisings saw the killing of Gaddafi and the ousting of Ali and Mubarak. Since the death of Gaddafi, Libya is still fighting, trying to find a way out of the deadlock. Egypt’s economy and political situation are still unstable and have no prospects of getting better any time soon (Altomonte et al, 2014:3). Tunisia survived the uprising and managed to navigate the aftermath of the Arab Spring (Sebe, 2014). As for Egypt and Libya, both countries are on the path to state failure. Thus popular uprisings can either help bring the desired change like in the case of Tunisia or lead a state on the path to failure as in the case of Egypt and Libya.

2.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.6.1 The Clash of Civilizations

Religion is now at the forefront of politics. According to Haynes (2011:1) “religion has proved to be the strongest source of identity for people”. Most terrorist acts carried out today are a result of clashes between people of different religions. Though primary sources of clashes were either ideologically or economically based, present day they are religion-based. Thus, the Clash of Civilizations offers an explanation for these conflicts. The continuous failure of Somalia’s state has been perpetuated by the existence of the terrorist group, Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is an Islamic sect with a strong Muslim identity. The group seeks to eradicate the transitional government which is pro-western and has the backing of an African Union sponsored force.

Huntington’s main argument is that differences among civilizations are not only real, they are basic. Civilizations are distinguished by history, language, culture, tradition and above all religion (Huntington, 1993:25). Civilization disparities can never vanish easily, they have been in existence for a long time. They are actually more original than ideologies and less susceptible to change. These differences actually identify individuals the way they are. Huntington (1993:25) further argues that “the world is becoming a smaller place, interactions between people of different civilizations are increasingly intensifying civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations”.

The fault line between Islamic and Christians is the most prevalent clash of civilizations with Islamic radicalization being the new religious terrorism that strengthens the theory

of clash of civilizations. Islamic extremism played a role in the September 11 attack by Al-Qaeda on the United States. Benjamin et al, 2002:39) argue that “the Al-Qaeda attack was an act of consummate religious devotion. Those who committed it were deeply pious. They expressed their motives in in-disputably religious terms and they saw themselves carrying out the will of God”. Revival of religion has provided identity that rises above national boundaries and unites civilizations (Huntington, 1993:26). According to Huntington (1996:109) “Muslims in massive numbers were simultaneously turning toward Islam as a source of identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power, and hope, hope epitomized in the slogan “Islam is the solution”. This Islamic resurgence in its extent and profundity is the latest phase in the adjustment of Islamic civilization to the West, an effort to find solutions, not in Western ideologies, but in Islam”. The escalating conflicts between Islamic and Western or Christian civilizations are the greatest antagonistic clashes in history.

The attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and beyond its borders is a typical example of how civilizations can clash. Also the clashes taking place between Boko Haram an Islamist group and Christians in Nigeria is religion based. Clashes of civilization between Islam and Christians are being used as justification measures to rise up against secular government rule. Olcott et al, (2009) are of the view that “ to make a declaration of the fact that unbelievers and the government are oppressors; that they are connected with Russians, Americans and Jews to whose music they are dancing: and they don’t think about their people”. This suggests that any regime that is not in line with Islamic teachings is illegitimate and a state that has a considerable Muslim population has to be liberated (Cox et al, 2009:27).

The main idea for Huntington is that post- Cold War world will be defined by a clash of different and incompatible civilizations. Cox et al (2009:26) assert that “for Huntington, relationships between states will not be predominantly defined by realist notions of power relations or liberalist adherence to international institutions and international law.” It actually suggests that the existence of conflicts or cooperation, either way will be determined by similarities and differences in culture. Huntington (1993:40) state that “ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets and the separation of church and state have little significance outside the West”. He believes that these efforts embedded in Western values to promote these ideas actually cause a backlash against humanity. Trying to advance democracy does not guarantee political stability as long as there are conflicts among civilizations.

Huntington is also of the view that globalization has separated people from their national identities at the same time placing them closer as different civilizations through swift and easy transportation (Huntington, 1993:26). The attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon bombings carried out by the Al-Qaeda terrorist group was due to the availability of global transportation and communication network that made it possible for the attack to be a success. The proximity of states to different civilizations creates inter-state wars causing political instability, for example Somalia’s nearness to Kenya. Also the proximity of different civilizations within the state causes intra-state wars and leads to political instability, for instance differing ethnic groups found in Nigeria.

Haynes (2011:205) alleges that “the centre of Huntington’s argument was that after the Cold war the Christian democratic West found itself in conflict with radical Islam, a key

threat to international order". Huntington's clash of civilizations theory helps in understanding why the Islamic world desires an international order which rejects key Western values (Haynes, 2011:204). The September 11 attack was the first incident which made Huntington's theory to be less abstract and more credible. Other terrorist acts carried out by Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, among other terrorist groups, also confirm the theory.

However there are scholars that oppose Huntington's assumptions. Kashefi (2013:179) states that critiques of Huntington like Siad "confronted the notion of fixed civilizations and puts more emphasis on the dynamics and interdependence of most civilizations". On the other hand Halliday debunks Huntington's thesis as he points out that culture or tradition does not exist of or independently of human beings living together in society. Halliday (2003: 208) argue that "cultural values do not descend from heaven to influence the course of history. This suggests that to explain behaviour on the basis of cultural values is engaging in circular reasoning". Clashes of civilizations assume civilization as a unit of analysis taking lightly clashes that occur within a civilization.

Some scholars do not entirely agree that terrorism is influenced by religious or ethnic disparities. Pape (2005:23) writes "modern terrorism is best understood as an extreme strategy for national liberation against democracies with troops that pose an imminent threat to control the territory the terrorists view as their homeland". He believes that foreign occupation motivates terrorism not clash of civilizations. On the other hand Barreto (2005:24) warns that "political extremism is not best explained by love or profit. Instead hatred for the out group, or resentment toward or perceived injustices will

provide better guides for explaining terrorist groups and their activities”. He also does not believe that terrorists’ acts are due to clashing of civilizations.

Huntington’s Clash of Civilization was also criticized by Linklater et al (2009:149) who denote that “the approach depicts civilization as a monolithic entity, for underestimating political and other divisions within civilizations, and for neglecting points of convergence such as the commitment to universal brotherhood that have been defended by many world religions”. Civilizations are not monolithic because they include different cultural, social and political groups. Goel (2002:2) suggests that “the West is divided not only among Catholics, Protestants and Jews, but also between Europe and North America”. Thus it is not sufficient to have the clashes limited to a single group. Goel (2002:2) further states that “Islam is even more fractured. It has numerous warring factions: Sunni versus Shia, Wahabis versus mainline Muslims, secularists versus traditionalists”. The theory is said to exaggerate disparities, at the same time it underestimates the variety of movements found in the Islamic world.

Huntington also reduced the meaning of culture to religious and language yet in essence the term has a broader definition. Kashefi (2013:194) denote that “culture consists of all the shared products of human society, material and non-material”. Huntington admits modernization as a universal nature but overlooks the advancement of science, education and social mobilization on cultural changes. Again Kashefi (2013:194) state that “universal technology such as internet, facebook, you tube and twitter as evidence of modernization, has facilitated cultural exchanges and exposed universal human culture to new generations”. The readily availability of new technology

has impacted the youth who see themselves willingly joining terrorist groups even if they are not of the same culture with them as long as they abide by the group's beliefs.

The debate over Huntington's theory cannot be easily addressed. Some authors like Fox (2002:417) argue that "nation-states and realpolitik will remain the major driving force between conflicts, another version of this type of argument is that the civilizations Huntington describes are not united and most conflicts will be between members of the same civilizations". There is no collective civilization rather there is a diversity of cultural blocks each with their own unique set of norms and values. The Arabian people do not share the common supposition of the Western world. They are more attached to their religion over their nation-state like what the Americans do. Though the Arabic world modernized in a Western direction, they borrowed some of the Western tools selectively and still it never drew them back from their own beliefs. They still followed their own trajectory and never assimilated into the Western expectations (Brooks, 2011). Fox (2002:417) further argues that "Huntington ignored some important phenomena; these include improved conflict management techniques, worldwide trends toward secularism, information technology that most ethno-political conflicts result from protracted discrimination rather than cultural roots and the desire of non-Western civilizations to be like the West". The fact that Huntington ignored these phenomena, infirmed his theory.

Kashefi (2013:179) is of the view that "there are fundamental disagreements among Muslim communities, for example between the Shias and Sunnis on the meaning of Islamic culture which is at the centre of Huntington's theory". The idea of civilization clashes is challenging because it is not easy to spot sound territorial boundaries to civilization and it is even harder to see them as acting rational units (Haynes, 2011:205).

Though Huntington distinguishes eight civilizations groupings, his theory is based on the West and Islam. Thus it is difficult to understand the world with a narrow number of cultures, each with their own distinct sets of beliefs. The Arab Spring that took place in 2010-2011 led to the death of thousands of Muslims in Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, Yemen and Libya. These clashes were not between West and Islam but only Muslims fighting their own regimes (Kashefi, 2013:193). The Arab Spring actually challenges the validity of The Clash of Civilizations.

2.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The prevalence of terrorism in Africa has been due to various reasons like resource curse, lack of education and poverty, information age, rise of Arab nationalism versus Western universalism, among other reasons. The prevalence of terrorism has impacted political and economic stability of states. Politically it has affected elections outcomes, voters' behaviour, caused internal wars and forced displacement of people. Economically it has affected the FDI, reduced tourists and affected oil prices. These impacts can also make a state to fail. Some of the factors that can lead a state to fail include ethnic differences, long-serving leadership, Neopatrimonialism, corruption, globalization, protests and dissenting behaviour. State failure not only affects the people within that territory but also lures in terrorist groups from other states.

Huntington's main argument is that differences among civilisations are not only real, they are basic. The fault line between Islamic and Christians is the most prevalent clash of civilizations with Islamic radicalization being the new religious terrorism that strengthens the theory of clash of civilisations. However, there are scholars that oppose Huntington's assumptions. Civilizations are not monolithic because they include

different cultural, social and political groups. The Arabs Spring actually challenges the validity of theory. In a nutshell, though this theory is one of the contested in international relations it best offers an explanation for the study at hand.

CHAPTER THREE: AL-SHABAAB AND THE PERPETUATION OF STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Somalia is a state situated in the Horn of Africa which comprises of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan. The state was once a colony of Britain and Italy, respectively, and did not exist as a single state; it was separated into northern British Somaliland and southern Italian Somaliland (Gardner et al, 2004:2). Britain decided to grant independence to the northern part and Italy also followed suit hence in 1960 these former colonies unified to form a sovereign Somalia (Gardner et al, 2004:2). It is home to approximately 10 million people as per the statistics of 2015 and 99 percent of the population is Muslim (Countrymeters, 2015). Though the country is populated by Muslims, they are still divided as most of them belong to different ethnic groups and clans. Tensions within these clans and groups prompted the rising of warring groups.

Somalia, since the overthrow of Siad Barre, has been marred by the absence of a government. Natural disasters like droughts led to the death of many Somalians and conflicts caused by warlords led to the displacement of many and clashes between different clans. The absence of a government led to the breaking away of regions to form small independent states within a state; in northwest there is Somaliland and to the east is Puntland (Jhazbhay, 2009:13). In 2006 the state witnessed the birth of Al-Shabaab, an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union. Al-Shabaab or the Youth is a terrorist group that is affiliated with Al-Qaeda operating in Somalia. The group is fighting for the formation of an Islamic state in Somalia at the same time wishes to topple the

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and is one of the most feared jihadist groups in Africa. Hansen (2013:3) states that “Al-Shabaab is today a large and heterogeneous organization, in which recruits are motivated by a variety of factors such as financial gain, fear, clan grievances and a quest for justice through Sharia legislation”. It is the only group operating in Somalia that was labelled by the United States of America as a terrorist group.

Al-Shabaab has been expanding over the years. In the process of growth it has been radicalizing and recruiting more members, mostly targeting the youth, who are victims of unfulfilled political and economic expectations (Clapper, 2014:77). Al-Shabaab kills, and tortures individuals who do not conform to the Sharia law. They even carry out their acts in public for others to witness, like stoning to death and amputating for wrongdoing. The region’s permeable borders, nearness to the Arabian Peninsula, a fragile arm of law and courts, persistent corruption and, in some instances state involvement in terrorist activities and the over 20 year nonexistence of a legitimate government in Somalia has granted an enabling setting for Al-Shabaab to carry out its activities (Ploch, 2010:4).

Even though Al-Shabaab has been shaped by different external forces, its expansion, militarization and radicalization came as a consequence of foreign intervention. For example, Somalia’s invasion by Ethiopia fuelled the advancement of Al-Shabaab’s ideology, enrolment, tactics and cooperation with other jihadists’ movements like Al-Qaeda. This helped them to convert from a relatively reasonable Islamic movement into a radical armed group in Somalia. Somalia’s struggle stemmed from the religious fundamentalism which is best understood from Samuel Huntington’s Clash of

Civilizations theory. The clashes are between Islamic extremists and the “infidels” who are pro West in East Africa (Hansen, 2013:4). The Clash of Civilizations theory provides insight into the misunderstandings that led to clashes.

Huntington stipulates that cultural as well as religious identities will constitute the prime source of post-cold war conflicts (Huntington, 1993:22). He further elucidates that these conflicts will be more endemic between the Islam and Christianity. Revival of religion has provided an identity that rises above national boundaries and unites civilizations (Huntington, 1993:26). Globalisation has brought together people of different civilizations which has in turn escalated cultural disparities. This suggests that cultural differences have been in existence for long and cannot be undermined. Huntington (1993:25) emphasises that “civilization differences are the product of centuries, they will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes”. Of paramount importance in his theory is the revival of Islamic nationalism which is being ruttet against Western universalism (Ferim, 2014:150). Ferim (2014:150) expounds that “fault line conflicts will be characterised by a clash between adjacent states belonging to different civilizations or clashes within a state which is home to populations of different civilizations”. This is reinforced in Huntington’s thesis (1993:22) where he states that “conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution in the modern world”. Al-Shabaab has been carrying out terrorist activities in and outside Somalia, and these acts have contributed to the political and economic instability of Somalia which have deepened the crisis and perpetuated state failure.

3.2 TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF AL-SHABAAB

Al-Shabaab has time and again exposed its ability to strike in urban areas and recuperate in its bases in rural areas. It has staged attacks of different magnitudes ranging from large scale attacks to small scale attacks. These attacks have been carried out on home ground as well as beyond its borders. Al-Shabaab has its own dream for Somalia which seems to counter the visions of the secular TFG. The group is guided and influenced by the Quran, and according to Agbiboa (2013) it adheres to one of its phrases which reads “anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors”. Al-Shabaab’s aim is to kill all apostate individuals among the Somali population until they convert to Islamism. The group has a variety of tools in its arsenal and uses unconventional military strategies and guerrilla-style attacks against the TFG.

A 2013 statement released by START (Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism) states that “since 2007 Al-Shabaab has carried out nearly 550 terrorist attacks, killing more than 1,600 and injuring more than 2,100”. The group attacks both government officials and civilians. Al-Shabaab has been angered by the intervention of other states in Somalia’s affairs especially its neighbouring states. This has caused Al-Shabaab to resent these states and has in turn attacked these countries in retaliation for deploying its troops in Somalia. Countries like Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, among others, have either been threatened or constantly attacked by Al-Shabaab. All their acts, whether carried out on home turf or beyond its borders, have destabilized and perpetuated state failure in Somalia. Below are some selected activities carried out by Al-Shabaab which are just a tip of the iceberg.

3.2.1 Bombings

Terrorism as highlighted in the previous chapter is the use of violence or threat of violence against a target audience in order to elicit political change (Kapitan, 2003: 48). Terrorists are violent to the extent of using explosives as a way of sending across a message which cannot be confused with a random attack (Hafez, 2007:ix). Bombings are well calculated moves used by terrorists so that their presence can be felt. Somalia's Al-Shabaab has also used this tactic of bombing and it is an imported phenomenon. Al-Shabaab's bombings were first carried out in Somalia before carrying out incursions in neighbouring states. Shuriye (2012:279) states that "in October 6, 2008, mortar aimed at the presidential palace in Mogadishu struck a market place killing 17. In September 3, 2008: twin bombings in the port city of Bossaso killed 25 and at least 70 injured". Since 2008, Al-Shabaab has demonstrated that it is equipped to instigate fatal attacks against outposts of the West and supposed foes outside Somalia.

In July 2010, the militant group was responsible for the twin bombings that took place at a restaurant and rugby club, respectively, in Uganda. The people had gathered to watch the World Cup soccer final match when the incident happened. These bombings left a trail of blood and 74 people dead (Hughes et al, 2011:444). Kayihura (2010) states that "On July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab carried out twin suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda, against people watching a soccer match, leaving 78 people dead and 89 injured". The Ugandan attacks, according to Al-Shabaab, were instigated to punish the state for its part in supporting African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Somalia (Onuoha, 2013: 28). Shinn (2010) argues that "Al-Shabaab feels threatened by the presence of peacekeeping forces, so it has continued to demand their complete

withdrawal from Somalia". Consequently, Al-Shabaab has embarked on a confrontational strategy of preventing countries endeavouring to pacify Somalia by targeting their cities to coerce them to pull out from Somalia.

Early 2012 Al-Shabaab forces amalgamated with Atom militia, a strong group that was operating in Puntland. In late 2012 they occupied the Galagala Mountains where they fought with the local forces. Ridley (2014:104) states that "in December 2012 they planted and detonated an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) among Punt land troops travelling by road in the Sugure area, killing 20 of the soldiers". Al-Shabaab is using the clash of civilization model where different civilizations are seen clashing constantly on home turf. By amalgamating with the Atom militia the group is taking Huntington's theory literally by trying to strike a balance between Islamism and local patriotism (Hansen, 2013:74). Targeted killings of civilians increased in areas where the TFG controlled. Human Rights Watch (2013:153) claims that "fifteen journalists were killed in 2012, which the Transitional Federal Government failed to investigate". Somalia's long-running armed clashes continue, leaving residents dead, injured and others displaced. This string of attacks makes the ordinary citizens lose faith in their government and at the same time it makes the security personnel look feckless.

Human Rights Watch (2013:154) further states that "according to the World Health Organization, between January and late September, four hospitals in Mogadishu treated 5,219 casualties, with 118 dying from weapon-related injuries". These casualties were a result of clashes between Al-Shabaab and the TFG's allied forces. On the other hand Ridley (2014:104) states that "in April 2013, a series of massive, coordinated, small arms and suicide bomb attacks in Mogadishu killed 30 people; al-Shabaab speedily

claimed responsibility". This was a well-planned attack as the AMISOM troops had been deployed in the outskirts, leaving the city vulnerable. This was a way of trying to convince the TFG that their endeavour to stop the group's political aim is not worth the bloodshed (Simpson, 2012:13).

In September of 2014 Al-Shabaab rammed a vehicle loaded with explosives into an African Union's minibus which was amongst the convoy travelling from the capital. This incident left 12 people dead and wounded 27 others. The group attacked as a way of revenging the loss of their leader Godane who died when US drones and aircrafts fired missiles and laser guided bombs on one of Al-Shabaab's camps (Moalimu, 2014). These bombings have forced people to flee for safety and be refugees in neighbouring countries like Kenya. By January of 2014 the total number of refugees in Kenya was 543,938 and 482,390 were from Somalia (Malinowski (2014:23). These are some of the devastating consequences of bombings and a country cannot function without its citizens.

In August of 2015, it was reported that 14 Somali forces were killed and 20 were wounded in an Al-Shabaab suicide attack in southern Somalia. The attack took place in a former university building where AMISOM soldiers camped. A minibus which was loaded with explosives was set off inside the camp (Agency Free-Press, 2015). There have been contestations on the exact number of soldiers who died; the authorities claimed its 14 whilst the insurgent group argues that the number is significantly higher than reported. Agency Free-Press (2015) stated that "it was 100 apostate soldiers who died according to Al-Shabaab". These successful bombings have made target civilians question what the group is capable of and such moaning has spread dread and fear that

Al-Shabaab needs to achieve their goals. Bombings have contributed greatly to state failure in Somalia. They have killed dozens of people, left many impoverished and have made many parts of Somalia inaccessible to humanitarian agencies (Simpson, 2012:13).

3.2.2 Small arms attacks

Small arms like the standard AK-47 assault rifle are one of the small arms used by terrorists. A small arm often targets accurately and gives a wide range of deadly fire that is usually concentrated on people (Nance, 2014:226). Al-Shabaab is well armed and small arms in Somalia are so prolific such that they are even used for trading as currency. In June 2013, 22 people died when a group of Al-Shabaab conducted a deadly assault on the United Nations Development Programme base in Somalia; the attack lasted for more than 90 minutes (Sheik, 2013). Al-Shabaab was accusing the United Nations of serving U.S interests and deterring them from fully changing the state to an Islamic state. In a different incident, 148 university students were massacred by Al-Shabaab at the Garissa University in Garissa; the carnage lasted for about 15 hours. The reason for their act was that the university was on Muslim land and had been colonized by non-Muslim people, for most of its students were Christians (Iaccino, 2015).

Arendse (2015) is of the view that “Al-Shabaab’s vision is of a perpetual religious clash of civilization”. Christianity, which is a western religion, has deterred Muslims from pursuing their own religious dominance. Arendse (2015) further states that “in 2007 Al-Shabaab supporters blew-up a Christian church in Ethiopia; in the Westgate attack non-

Muslims were picked out for murder as they were in Garissa. However in Somalia itself, Al-Shabaab persecutes Muslims who do not subscribe to their own brutal interpretation of Islam". The Clash of Civilizations does mention that the 21st century will be characterized by growing tensions and clashes between contending cultures. Islam is the only civilization so far which has put the survival of the West's culture in doubt (Huntington, 1996:210). The growing impact of religious fundamentalism, particularly political Islam, is witnessed in incursions they carry out in other countries (Agbiboa, 2013).

In May 2015, a fight erupted between Al-Shabaab militants and the Somali government troops which resulted in the death of 24 people. Omar et al (2015) depict that "Al-Shabaab launched an attack on government troops late on Friday in the Awdigle district and Mubarak, south of the capital Mogadishu. Clashes killed at least two dozen people". The Islamist group vowed to continue killing the enemies until they topple the Transitional Federal Government backed by the West. In another incident Laing (2015) notes that "on June 26, the group dealt a major blow to the AMISOM force killing as many as 50 soldiers and beheading some of them". The shootings that the TFG has failed to suppress have crippled TFG's attempts to save the failed state. Small arms attacks have played a significant role in perpetuating state failure in Somalia.

3.2.3 Beheadings and executions

Beheadings were common during great upheavals like the Mahdi uprisings and epochal changes worldwide, today we witness them being used by terrorists (Campbell, 2015:no page). Beheadings and executions are usually recorded and aired or shared over the

internet for the world to see. Beheadings and executions are at times preceded with either the group's demands or political statements chanted in Arabic (Giroux, 2016: no page). Weapons used to carry out beheadings differ though knives and machetes are the common ones (Campbell, 2015:no page). Al-Shabaab like other terrorist groups is notorious for beheading and executing people. The imposition of Sharia law has seen many people being punished and brutally killed in compliance with a legal sentence guided by the Islamic law. In 2008, a girl aged 13 was raped and she reported the case in which the girl and the identified perpetrators were arrested. The offenders were set to go scot free without being charged and the girl was found guilty of adultery. She was stoned to death in Kismayo as her sentencing. In 2009, seven people were beheaded in Baidoa for being Christians (Taarnby et al, 2010:17).

In 2011, the group detained people from Juba, Bay and Bakol and beheaded them for spying. On another scenario the Country Report (2012:4) attests that "on August 14, Al-Shabaab militants executed by beheading nine public transport workers-six drivers and three- conductors after they failed to comply with extortion demands". Extortion is one of the ways that Al-Shabaab uses to gain money. In December 2014, Al-Shabaab beheaded five people within a week which included two policewomen, two government soldiers and a Quran teacher who had refused to leave his house after the group had seized the town (Nor, 2015). Al-Shabaab has managed to take over some villages with the aid of beheadings and its harsh Sharia laws. Citizens have fled or avoided speaking, crushing the hopes of rebuilding a peaceful state hence perpetuating state failure.

The April 2015 attack on university students in Kenya left dozens dead, mostly Christians and amongst the dead some were beheaded (Iaccino, 2015). The minute

percentage of Christians in Somalia lives in fear as they are targeted for beheadings or executions. World Report (2015) attests that “in June 2014, Al-Shabaab publicly executed three men accused of spying for the federal government and foreign governments in the port-town of Barawe”. In June 2015, several soldiers were beheaded when a group of Al-Shabaab militants stormed an AMISOM base (Sridharan, 2015). Beheadings and executions have proved to be an effective strategy because it can make a small terrorist cell far more striking than it really is (Campbell, 2015:no page). The exercise of beheading and executing has contributed to Somalia’s state failure because it has made people to fear them. Campbell (2015:no page) argued that “the citizens are so overwhelmed with fear such that taking a stand is less likely to be achieved”. Civilians now cannot do anything which is contrary to Al-Shabaab’s beliefs as they are afraid to lose their lives; this ultimately perpetuates state failure.

3.2.4 Siege

History of terrorism is as old as that of mankind, and staging a siege has been a part of it (Post, 2007:2). Terrorists deliberately carry out a siege with the hope of using their victims as a tool for their demands to be met or to simply convey a message across. In September 2013, a four day siege led by Al-Shabaab left 67 people dead at Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The militants deliberately targeted non- Muslims during the siege. Hostages were asked to name relatives of the prophet Mohammed or to recite the “shahada” which is a Muslim profession of faith (Stakelbeck, 2015:70). This was intentionally done because it would expose those who are Christians and they would be killed immediately. Iaccino (2015) states that “Al-Shabaab took responsibility for the attack, saying it was a retribution to the Operation Linda Nchi military (Protect the

Country), which saw the deployment of Kenyan troops in Somalia to counter-attack the militants in 2011". This shows how deadly the group is and their zeal to convert Somalia into an Islamic state has not yet been dampened.

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the siege that happened in Makka al-Mukarama, a hotel in Somalia, in March 2015. Twenty-four people lost their lives when six Al-Shabaab men stormed and opened fire in the hotel. The hotel is popular with government officials and foreigners (The Associated Press, 2015). Al-Shabaab depends on staging a siege as a way of conveying their demands to both the TFG and all other countries like Kenya that have tried to get rid of the group. With this strategy they have managed to force other countries like Uganda to pull out their troops and plunged Somalia deep into crisis, perpetuating state failure.

3.2.5 Kidnappings and raids

Kidnapping and raiding are some of the terror strategies used by terrorists all over the world for various reasons; some use it for financial gain, and others use it to get the public's attention, to instil fear or for political reasons. Rocha da Silva (2014) elucidated that "terror related kidnapping serves significant political goals, as it is a fairly simple method of gathering public attention, of communicating political positions and of obtaining concessions that would not materialise otherwise". Kidnapping and raiding are some of the tactics that Al-Shabaab uses to pursue its political agenda. The group is hoping that by using these tactics it will get the desired attention from TFG and the World at large. In Somalia the group has kidnapped inhabitants as well as raided government and aid buildings. The United Nations Security Council (2014) affirms that

“Al-Shabaab raided and shut down the field offices of UNOPS, UNDSS and UNDP”. The group is against the West and so anything that runs under the mandate of the West is a target to Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab kidnapped prominent business people who would have refused to give in to their extortion demands (Country Report, 2012:5).

Al-Shabaab not only kidnaps or raids in Somalia but also in its neighbouring states. In Kenya the group mostly kidnaps foreigners and this is one of the reasons that the Kenyan government gives to justify their forces, incursions into Somalia (Machar, 2015:202). Their pride as a country is at stake as Al-Shabaab is ruining their country’s image by targeting foreigners, both tourists and aid workers. In September 2011 they kidnapped some aid workers who worked at some refugee camp which is home to Somali refugees in Kenya and took them to Somalia. The aid workers were rescued by Kenyan forces under AMISOM in 2014 (The Guardian, 2014). Hyndman (2014:121) attests that “in June 2012, a Kenyan driver was killed and four international staff working for the Norwegian Refugee Council were taken at gunpoint. They were later rescued from Somalia by Kenyan forces”. These activities have led to the pulling out of some humanitarian organizations and their staff from the camps due to Al-Shabaab’s actions. Such situations reveal how innate ethnic fault lines have a tendency of replicating across national boundaries as suggested by Huntington (1993:22).

Late January 2015 Al-Shabaab kidnapped more than 40 farmers, all men from a village in south-western Somalia and took them to an anonymous destination. Horsed Media (2015) reported that “Al-Shabaab terrorists have kidnapped innocent farmers and pastoralists; they want to release them on ransom”. By abducting these men the group hoped to get the TFG’s attention. Terrorists usually take their hostages to a location not

known by authorities making it difficult for security personnel to rescue them. Rocha da Silva (2014) states that “when kidnapping, the perpetrators hold hostages at a location unknown to the authorities. These incidents usually last longer because they provide the terrorists with anonymity, security and mobility, while rendering the security forces almost powerless to intervene”. In June 2015, soldiers who are under the African Union mission were raided and attacked by Al-Shabaab in northwest of Mogadishu. The military base manned by Burundian soldiers was raided and attacked at dawn. Machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and a suicide car bomb were used in the attack. Dozens of people lost their lives and in the process the terrorist group also seized weapons to be used in further attacks (Al-Jazeera Agencies, 2015). Kidnappings and raids that mostly take place locally are meant to instil fear and coerce obedience from local communities, which is working in favour of Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

3.2.6 Hijackings and looting

Hijacking and looting have been an important component of terrorists’ arsenal. Hijacking or looting is carried out so as to demand attention from government and the public, exchange for imprisoned members or to raise funds. Crenshaw (2014) mentioned that ‘terrorists rely on hijacking as a source of funds and publicity or to pressure governments into implementing policy changes and releasing other terrorists held in jail’. Al-Shabaab like other terrorist groups has also incorporated hijacking and looting as part of their strategies. In 2008, the group seized the Kismayo port in Somalia and used it as their base for illegal trading in charcoal, bringing in between \$35 -50 million for the group (Mastropasqua, 2013). The Kismayo port was the most important revenue source for the group; however it was forced out by the Kenyan forces under AMISOM.

This incident has led Al-Shabaab to focus on using asymmetric attacks with the intention of discrediting the TFG. Pirates in Somalia have been working side by side with Al-Shabaab; they hijack ships for ransom purposes and help in funding Al-Shabaab. Middleton (2008:1) affirms that “Somali pirates could become agents of international terrorist networks. Already money from ransoms is helping to pay for the war in Somalia, including funds to the US terror-listed Al-Shabaab”. Mostly governments whose ships would have been hijacked pay out the ransoms so as to retrieve their ships and this has made piracy a lucrative business. Both groups seem to be benefiting from each other’s existence.

In November 2014, the Islamic militant group hijacked and attacked Christians who were travelling by bus, killing twenty-eight people on the spot. The group separated Christians from Muslims before killing them (Khalif, 2014). This attack on Christians reinforces the theory of Clash of Civilizations as seen in the light of Al-Shabaab’s attack based on religious differences. The Muslims stress the superiority of their culture and the need to conserve it. According to Huntington, (1996:215) “Muslims see Western culture and religion as materialistic, corrupt, decadent and immoral and attack the West for adhering to an imperfect, erroneous religion”. Al-Shabaab believes that basic differences exist between their culture and the West, and those who are Christians are abiding with Western culture. Those who failed to recite the Quran were the ones put to death. The Islamic militants have made it clear that it is pursuing the Islamic culture and non-conformity results in death.

Looting of humanitarian aid meant for the Somali people has been rife and Al-Shabaab has been responsible. In December 2009, Al-Shabaab militants took computers and

radio equipment from a United Nations Mine Action Services (Unmas). In the process they managed to get away with three fully equipped ambulances (Staff Reporter, 2009). In November 2009, they looted World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) offices (Staff Reporter, 2009). They also looted foodstuff from local business people and also ransacked markets in the capital. Ahmed (2014) stated that "a convoy of Al-Shabaab vehicles descended into the market; terrified traders were ordered to give their entire food inventory to the fighters for free". All these stated activities by Al-Shabaab have had consequences economically as well as politically, therefore perpetuating state failure in Somalia.

3.3 EFFECTS OF AL-SHABAAB'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN SOMALIA

Al-Shabaab's terrorist activities have threatened peace and security in Somalia. The group has greatly capitalized on its Islamic religion as its common identifier in becoming a dominating force in Somalia. The terrorist activities by Al-Shabaab have led to negative consequences both politically and economically, perpetuating Somalia's state failure. Politically, the group has belittled TFG's authority, instilled its Sharia law among other consequences and economically Al-Shabaab has been collecting taxes, running the Kismayo port and working hand in hand with pirates, much to the detriment of the state's economy. These actions are a direct challenge to the government of Somalia's monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force.

3.3.1 Political consequences of terrorism in Somalia

Somalia is a battle-weary state and has been affected by the presence of Al-Shabaab and its activities. These activities have had dire consequences for the state. Al-Shabaab has been challenging Somalia's TFG over the use of legitimate force and has weakened the Somali troops which has led to political instability. The country's army has failed to fight and drive out the terrorist group. Also the interim government has failed to mobilize the citizens to help them conquer Al-Shabaab. Clunan et al (2010:91) postulate that "in failed states like Somalia, empowering local authorities and clans who can police their territory and compete with terrorist organizations for local support yielded great dividends in fighting terrorism". The presence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its activities has failed the nation, perpetuating state failure.

Somalia has been subject to years of political instability caused by terror acts from Al-Shabaab. Somalia is on its path to conducting democratic elections in 2016 and there are fears that Al-Shabaab might disrupt these elections. Thus, Mr Kay the head of United Nations mission in Somalia (UNSOM) stated that "I remain concerned about security in Somalia, and about the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to the wider sub-region, demonstrated by the heinous attack on Kenya's Garissa University in April. With so much at stake between now and 2016, we can expect Al-Shabaab to do everything it can to derail the political process" (Hasselberg, 2015). Terrorist acts carried out by Al-Shabaab in Somalia have stirred the country's efforts off-track on its endeavoured journey to improving security and holding of credible elections in 2016. Felbab-Brown (2015) stated that "Somalia was supposed to hit three milestones by 2016; hold presidential elections; adopt a new constitution and form sub-national states". Persistent

insecurity makes holding national elections difficult. The success or failure of the 2016 elections is yet to be witnessed though there are doubts already that they will be conducted given the way Al-Shabaab have been attacking lately.

The TFG has failed the Somali people because citizens' trust upon the government to protect them from random violations of their personal safety from Al-Shabaab has diminished. Somalia is characterised by a strong clan system which has seen the failure of an effective central government. The TFG is made up of different clans who have different cultural beliefs and is affected by high turnover of officials and this has contributed to its failure to work as a team (Silva, 2014:72). Felbab-Brown (2015) confirms Silva's claim and states that "TFG will soon be paralysed by the infighting between ministers and the constant turnover of government officials at the federal and sub-national levels is another problem". Al-Shabaab has taken advantage of political factions within the TFG and has been conducting more terrorist attacks just to frustrate the TFG and people even more. Weber (2015:15) denotes that "Al-Shabaab's acts of desecration demonstrated that it would act not only against "unbelievers" and the government, but also against Somalis". Al-Shabaab has attested its ability to launch asymmetric attacks, keep its territory and continue to be a serious security threat, in spite of the killing of its leader in 2014 (Achilles, 2015:10). The TFG is struggling to make progress in reconciling so as to offer a basis for bearable political settlement, much to the delight of Al-Shabaab.

Somalia is faced with disheartening challenges of creating suitable conditions for sustaining national reunion, peace and stability, and above all rebuilding the state and institutions. Regardless of Somalia being known already as a failed state, root causes of

its failure started with the downfall of the State and its institutions which resulted in anarchy (African Development Bank Group, 2015: 4). Instead of abating these problems, terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab have thrived and fuelled the instability in Somalia, further perpetuating its failure.

These TFG officials have been misusing resources meant to help the people for self-enrichment. Aid taken through the control of the government has been used to uphold a system of patronage politics along clan lines (Achilles et al, 2015:15). The TFG has failed to put in place applicable policies that will ensure sustainable management of external aid so as to build sustainable peace and stability and improve the livelihood of their people. Also the TFG is mainly focusing on getting more external aid instead of building political institutions that will help resuscitate Somalia. Mckenzie (2013:220) argues that “Al-Shabaab’s terrorist activities have perpetuated fighting in Somalia, destroying the economy and the capability of the interim TFG to control its territory”. The perpetuation of state failure in Somalia has lowered the state to a level of dependency for its survival.

Terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab resulted in the fleeing of people to neighbouring states whilst others were internally displaced (Nduwimana, 2014:46). Nduwimana (2014:46) alludes that “in July 2011 alone, 30,655 people fled to Kenya; the total number of Somali refugees there increased to nearly one million by the end of 2011, while the number of internally displaced people in Somalia reached 1.36 million by April 2012”. TFG is incompetent to develop a response mechanism but rather good at diverting humanitarian aid and partaking in corrupt acts. Weber (2015:18) mentions that “Al-Shabaab under the leadership of Godane, blocked aid deliveries to underline their

rejection of Western humanitarian organisations, and the needs of the Somali population controlled by Al-Shabaab had to take second place”. It also restricted non-governmental organizations that wanted to help the TFG in providing humanitarian aid. Hyndman (2014:121) denotes that “Al-Shabaab has succeeded in driving many United Nations and non-governmental organizations to pull out their international staff from the camps”. The reality in the politics of Somalia and their need of humanitarian aid has made it a convenient base for terrorists and the citizens have grown weary of TFG.

3.3.2 Economic consequences of terrorism in Somalia

The collapse of key institutions in the country led the state to have soaring numbers of poverty. According to the Guardian in Comeau (2014) “seven out of ten people in Somalia are unemployed with 70 percent of the population below age 35”. Such statistics suggests that those in the workforce also have a bleak future. The Guardian further notes that the average income of a Somali person annually is estimated at US \$650 whilst a single act of piracy can earn a minimum of US \$10 000 (Comeau, 2014).

The African Development Bank Group (2015:22) claims that “in Somalia there is no effective Public Finance Management. The government budget has a very weak revenue base, which cannot even accommodate the wage bill of civil servants”. This has weakened its economic base and Al-Shabaab has taken advantage of the situation by targeting the youth and recruiting them, paying them little wages that the TFG has failed to do through creating jobs. Terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab have hampered the

TFG's endeavour of running the state. The TFG have failed to fully save its economy which means there is no proper tax policy.

Al-Shabaab has taken it upon themselves to collect taxes. According to Shay (2014:14) "some Al-Shabaab members forcefully took taxes from people in the name of jihad". Al-Shabaab extorts shopkeepers, business people and intimidates the citizens by sending letters or cellphone messages. Felbab-Brown (2015) states that people regularly receive cellphone texts such as "you forgot to pay your zakat (religious tax); tomorrow we cannot guarantee your security". Such intimidation is prevalent in Somalia and is only working in favour of Al-Shabaab not towards the rebuilding of the state as a whole. Achilles (2015:14) also substantiated the collection of taxes by Al-Shabaab and stated that "al-Shabaab banned several agencies and imposed new taxes and conditions on those that were allowed to continue operations". Businesses are not regulated or formally taxed. Al-Shabaab has been carrying out illegal businesses to generate more funds for the group. Other sources of funding for Al-Shabaab include levies and taxes on commercial activities, mafia-like protection arrangements and abductions for ransom (Weber, 2015:27).

Terrorist groups have been linked with criminal activities numerous times; these activities include human trafficking and smuggling, among others (Jonsson, 2009). Al-Shabaab has been exploiting the country's natural resources illegally as a way of funding themselves. They have been transporting charcoal illegally despite a ban from the UN. Such acts have slowed down the economic growth of Somalia since the income gained only benefits the group and not the state. Zanolio (2014) argues that "Al-Shabaab has become a sophisticated economic group that pulls in massive funds for

their cause, using various schemes and crimes to fund their activities, primarily extortion and illegal taxes". The group is also involved in money laundering between Al-Shabaab's leaders and their associates in the United Arab Emirates (Money Jihad, 2014). Not only has Al-Shabaab weakened Somalia's economy even more, it has also exacerbated poverty and starvation.

The social economy of the Somali people is in a bad state such that terrorist activities have worsened it and made people to migrate to Kenya in search of greener pastures. Malinowski (2014:23) posits that "as of January 2014, UNHCR put the total number of refugees in Kenya as 543,938 of whom 482,390 were from Somalia". The refugee predicament in Kenya is primarily an outcome of the conflict in Somalia. The refugee influx experienced by Kenya is a testimony of the effects of terrorist acts carried out by Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab has managed to capitalize on high unemployment rates. Okari (2014) emphasised that "Al-Shabaab exploits the unemployment factor to lure youth into joining their ranks". Most youths who get recruited by Al-Shabaab to join the movement do not do so because of the group's ideology but because of economic adversities they have endured (Taylor, 2013:1). The inability by TFG to carefully address legitimate demands by communities like job creation has made life easy for Al-Shabaab as the group takes advantage of the TFG's failures.

Since Al-Shabaab uses asymmetrical warfare when attacking, the devices used like landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) have negative impacts even economically. In some areas the grazing lands have been destroyed as well as water

sources (Nduwimana, 2014:45). The ongoing clashes between Al-Shabaab and AMISOM have worsened Somalia's situation. This means less agricultural activities and more famine for the Somali people.

Al-Shabaab believes in educating male children over their female counterparts. In Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, jihad was incorporated in the elementary school curriculum. In some instances, school children were rewarded with AK-47 rifles as prizes (Country Report, 2012:37). Such an act by Al-Shabaab serves to manipulate these children as they are drawn into using guns at a tender age. It lures these children to drop out of school and join the group with an urge to use those guns they have been given. This further promotes continuity in the instability of the state economically and worsens the illiterate rate which affects the development of a sound state.

Illegal economic activities have been rife since the emanation of Al-Shabaab. The group seized Kismayo port and used it as its base in illegal trading of charcoal and sugar, earning them a whopping \$35-50 million a year. Mastropasqua (2013) asserts that "Al-Shabaab has a role in the illegal importation of sugar to Kenya, a trade worth hundreds of thousands of dollars". Since the government is not that functional it has failed in regulating its imports and exports. The seizing of Kismayo by Al-Shabaab after a fierce battle affected the revenues of Somalia. The group imposed administrative rules based on the Sharia law on the port. Kambere (2015) claims that "to raise revenue, Al-Shabaab increased fees for importing and exporting goods through the port by 30% per cent". The taxes collected by Al-Shabaab from the port generate approximately \$1 million quarterly (Ploch, 2010).

Instead of using the money they collect to maintain the port and people's needs, they send the money to other locations to preserve their control and spread insurgency. Lutz et al (2014:526) argue that "if national economic assets can be successfully targeted, it will reduce the resources available to the government. Reduced resources will mean lower levels of revenues for security forces or less funding for programs that might address the legitimate grievances of the population". The targeting of the Kismayo port by Al-Shabaab was a way of sinking down resources accessible to the TFG.

Somalia as a failed state has been affected by natural disasters like famine, leading to the high demand of humanitarian aid. However, terrorist activities have crippled humanitarian aid from reaching Somalia. Akbar (2011) denotes that "abundant U.S. aid targeted for the Horn of Africa cannot directly reach 2.8 million starving people in southern Somalia because it is blocked by Al-Shabaab". Southern Somalia is one of the strongholds of Al-Shabaab. Those in charge of delivering humanitarian aid also fear for their lives since the group is notorious for staging attacks anywhere and anytime. Blocking foreign aid is a means of thwarting the TFG's efforts of dealing with domestic problems.

3.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Al-Shabaab has been carrying out terrorist activities in Somalia and these acts have contributed to the political and economic instability of Somalia, which has perpetuated state failure. These activities range from bombings, small arms attacks, beheadings, executions, siege, kidnapping, raiding, hijacking to looting. These activities have been carried out within Somalia as well as beyond its borders with dire consequences. These

activities destabilized the political and economic stability of the country and perpetuated state failure.

CHAPTER FOUR: OTHER FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PERPETUATION OF STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter Al-Shabaab's terrorist activities were discussed and their effects on Somalia that have contributed in the perpetuation of state failure. This chapter however, will look at other factors responsible for the perpetuation of state failure in Somalia other than terrorism. When Al-Shabaab started its operations in Somalia, it was already regarded by the international community as a failed state. The state is regarded as an archetype of a failed state. The essence of this chapter is to identify other causes besides terrorism that contributed to state failure in Somalia.

4.2 CAUSES OF STATE FAILURE IN SOMALIA

Causes of failed states are multiple, states do not fail overnight. These causes range from lack of education and poverty, resource curse, neo-patrimonialism, lack of property rights, forced labour, absence of law and order to popular uprisings, among others. Failed states cause transnational threats and global crises. Below are some of the notable causes that have played a role in the state failure of Somalia.

4.2.1 Clan rivalry and civil war

Traditional African cultures emphasize the importance of clans. Mulemi (2010:246) asserts that "clans refers to a group of people within an ethnic or sub-ethnic society who believe that they descended from a common ancestor and the clan offers continual, economic, emotional and spiritual support". The differences in clans often lead to misunderstandings, others thinking they are more superior compared to their

counterparts. Waibel (2005:154) notes that “such assumptions of some clans being superior and others being deemed as inferior stir up civil wars which can have consequential results for a state”. Somalia like any other African state is made up of clans which have an indigenous population with a mono-ethnic group. Somali clan system is one of the major defining properties of both Somali politics and society. There are five major Somali clans and these are Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaaq and Rahanweyn. Under the clan system, citizens show their loyalty to their families, and then to the clans they belong too and lastly to the nation. Within clans are sub-clans that further propelled divisions in Somalia. In the early 1980’s right through to the early 1990’s Somalia underwent an intense crisis of identity, purpose and direction. This crisis was a threat to Somali society and its existence. This ultimately led to a civil war which saw uprisings from clans against the government (Fitzgerald, 2002:45).

Various regimes governed Somalia until Siad Barre’s period in office; he had a difficult time controlling different clans and their activities. Barre belonged to the Darod clan; under Siad Barre, control over clans and the favouring of his clan could only be achieved through authoritarian rule and force. This did not go down well with other clans. Clan leaders felt marginalised by Barre. It alienated Barre’s regime from the Somali people. There were internal strifes within his government, and an outcry from the people. Fitzgerald (2002:46) states that “Barre incited and inflamed clan rivalries to divert public attention from the problems of his increasingly unpopular regime”. He was an expert in the art of dividing and ruling. The country began to witness outbreaks of inter and intra clan conflicts. Clans began to practice self-governing and the political

environment was too volatile. This led to his fall in 1991 when he was ousted; since his fall, there was a rise in insurgencies that were motivated by clans and other groups.

Those entrusted with power like Siad Barre had to satisfy clan needs at the expense of other clans or collective national interests. He managed to harness the state's limited resources and used them for his clan. To validate this statement there is a Somali proverb that shows the hierarchy of priorities and it reads "me and my clan against the world; me and my family against my clan; me and my brother against my family; me against my brother" (Author unknown). Such allegiance of rulers to their clans before the nation's needs led to political patronage and nepotism. Inevitably, it led to squabbles over political power, resources and divided Somalia (Chun, 2012:5). The eruption of civil war brought opportunities for non-clan groups to enlarge their activities whilst the state collapsed. The social and economic breakdown brought poverty, arms were smuggled and drugs trafficked (Chun, 2012:5). Somali society exploded into full blown violence. Barre was forced to leave the country and warring clans led to the death of over 250 000 Somalis (Das, 2013:78).

Even the TFG parliament that is operating presently is marred by serious clan rivalry. With a membership of 550, the dominating clans in parliament are the Darod from the north and Hawiye clans from central and southern Somalia. The U.S tried to be inclusive in helping TFG deal with clan differences and work towards a common goal which is restoring the country. Their efforts were met with meagre results as the Darod clan opposed this notion and rather went on to reflect the priorities and prejudices of their clan and its allies. Also the Hawiye clan which dominates in Mogadishu opposed the TFG. They too went on to form alliances with well-known business people and

Sharia courts that operated in Mogadishu. This was done to ensure that the Darod clan did not encroach on their clan interests (Boyle, 2013:151). Waibel (2005:154) claims that “leaders are under strong pressure to accumulate and redistribute wealth and handouts to family, kin or clans, contribute to extensive misuse of resources, corruption and nepotism”. Such a political environment is prone to suffer from clan rivalry which leads to civil war and an end result of state failure. The different clan structures have never reached a consensus on a ruling government, which has made Somalia an example of a failed state. This entire tug-of-war taking place in parliament only serves to escalate state failure since all clans are on the lookout to pursue their interests over others.

4.2.2 Warlords

Warlords fall under the category of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA). Warlords are charismatic leaders with the ability to exercise control over territories through their military power (Williams, 2008: 9). A warlord as defined by Troy et al (2005:123) is “a military commander exercising civil power in a region, whether in nominal allegiance to the national government or in defiance of it”. They put their individual interests first before collective interests. Warlords are distinct from insurgent groups in the sense that insurgent groups draw their support from the local people whilst warlords actually prey on local people. Even though warlords recruit their members from the local population, they do not necessarily depend on their support to achieve their political goals (Troy et al, 2005:124).

Warlords are still rife in present-day in Somalia as it was in the 1990's. Warlords were responsible for the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. Hassan (2008) states that "the warlord phenomena started with the demise of Somalia, top brass army officers led the tribal militias that toppled Siad Barre". Warlords in Somalia were categorised into different groups. The first type of warlords was the top army officials who ousted Barre; the second type was the business people who joined the political arena to share the spoils, too. Hassan (2008) postulate that "second group of warlords, the business tycoons, was born to add fuel to the fire". Clerics hiding behind religion also emerged and became warlords operating in the lawless country (Hassan, 2008).

Warlords still have power and their presence is still felt by both the TFG and the civilians. For example, one of the Somali warlords Ahmed Dai, a militia commander who operated in Mogadishu and has killed several people, was on the run in 2014. The TFG launched an operation to disarm him together with his members and heavy fighting broke out in the capital. BBC (2014) reported that "a raid on his house near the airport was launched at dawn killing at least 10 people living nearby. It was the heaviest fighting in the city since Islamist militants were driven out in 2011". Some members of his group were arrested whilst the warlord managed to escape. Ahmed Dai maintained that he had weapons to protect himself and the civilians from the militants. (BBC, 2014) reported that Ahmed Dai said "African Union Force was providing protection for government and foreign agencies, but not for the other civilians". This shows how warlords are continuing to expand even in the existence of Al-Shabaab.

Hansen (2003) emphasized that "warlords do not have the power to make peace, only the capacity to disrupt and destroy. Their power and influence solely depend on the

dynamics of war. Therefore they have no interest in a peaceful settlement, because it would lead to the diminution of their power". Somalia has been accommodating warlords and this has played a role in its state failure. As Hansen mentioned that warlords are not interested in peaceful settlements, they have prolonged conflicts, mostly clan based, leading to lack of cooperation between and amongst clans, subsequently failing Somalia.

4.2.3 Piracy

According to the Geneva Convention on the law of the sea of 1958, piracy is "any illegal act of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or aircraft" (Osei-Tutu, 2011:5). Piracy is a global problem that has never been completely eradicated and has crippled maritime commerce. The crippling of maritime commerce affects economic growth which in turn slows down the government from rendering basic services, leading it to state failure in the long run. Osei-Tutu (2011:5) states that "piracy, in the long run is detrimental to political and social progression and it all but eliminates economic growth". This has been the case in Somalia and it has played a significant role causing the state to fail. Piracy has been prevalent in Somalia even before the birth of Al-Shabaab. Pirates in Somalia often disrupted shipping routes in the Gulf of Aden by capturing ships and demanding ransom for their release. However some scholars like Leonard, Ibrahim, among others, think there is a link between piracy and terrorism. They think piracy operations have shifted and are now used to raise funds for terrorism. Leonard et al (2013:9) postulate that "there is little direct evidence that piracy is carried out with the explicit aim of raising funds for terrorism". According to Ibrahim (2010:290) "20-50% of

the ransom money pirates receive is given to Al-Shabaab. Although Al-Shabaab would prefer being paid cash for letting pirates use their ports, the organization is open to being compensated through the acquisition of weapons. Pirates in turn, need Al-Shabaab to provide protection for captured ships and crews until ransoms could be extracted". Though there is the TFG in place it is only an interim government and a weak one, enabling piracy to flourish.

Piracy in Somalia became so prevalent such that it had dire consequences for the state. Puntland has been identified as the epicentre of piracy. Boon et al (2012:269) attest that "piracy attacks are launched from two major locations: Puntland, home of vast majority of the pirates, and the centre-south of Somalia". There were more reports of pirates attacking ships. Boyle (2013:156) reported that "in 2008, 111 ships were attacked and 47 were hijacked off the Somali coast. There were 47 successful hijackings in 2009, and over 120 vessels were fired upon; Somali pirates seized 867 hostages, and held 263 crew members for what amounted to millions of dollars in ransoms". Somali piracy had heightened and became worse. Davis (2012:15) reported that "in January 2009, Somali pirates received a \$3 million ransom for the Saudi Arabian tanker the Sirius Star hijacked in November 2008". Pirates now aim larger freight ships, oil, gas or chemical tankers and take the ships to their pirate's haven in Puntland. They then demand for ransom in exchange for the ships or tankers.

These pirates moved further into the sea and off their coast, posing more danger to global shipping. From 2009-2011, pirates in Somalia have generated more than \$120 million from ransom paid by foreign countries for their crew members taken as hostages (Boyle, 2013:156). Somali piracy has over the years gained the status of one of the

worst pirates. Piracy has affected the supply of the world's 30 percent of oil to Western states since oil tanks are transported by sea. The effects of piracy have expanded criminal networks and contributed to corruption; piracy is now admired by poor citizens. Davis (2012:15) states that "piracy has become popular among the impoverished population as a share in ransom translates into an easier life". It is an irresistible loot for starving citizens and this challenges the government's monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force; piracy has perpetuated Somalia's state failure.

Somali people basically rely on exporting livestock to Gulf countries, remittances from members in the Diaspora and the operations of ports. The situation is so bad in the country such that Somali people are now depending on piracy for survival. Some clan chiefs have given pirates their blessings to carry out their activities (Boon et al, 2012:269). The citizens have reached a no turning point, with clans that are deeply disintegrated and each fending for itself to survive; thus citizens now believe in a piracy-motivated economy. Somalia suffers from high unemployment rate as well as high poverty rates. Piracy is an organised crime and turned out to be an attractive destination for the poor (Talha, 2013:10). By partaking in piracy, the poor have managed to maximise their payoffs. The persistent piracy has denied northern Somalia to create job investments. Officials are denied an opportunity to develop infrastructure for port operations and fishing purposes. Apart from stopping development to take place, they also block food aid (Boon et al. 2012: 269). This selfish act has seen nearly 2 million people starve, worsening the hunger and poverty, which ultimately propels citizens into piracy, leading the country to fail. This has destabilised Somalia and failed the state.

4.2.4 Poverty

Poverty is a scourge troubling people all over the world and is linked to a shortage of essential resources and the toleration of harsh and unfriendly environment (Davis, 2012:13). These unfriendly environments include breakdown of economy, ecological factors and bad governance, among others. Ali-Akpajiak et al (2003:50) define poverty as “a way of life characterised by inaccessibility to adequate health facilities, low quality education system, lack of access to basic needs, low life expectancy, high infant mortality, low income, unemployment and underdevelopment”. These characteristics mentioned in the above definition played a role in failing some states and one of those countries to have experienced those characteristics is Somalia.

The country has been marred by consecutive years of irregular and failing seasonal rainfall. Maystadt et al (2013:1) assert that “in 2011 Somalia experienced the most destructive drought in the last 50 years”. This drought resulted in severe famine, making the number of Somalis in need of food aid relief skyrocket to about four million people. About half of that population were starving to death in 2012. The longest drought that was reported to have hit Somalia lasted for 23 months from 2002 to late 2004 (Maystadt, 2013:4). The prolonged drought led to an eruption of violence over water and it was termed “war of the well”, the country had limited water sources. The fight over water left 250 people dead and others injured (Das, 2013:79).

It has been established that an increase in high temperatures and low rainfall also increased the risk of violent conflicts in East Africa, e.g. Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Rwanda (O’Loughlin et al, 2012:45). Raleigh et al (2012) confirmed this claim and stated that “frequency of conflict events in East Africa increases in periods of

extreme climate variation, with higher rates of rebel conflict exhibiting during anomalously dry conditions". Somalia is vulnerable to weather shocks because of its geographic position making droughts to be a frequent element of its climate and the ultimate end result has been poverty.

Serious food shortages and high unemployment rates affected Somalia greatly, leading to the fractionalization of its people. The desire to reverse this situation prompted UN to intervene. Unemployment of people, low life expectancy, high illiterate rates and many parts of Somalia lacking access to food aid relief, have impoverished millions of people because of unending insecurity (Davis, 2012:13). Pirates or militants often block humanitarian aid from reaching these people. At times pirates or militants loot the food aid and use it as a way of recruiting people into joining them. Somalia as a whole is at the brink of nearing famine yet the world's attention is rested on having a central functional government. A prominent politician Asha Haji Elmi was quoted by Davis (2012:13) saying "there is no food, no shelter, no water, no jobs and people are dying every day". International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said that "the drought, famine and civil war are like the great famine of 1992", (Davis, 2012:13). On the basis of this simile, ICRC has been encouraging people to escape and seek refuge in other countries where humanitarian aid is swiftly delivered.

Poverty has indeed contributed to state failure in Somalia. It has had a toll on Somali people who have suffered from famine and being jobless long enough. It has been a burden which affected the well-being of humans and deteriorated economic developments. Somalia is no stranger to poverty, but poverty coupled with high

unemployment and no food or water is double tragedy. Poverty exacerbated state failure in Somalia.

4.2.5 Religion

Religion is back at the centre of world politics and has seen the belligerent combination of state failure and religious radicalization. Fox (2002:57) is of the view that “today’s hot spots of world affairs in Africa and Asia are characterized by eroding state power and a religious overtone”. Religious conflicts are more intractable and cannot be easily bargained because of the nature and motivations behind them. Somalia is also one of the countries affected by conflict fuelled by religious fundamentalism, it is dominated by Muslim followers and about 0.01 percent of the country’s population are Christians. Though the dominating religion is Muslim, it is divided into two main sects, Shia and Sunni. Majority of the world’s Muslims belong to the Sunni’s. Stokes (2007:462) suggests that “Sunni Islam is the largest sect with 940 million adherents out of about 1.1 billion Muslims”. Shia Islam incorporates Muslims that do not belong to the Sunni sect. This division took place after the death of Prophet Muhammad. Sunnis chose to follow Abu Bakr who was a leader even before Muhammad’s death whilst the Shia’s followed Ali who was Muhammad’s son-in-law (Stokes, 2007:462). Despite being Muslim, denomination followers of either Islamic sect do not identify members of the other sect as fellow Muslims. There are conflicts between these two sects.

In Somalia there are grave abuses of religious freedom, these abuses emanate from the differing Muslim sects that undermine each other. This religious fractionalisation also affected the TFG; it hindered the TFG from bringing the desired stability in Somalia

based on the Sharia law (Svensson, 2012:96). The reason why progress has been slow from the TFG is because there are different sects who make up the parliament and though they are Muslims they interpret the Sharia law differently. In Somalia, there are Sufis which is a sect of the Sunni. Apparently, Al-Shabaab is against the Sufis as they interpret Islam differently. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (2010:291) points out that “Al-Shabaab views Sufis as apostates, and attacked the Sufi religion and assaulted its followers, including destroying and closing Sufi mosques and attacking and killing Sufi clerics, including those who speak out against Al-Shabaab and its interpretation of Islam”. The Sufis have been stopped from partaking in religious ceremonies and attending pilgrimages.

Christians in Somalia are also under attack; unfortunately Christians are targeted by the TFG and militants alike. Conversion is not illegal but it is not generally accepted in society. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (2010:291) alleges that “TFG Charter banned proselytization. The few remaining Christians worship secretly in house churches”. Since the banning of proselytization, many Christians have been killed in the country. These religious clashes amongst Muslim sects and against minority Christians have slowed down the possibility of having a stable government that can maintain political, social and religious balance. The existence of a weak government has led religious sects in Somalia except Christians to mobilize with extremism ideology. Also sects have been relying on their unmatched interpretations of the Quran to justify their hate for each other and Christians (Farah, 2011:73). All these religious conflicts have led to unwanted religious intolerance and above all contributed to state failure.

4.3 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Apart from terrorism, other factors have contributed to state failure in Somalia. These factors include clan rivalry, civil war, warlordism, piracy, poverty and religion. A combination of these factors have been responsible for state failure in Somalia. They have had negative repercussions as they paved way for terrorism to grow and expand. The power vacuum in Somalia triggered these other factors. In a nutshell, the above mentioned factors have greatly contributed to Somalia's state failure.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE RESPONSES BY ACTORS TO CONTAIN THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF AL-SHABAAB

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter paid attention on other factors responsible for the perpetuation of state failure in Somalia. The essence of this chapter is to outline how actors have responded in their endeavour to contain the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab. The African continent is currently the hotbed for the emergence of terrorist groups that are willing to initiate asymmetric wars. Somalia is one of the countries that have suffered the worst and most prolonged humanitarian crisis on the continent (Global Terrorism Index, 2014). The crisis is highly politicised and has complex dynamics of the current War on Terror. The TFG in Somalia has failed to control the state beyond its capital and is at risk of being deposed by Al-Shabaab. However there have been various responses by state actors in trying to contain Al-Shabaab. Some of those who have responded include the African Union by deploying African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations, Kenya and the United States of America.

The responses of these actors fall in line with a norm referred to as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This norm was developed in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (ICISS, 2001:11). ICISS (2001:19) outlines the R2P responsibilities as “responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild”. The 2005 World Summit emphasised the importance of individual countries protecting their people from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing (Weiss, 2012:no page). However, in instances where a state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, that responsibility shifts to the

international community. Hence, the onus to protect Somali people is also a responsibility of the International community; in this instance AMISOM will execute the R2P (Aboagye, 2012). Some of the responses and mechanisms have contributed to the complications connected with the underlying forces of power struggle in Somalia, perpetuating state failure, whilst some have yielded positive results.

5.2 SOMALI TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Somali government has demonstrated its preparedness to fight Al-Shabaab. The Somali government has tried to rebuild its Somali National Army (SNA) following over two decades of incessant conflict and has since been working alongside AMISOM. The SNA troops comprise of clan militias and are constitutionally tasked to ensure the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The army has over 10 000 troops who are currently in service. In 2011, the TFG created a new Somali force which consisted of 300 trained soldiers. The force's task was to protect relief shipments and distribution centres in the capital and the major task was to fight Al-Shabaab (Khalif et al, 2011). The force grew from 300 to 13, 829 by April of 2015 and to 16, 780 by end of August 2015. Global Security Organisation (2015) mentioned that "a total of 13, 829 Somali national army were registered in the human resources system and 16, 780 were registered in the human resources system in April and August, respectively". The significant increase in the SNA shows the willingness of TFG to contain Al-Shabaab and restore hope and stability for its citizens.

However, despite the growth of SNA personnel, the force has been facing some challenges that have impeded the SNA from fully ameliorating the country's situation. The SNA personnel are under-educated, under-funded and above all they are not

adequately equipped. Resolution 2093 (2013) of the United Nations lifted the arms embargo; this resolution allowed Somalia to now purchase light weapons for a period of one year but restricted the purchasing of heavy weapons (Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, 2014:2). Despite the lifting of the embargo the SNA had not accessed any weapons. Global Security Organisation (2015) reported that “Somalia’s armed forces have not received a single bullet or one AK-47 despite the partial lifting of a United Nations arms embargo because the East African country lacks funds”. This has led the SNA to fail to stabilise the country because they are not well equipped with the right arms for them to defeat Al-Shabaab.

TFG forces have been joined by some individuals who have defected from Al-Shabaab. Dagne (2010:1) attests that “an estimated 550 fighters defected from Al-Shabaab and joined the TFG”. The problem that is facing TFG is how to sustain those who defected and at the same time consolidate its own national force. The TFG has challenges in assuming full responsibility for salary payments for SNA. This has hindered the envisioned sustained offensive operations against Al-Shabaab. It is also alleged that some soldiers sell their weapons to sustain themselves since they at times go for months without being paid (Kovac, 2013:6). The underlining concerns of the SNA are that the force lacks equipment and logistical support.

Civilians have been caught up in the fighting between SNA and Al-Shabaab and at times have been victims to their own SNA. Ordinary citizens have become casualties of indiscriminate attacks by SNA in their heavy handed response to insurgent attacks. Instead of the SNA protecting the civilians from the terrorist group, some members of the force have been accused of gender based violence and rape and even killings of

children (Human Rights Watch, 2015). In line with the aforementioned, Kelley (2014) clearly brings out how children have either been killed or raped. He states that “at least 237 Somali children were reportedly killed, with 98 deaths attributed to the Somali National Army and the rape of 21 children in 19 separated incidents by national army”. The SNA failed to enhance the protection of its citizens, especially children. Human Rights Watch (2013:15) reported that “during May 2011, 50 percent of the 1590 injured admitted in hospital in Mogadishu were children under the age of five”. Despite the many civil casualties, SNA has never admitted responsibility for any casualty (Human Rights Watch (2013:17). The above mentioned examples show how civilian casualties are not readily admitted and this antagonises the Somali citizens and in turn perpetuates state failure.

The force has not been able to fight the terrorist group without the help of AMISOM, they simply lack the capacity to do so. TFG’s governing authority, its legitimacy and security capabilities are derived from external sources. The force relies on AMISOM too much for protection from Al-Shabaab (Felbab-Brown 2015). SNA’s reliance on AMISOM has overshadowed their personal capabilities of fighting Al-Shabaab. Contestations have been raised on whether SNA is capable of fighting Al-Shabaab without being backed or not. On that note, Joseph et al (2014) reinforced the above claim made by Felbab-Brown by stating that “the Somali National Army has about 11, 000 personnel overall, most of them trained in neighbouring countries, but have difficulties fighting Al-Shabaab without AMISOM support”. Felbab-Brown (2016) also testified that the Somali National Army was still torn by clan rivalries and has faltered in delivering the protection that Somali people anticipated, hence “AMISOM continues to be the principal

counterinsurgency force”. TFG’s efforts to bring peace through its national force failed because of lack of equipment, inadequate funding, and infighting within SNA caused by clan rivalries and, above all, its failed leadership has propelled instability and perpetuated state failure in Somalia.

5.3 AFRICAN UNION (AU)

African Union is the continent’s leading organisation that was officially inaugurated in 2002, replacing the Organisation of African Unity. AU’s role was to act as a guardian, enhance the security and respond to armed conflicts on the continent. The primary objective of AU was to maintain continental peace and security by avoiding over-reliance on United Nations peacekeeping operations and seek solutions best for African problems (Kobbie, 2008:9). The African Union has been hands-on concerning conflicts and its member states have organised and deployed soldiers to warring countries like Mali, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The African Union also responded to the activities of Al-Shabaab and carried out its first and biggest ever peace support operation in Africa.

The AU established AMISOM which was authorised and endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council in 2007. AMISOM was a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) which was proposed in 2005 by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) but failed to deploy. IGASOM could not deploy successfully because it lacked subsidies and faced challenges with the neutrality of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC’s) which were mostly Somalia’s neighbouring states

(Nduwimana, 2013:11). IGASOM's failures led AU to embark on a new plan which saw the inception of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).

AMISOM's mandate was to stabilise the situation in Somalia and create an atmosphere which was good for humanitarian activities. AMISOM's mandate according to AU (2007), among others, was to provide protection to the TFG officials, foreign officials engaged in the process of trying to restore order in Somalia and to implement civil-military service, like delivering food-aid as well as medical services. The major task of AMISOM is to support the TFG and the Somali National Force to reduce threats posed by Al-Shabaab and help TFG regain control of Somalia as a whole (AMISOM, 2007).

AMISOM was deployed to Somalia in early 2007 to quell attacks by Al-Shabaab in the country as well as protect the TFG officials and international visitors. When AMISOM was deployed it had 1,500 soldiers from Uganda who were based in Mogadishu. The mission expanded with time and by mid-2012 it had a force of 18,000 which was made up of soldiers, police and civilians from different African states (Nduwimana, 2013:15). The mission was meant to last six months but the mission has been repeatedly renewed with no stipulated time-frame as to when it will end. Badmus (2015:152) attests that "AMISOM's deployment was for an initial six-month period with the intention that the mission will be rebadged into a broader UN peace mission after having worked to create conditions conducive for such deployment". AMISOM's mandate has been extended again to 2016.

In 2013 AMISOM's strength was increased by deployment of more troops and it had a total of over 22,000 uniformed recruits (Bruton et al, 2014:2). These troops are from

Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone and were recently joined by Ethiopia. Upon deployment of AMISOM in 2007 they worked alongside Ethiopia National Defence Force (ENDF). Ethiopia was the first country to respond to Al-Shabaab's activities whilst it was under Islamic Courts Union. Ethiopia was the sole reason that led Al-Shabaab to become a more radical group. Its intervention in the Somali conflict helped topple the ICU that had gained power in Mogadishu. Ethiopia justified its act and argued that they were stopping the group from taking over Ogaden region (Williams, 2011:140). The forces managed to drive out the ICU and withdrew from Somalia. Hansen (2013:4) states that "the greatest defeats suffered by Al-Shabaab were inflicted by Ethiopian forces, which intervened in force against Al-Shabaab". Ethiopia later redeployed troops under AMISOM. AMISOM was tasked with protecting strategic locations in Mogadishu like the presidential palace at Villa Somalia, air and sea ports whilst the ENDF patrolled the Mogadishu streets (Bruton et al, 2014:46). AMISOM and ENDF were targeted by Al-Shabaab because both forces were seen as proxies of the U.S.

AMISOM had its successes as well as failures. AMISOM's presence in Somalia has been helpful to a certain extent; some parts of the state have been liberated from Al-Shabaab meaning there are no more Al-Shabaab bases like in Mogadishu, the capital. Nduwimana (2013:13) asserts that "while the entire country has not been liberated yet and insecurity remains a great concern in many areas in Somalia, what had been achieved by AMISOM had begun to lay strong foundations for the restoration of peace and security". Al-Shabaab has been driven out of the capital and is currently dispersed in remote areas. AMISOM has so far performed fairly well, given the fragile security

state in Somalia that does not permit the operation to permanently end the battle (Badmus, 2015:156).

The turning point of AMISOM was in 2011 where there was great coordination by the AMISOM forces, considering the fact that the force is made up of different countries. Also the joining in of troops from Kenya and Djibouti in 2012 helped strengthen AMISOM. The participation of the KDF which has a well-trained air force and is well equipped was an added advantage for AMISOM. Ethiopia also decided to redeploy its forces into Somalia and managed to seize Beledweyne and moved into central areas of Hiraa as well as Galgaduud. Soldiers from Burundi and Uganda played a big role in AMISOM's successes because both forces have some experience with insurgencies. They managed to demonstrate their flexibility to asymmetric warfare due to the experience they gained from protracted conflicts in their countries (Nduwimana, 2013:20). This helped drive out Al-Shabaab from the capital city thereby weakening the group.

Since the initial mandate of AMISOM was to protect the TFG, they successfully managed to station at different key areas in Mogadishu. Ugandan troops provided security at the Aden airport, seaport and the presidential residence. The Burundian troops protected the Mogadishu University and the military academy. AMISOM managed to drive out Al-Shabaab from the capital, helping TFG gain control of the capital. Badmus (2015:158) claims that "AMISOM liberated Mogadishu and most parts of central and southern Somalia including Kismayo and Marka". The fact that AMISOM drove out Al-Shabaab from Kismayo was a success because they were able to curtail Al-Shabaab's major economic base. Also they offered their services to humanitarian

agencies by escorting them when distributing aid to the local people to ensure they were not hijacked by Al-Shabaab (Badmus, 2015:158). The intervention by AMISOM in Somalia's conflict has ensured relative peace. Also in areas that have been liberated by AMISOM, they have helped the TFG in controlling them (Nduwimana, 2013:21). Even though the TFG is now in control of some parts of Somalia, the political power of TFG still needs to balance with the military power so as to sustain these territories.

A challenge faced by AMISOM is that of uncertainty in Somali politics. Somalia's politics is made up of heterogenic clans which are different in their own way. There has been a struggle for power and this has been an important source of clan rivalry. These rivalries have made it difficult for peace negotiations to be carried out successfully. Also major clans of Somalia like Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Rahanweyn support a federal system of governance where different areas of the country are autonomous yet federated into a nation state (Owen, 2012:3). This system would give territories the power to control themselves. Hence AMISOM's success largely depends on the co-operation of these clans and the acceptance of TFG as a legitimate government. TFG is now faced with challenges of trying to unite its clans before they can effectively deal with Al-Shabaab. Even though the TFG does exist, it too has no capacity to govern as it is not functional on its own without the backing of AMISOM. This means once the AMISOM has completed its task, TFG runs a risk of being toppled (Owen, 2012:4).

The other challenge facing AMISOM is the fact that their mandate gets revised on a yearly basis and some of the forces are rotated. This affects AMISOM's performance because some of the force members leave the group after they have been trained and acquired knowledge on how to fight Al-Shabaab. Also there are a lot of negotiations that

take place between AU and its troop contributing partners. Badmus (2015:166) argues that “the outcomes of these negotiations mostly have intricate intentions and interests that affect the autonomy of the mission”. AMISOM’s mandate is too ambitious given the incapacity of AU. The number of deployed troops with inadequate resources cannot undertake this mandate effectively. Their mandate means the military has to be transformed and more troops have to be deployed since some lose their lives in the peacekeeping mission. The mandate did not give provision to protect ordinary people and this has been a challenge for AMISOM. Their mandate only gives room to protect TFG personnel, equipment and installation, self-defence and nothing on civilians; yet Al-Shabaab targets the civilian population (Badmus, 2015:166). Hence the mandate should have gone beyond self-defence and included the ordinary citizens, too.

Reliance of AMISOM on donor funds has made it impossible for the mission to be completed within a set time-frame. It has also caused a strain on the continuity of its operations as it has been hampered by non-availability of resources to sustain the troops (Nduwimana, 2013:23). The U.S has been AMISOM’s biggest financial donor. Bruton et al (2014:78) attest that “from 2007 to May 2013, the U.S Government obligated more than \$341 million to AMISOM”. AU once appealed for a grant package from U.N which included logistical as well as technical support and an additional amount of \$ 800 million in financial aid. The AU was incapacitated and had asked TCC’s to fund themselves for the duration of the mission, promising them that it would reimburse all their incurred costs (Badmus, 2015:161). Clearly AMISOM is a mission that is too big for AU to fund on its own without an injection of funds from their partners.

The other challenge that AMISOM has been facing is the fact that TFG has failed to fill leadership vacuums left by Al-Shabaab in towns that TFG now controls. Also in remote areas that have been liberated from Al-Shabaab, AMISOM has no ample troops to control these places. Instead, AMISOM has let the incompetent TFG forces to control the areas. The TFG forces in turn have been undisciplined and predatory to their own people (Menkhaus, 2013). It has been a daunting experience for AMISOM as they have to protect the TFG from Al-Shabaab and the ordinary citizens from TFG forces. This has served to heighten insecurity and not stabilise the situation. The other frustration for AMISOM is that there is reluctance on the part of aid workers in providing humanitarian aid to people who have been freed from Al-Shabaab's wrath. AMISOM's aim is to show the people that they can survive without Al-Shabaab. Menkhaus (2013:140) argues that "AMISOM appealed to humanitarian agencies to come to the aid of the people fleeing to areas liberated by AMISOM, but aid agencies are reluctant to be seen as being too closely associated with an armed party". Such a dilemma on the part of aid agencies has impeded the operations of AMISOM and the message they are trying to send to the masses. Also recruiting the people to help AMISOM get rid of Al-Shabaab has not been easy.

The worst challenge that AMISOM has witnessed is the withdrawal of some of the troops from the mission. Withdrawal of troops weakens the forces. Al-Shabaab has been quick to capitalise on the withdrawal of troops to their own advantage. In September of 2015, Ugandan and Ethiopian troops withdrew after Al-Shabaab attacked an AU military base. Nor (2015) state that "Somalia's Al-Shabaab fighters took control of a second strategic town in Somalia after African Union peacekeeping troops withdrew".

Despite this, there have been contentions on exactly what led the troops to withdraw. The Ugandan independent newspaper “Sunday Monitor” is alleged to have reported that the withdrawal of its troops was due to the fact that they had gone for 9 months without being paid. On the other hand it is argued that it is because the troops had suffered some fatalities (Nor, 2015). Ethiopian forces also left the country; such unexpected withdrawal dampens AMISOM’s spirit to complete their mandate and, above all, it affects the morale of the troops. AMISOM has been operating for 8 years now and still they continue to be barricaded showing that their efforts have been stalled (Felbab-Brown, 2016). AMISOM needs a more supportive political framework and hope that the SNA will become an effective partner to AMISOM. This could allow AMISOM to handover to SNA the responsibility to stabilise Somalia. Failure to do so will lead to the perpetuation of state failure because Al-Shabaab will not rest until foreign forces leave Somalia.

5.4 KENYA

Kenya as the power house in the Horn of Africa is a strategic partner for the West in ensuring international security in that region. It is an ally of the U.S led Global War on Terror (GWOT) (Githigaro, 2014:162). Kenya has been susceptible to terror attacks and of late has been targeted by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab’s activities in Kenya raised a lot of concern for Kenya’s government. These events were a threat to the Kenyans but mostly to the lucrative tourism sector. The country’s security had to be protected which resulted in Kenya going to war against Al-Shabaab before they could do more damage. Kenya has actively been involved with Somali’s politics and even played a role in the creation of the TFG. Its support for TFG did not sit well with Al-Shabaab. Kenya’s support of the

TFG earned them Al-Shabaab's rage by involving itself in Somalis' endless internal clashes (Mann, 2013). The refugee crisis, kidnappings, and attacks from Al-Shabaab prompted Kenya to respond. Operation Linda Nchi by Kenya was a way of insulating the state.

Operation Linda Nchi is Swahili for "Protect the country"; it is the codename that was given to the Kenyan military operation that launched an offensive action against Al-Shabaab in Somalia. In 2011 Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) were deployed into Somalia. Lind et al (2015:20) posit that "On 16 October 2011, 1,500 Kenya Defence Forces personnel crossed the border into parts of southern Somalia, marking the beginning of a military campaign dubbed Operation Linda Nchi". The U.S government was aware of the plan to invade though they may not have known the exact timing. The U.S played a part in equipping Kenyan military for this operation by training them. This was Kenya's first major military campaign beyond its border since its independence (Blanchard, 2013). This operation was initiated and announced by the Security Minister who made it clear that the country had to defend and ensure its peace and stability under international law.

Kidnappings of foreign aid workers triggered the deployment of the KDF. The operation's supposed goals have changed with time. When Kenya responded using Operation Linda Nchi, it was in pursuit of kidnappers. Later it changed the aim which was now to destroy Al-Shabaab completely and create a buffer zone between Somalia and Kenya. Lastly, they made it clear that Operation Linda Nchi had no specific time limit, which meant the KDF would operate until Kenya was safe (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012:5).

The KDF has contributed significantly with Operation Linda Nchi liberating some Somali towns. The KDF managed to liberate Juba, Gedo and Kismayo (Nduwimana, 2013:20). The most notable success of KDF was taking back the port of Kismayo which was a revenue base for Al-Shabaab (Lind et al, 2015:24). Kenya's intervention into Somalia managed to ameliorate the situation to a lesser extent. On the other hand, the driving out of Al-Shabaab from Kismayo port was fatal. It made Al-Shabaab to retreat and instead created more power vacuum as the TFG has no adequate means to administer the port. This move further stirred more civil unrest with fighting taking place as to who will be in charge of the port. It destabilised the country more and perpetuated state failure (Miyandazi, 2012:5). On the other hand Hansen denies that Kenya managed to seize Kismayo. Hansen (2013:4) states that "Kenyans did not manage to inflict a strategic defeat on Al-Shabaab, and failed to take the strategically important town of Kismayo". Kenya's plan was to barricade Kismayo and protect its interests.

The initial belief was that the operation would be carried out swiftly; unfortunately they had some glitches. Operation Linda Nchi has made Kenya a prime target of Al-Shabaab. Since the Linda Nchi started there has been an increase in attacks in Kenya such as the Westgate Mall siege, Mandera attack on workers and the recent Garissa University attack (Atta-Asamoah, 2015:2). An increase in attacks led to great political and economic effects for Kenya. It has affected the tourism industry, eroded investors and, above all, caused high insecurity in all spheres of life. The fact that Kenya's security is at stake has seen political debates in Kenya being mooted on whether to withdraw their troops or not (Lind et al, 2015:23). President Uhuru Kenyatta was against the removal of the KDF in Somalia and confirmed the troops will stay until the job is

done. Lind et al (2015:23) affirmed that “Deputy President Ruto similarly dismissed calls for Kenyan troops to withdraw because doing so, would provide a safe haven for Al-Shabaab which causes an even greater risk to Kenya and the region”.

The KDF joined AMISOM IN 2012. Crisis Group Africa Report (2012:18) argues that “the slow pace of the military operation and the high cost of keeping troops in the field are the main reasons behind Nairobi’s desire to operate under AMISOM command”. It is estimated that Operation Linda Nchi cost the government at least US \$2.8 million per month in KDF’s costs whilst the country had a budget deficit of US \$3.1 billion (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012:18). The KDF was faced with financial constraints and could not carry on with Operation Linda Nchi hence they had to join AMISOM in 2012 to cut down on their expenditures and let UN foot the bills (Githigaro, 2014:171).

A major setback with Operation Linda Nchi was that discrepancies on its strategy and its goals were not well articulated. The government had stated that it was an operation designed to stop kidnappings that threatened the tourism industry. On a different note the authority suggested the core goal was to eliminate Al-Shabaab. The group was a much greater threat, apparently prompting a more severe response. Whilst others have said it is to hasten the creation of a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia. These different aims pinpoint differences on strategies within the political and military leadership. This uncertainty led the operation to move stealthily whereby goals accumulated, requiring more resources, time and commitment (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012:19).

Kenya needs to change its offensive attack and try including traditional ways. Kenya should move away from the top-down security approach used by the West. It should engage with clan elders since the country has diverse clan groups; by so doing it would have an understanding of clan interests within Somalia and power struggles faced by its citizens. This could help in establishing functionary territories at grass-root level before they can reach the TFG level (Githigaro, 2014:180). The KDF's intervention into Somalia was done without the inclusion of TFG and this has made it difficult for them to achieve their intended goal of stabilising the country. Miyandazi (2012:6) expressed that "the conflict in Somalia has political, social and humanitarian dimensions to it that the Government of Kenya needs to recognise and take into greater consideration the inclusion of the Somali government. A military approach alone will not provide a long term solution". The inclusion of TFG would help stabilise the country and bring about an environment where Kenya and Somalia would co-exist peacefully. As is stands the KDF has failed to decimate Al-Shabaab, instead has been adding fuel to the fire, destabilising and further perpetuating state failure.

5.5 THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

United Nations is one of the organizations that are partaking in the fight against terrorism. The United Nations through its Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 in 2001 which marked a turning point in the global operation against terrorism. The Council placed a responsibility on its member states to enforce measures against acts of terrorism. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) called on member states to "cease providing financial assistance or physical support to terrorists. It further obligated countries to assist one another through information sharing, prosecution of

terrorists and ratification of international conventions”. The main aspect of Resolution 1373 was the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee which was commissioned with the duty of monitoring member states to ensure Resolution 1373 was implemented. This Resolution led to the fight against terrorism globally.

Somalia as a country affected and harbouring terrorists drew the attention of the U.N, which has played a part in fighting Al-Shabaab. The United Nations has been concerned by the deterioration of Somalia’s situation, the loss of human life and the damage caused to infrastructure due to the conflict in the country. The U.N fears the perpetuation of these conflicts is a threat to international peace and security (Kfir, 2008:27). Thus the United Nations has played a pivotal role in responding to terrorism in Somalia unleashed by Al-Shabaab. Through its Security Council it has come up with resolutions that would help fight Al-Shabaab. Though it had resolutions in place, not all yielded the desired results.

The United Nations Security Council approved an African protection and training mission in Somalia. The UNSC acting under Charter VII of the U.N first passed Resolution 1725 in 2006 which reiterated “its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia”. The resolution further refrained neighbouring states of Somalia to take any action that would contravene the arms embargo (Security Council, 2006). The mandate of the mission according to Security Council (2006) was to “monitor progress by the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts in implementing agreements reached in their dialogue; ensure the free movement and safe passage of all involved with the dialogue process; and maintain and monitor security”. However Resolution 1725 failed to broker the peace

deal UNSC had hoped for. The dialogues did not bring the envisaged peace and restoration of stability in Somalia. The UNSC was back again to the drawing board.

In 2007 the UNSC passed another resolution, Resolution 1772 which authorised African Union to create a peacekeeping mission in Somalia which would run for six months (International Business, 2013:63). This resolution led to the birth of AMISOM. The U.N continued to support AMISOM after its inception. U.N helped AU to generate military groups that would assist AMISOM take a forceful action as per the requirements of its mandate. The U.N organised for the training of AMISOM in a joint mission that took place in Democratic Republic of Congo. To improve the mobility of AMISOM, the U.N provided equipment and logistical support worth \$71, 6 million in 2009 (Boon et al, 2012:99). All this was done in response to terrorist activities in Somalia. U.N's help to AMISOM was a way of countering terrorism. They have been using quiet diplomacy and let AU be at the forefront.

The U.N has been amending AMISOM's mission and further extending their stay in Somalia. In 2012, UNSC adopted Resolution 2073 which expanded logistical support for AMISOM. The UNSC encouraged AU to maintain its deployment until 2013. The resolution entailed AMISOM to reduce threats posed by Al-Shabaab and help TFG legitimise its government across Somalia (United Nations Security Council, 2012:1). Resolution 2093 (2013) maintained the deployment of AMISOM until 2014 and also lifted the arms embargo. This resolution allowed Somalia to now purchase light weapons for a period of one year but restricted the purchasing of heavy weapons (Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, 2014:2). However, the U.N, called to have the ban on arms embargo reinstated after evidence surfaced that shipments of

arms meant for the TFG ended up in the hands of Al-Shabaab (Solomon, 2015:62). The fact that United Nations keeps on extending AMISOM's mission and the lifting and reinstating of the arms embargo, among other endeavours, shows the failure of UN and this has resulted in the perpetuation of state failure.

5.6 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States has a key role it plays in combating terrorism; where terrorists offer injustice and disorder the U.S stands for freedom, equality and dignity. America now relies on its allies or indigenous troops with a little American combat role. America through the Pentagon provides intelligence as well as logistical assistance to proxies including African troops (Schmitt, 2014). As of 2010, U.S has been working on using soft power to combat terrorism. Sadik (2011:6) stated that "Barack Obama instructed to mainly employ soft power elements instead of armed forces in the fight against terrorism". U.S has been at the forefront of combating terrorism and they are also trying to pacify Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

The United States of America has national interests in Somalia and also politically it wishes to stabilise the Horn of Africa more especially Somalia. Since the September 11 attack the U.S announced the war on terror. They have played a major role in fighting terrorism and have brought strategies to counter terrorism, especially in Africa. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia to be specific, the U.S has been using indirect intervention. U.S policies towards Somalia are now shaped by their previous experience in the country. The U.S adopted a "no-American-boots-on-the-ground" policy. This policy required that they financially supported African forces fighting against Al-Shabaab. This entailed that

these troops are actually acting on behalf of U.S (Warah, 2014:7). Thus U.S has never sent its own troops to Somalia ever since the Black Hawk Down incident.

Somalia became an area of cumulative concern for the U.S with the continuous rise of terrorism in the country. The U.S has relied on its partnership with Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, Uganda, Djibouti and Somali troops to fight Al-Shabaab (Burgess, 2015:28). Kenya and Ethiopia are regarded as natural allies in the U.S war on terror. They have been more than willing to secure U.S funding for their own anti-terrorism events (Warah, 2014:8). The U.S has also been making use of the Combined Joint Task-Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) with hope of winning the hearts and minds of Somali people. Also the Department of State (DOS) working hand in hand with the Department of Defence (DOD) has had different approaches towards the Horn of Africa, in particular Somalia.

The United States of America through its Department of State has been involved in combatting terrorism in Somalia. Somalia has been topping the global terrorism index due to the absence of state institutions for over two decades (Global Terrorism Index, 2014:22). The aim of DOS was to bring round state building and the TFG had to pave the way for the reconstitution of Somalia's government. The DOS had a policy in place which expressed the top-down state building policy of the Obama administration. Al-Shabaab has been too hard to pin down and the DOS has pursued a policy trying to institute security in Somalia so that Al-Shabaab could be conquered and restore some sanity in the country. The marginalization of Al-Shabaab is possible and the U.S desires to weaken the group. Containing Al-Shabaab has cost the DOS millions of dollars which they have spent so far on Burundian, Ugandan and Kenyan troops. The DOS also

practiced a top-down security approach which ultimately led to the establishment of the TFG and AMISOM with the aim of rebuilding Somalia (Burgess, 2015:31).

The “no-American-boots-on-the-ground” policy has been realised through AMISOM. The top-down and indirect security approach used by DOS did yield some positive results because they ensured that AMISOM troops were well trained and properly equipped. This move led the U.S to recognise the government of Somalia in 2013 for the first time in 22 years and advised for democratic elections to be conducted in due course (Burgess, 2015:32). DOS worked together with the Department of Defence (DOD) in funding and training AMISOM troops. The U.S in support of AMISOM has in limited cases taken direct action against Al-Shabaab. The U.S through its DOD carries out aerial surveillance of Somalia from its various locations in the region and lets Kenyan Air Force to take the strikes.

The 9/11 attack subsequently led to the birth of The Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in October of 2002. The sole purpose of this force was to counter terrorism that was feared would emanate from the region, Somalia to be specific (Bradbury et al, 2014:149). Since the U.S used an indirect approach in response to Al-Shabaab activities, CJTF-HOA played a role by training forces in the Horn of Africa. The CJTF-HOA spent months training Ethiopian troops in anticipation they would be able to carry out joint exercises as well as border patrols. Apart from training Ethiopian forces, CJTF-HOA worked with Kenyan soldiers so as to improve their capacity to safeguard their porous borders from Al-Shabaab (Daniels, 2012:89). In 2013, the U.S deployed military trainers and advisors to Somalia secretly marking their first boots on the ground since the Black Hawk Down incident in 1991 (Institute for National Security and

Counterterrorism, 2014:3). They advise as well as coordinate operations with AMISOM in fighting Al-Shabaab. The U.S has been at all costs avoiding direct intervention in fear Al-Shabaab might retaliate against them.

United States in 2006 gave Ethiopia logistical support to help them invade Somalia and fight Al-Shabaab. It barred any interaction with Al-Shabaab and ruled out any possibilities of finding a working solution. Jeenah (2015:110) asserts that “the US created and supported the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT)”. It was a partnership of warlords that had failed to defeat Al-Shabaab and instead escalated violence which led to more instability. The U.S, apart from helping Ethiopia, also backed Kenyan soldiers. The U.S has been calling for African countries to strengthen their ties with the States so as to develop stronger security and military relations (Jeenah, 2015:111). The U.S has been active in its endeavours to destabilise Al-Shabaab.

In 2007 the U.S created Africa Command (AFRICOM) which is a unified combatant command of its armed force. AFRICOM's aim is to provide a secure environment that is conducive for development and good governance to take place. AFRICOM helps countries that need to counteract terrorist threats in Africa. The AFRICOM has deployed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Somalia which has been involved with intelligence operations against Al-Shabaab as well as carrying out helicopter attacks and drone strikes (Solomon, 2015:120). Though U.S AFRICOM has been helpful in some cases, on the other hand it has been seen pursuing an American agenda. Jeenah (2015:111) argues that “a closer military and security relation with the U.S does not provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development, but death,

destruction and underdevelopment”. AFRICOM has instead exploited Africa’s resources, brought about more violence and above all undermined AU’s authority. AFRICOM is not what the people of Somalia need and will not help in bringing long term stability in the country; it failed to bring about state building, perpetuating state failure.

5.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

In conclusion, actors have responded to the activities of Al-Shabaab hoping to contain the group. The TFG through its troops has been fighting Al-Shabaab with the help of foreign troops. The African Union responded by deploying AMISOM troops. Kenya also responded by carrying out Operation Linda Nchi that launched an offensive action against Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The United Nations through its Security Council, came up with resolutions that would help fight Al-Shabaab. The U.S has been using indirect intervention and has been hands on through its Department of State and Department of Defence. In a nutshell, the actors’ responses have to a certain degree helped Somalia by liberating some of its towns. To a larger extent the actors’ involvement contributed to the country’s state failure.

CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 SUMMARY FINDINGS

The essence of this study was to investigate terrorism as a contributory factor to state failure in Somalia. Chapter three of the study analysed how terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab perpetuated state failure in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has been carrying out terrorist activities in and outside Somalia, and these acts have contributed to the political and economic instability of Somalia, which has deepened the crisis and perpetuated state failure. Al-Shabaab has used bombings, small arms attacks, beheadings, executions, siege, kidnappings, raids, hijackings and looting as some of their tactics of attacking. These strategies by Al-Shabaab have led to negative consequences both politically and economically, perpetuating Somalia's state failure. Politically, the group has belittled TFG's authority and instilled its Sharia law. Al-Shabaab has been challenging Somalia's TFG over the use of legitimate force and has weakened the Somali troops which has led to political instability. Somalia is on its path to conducting democratic elections in 2016 and there are fears that Al-Shabaab might disrupt these elections (Hasselberg, 2015).

Economically, the collapse of key institutions in the country led the state to have soaring numbers of poverty. There is no effective Public Finance Management. The government budget has a very weak revenue base, which cannot even accommodate the wage bill of civil servants. Al-Shabaab has exploited the circumstance by targeting the youth and recruiting them, paying them little wages that the TFG has failed to do through creating jobs. Al-Shabaab has taken it upon themselves to collect taxes, they have been

transporting charcoal unlawfully notwithstanding a ban from the UN. The income gained only benefits the group and not the state (Zanaglio, 2014).

The study acknowledges that there are other factors apart from terrorism that has contributed to state failure in Somalia. Hence, chapter four of the study explored on other factors responsible for the perpetuation of state failure in Somalia. These factors include clan rivalry and civil war, presence of warlords, piracy, poverty and religion. Clan rivalry, differences in clans often led to misunderstandings others thinking they are more superior compared to their counterparts leading to misunderstandings and ultimately civil war. Warlords: the country has been accommodating warlords who have no interest in a peaceful settlement, because it would lead to the diminution of their power hence their presence has perpetuated state failure. Piracy in Somalia has been detrimental to political and social progression, eliminating economic growth, and only contributing to state failure. Poverty is said to be a shortage of essential resources and the toleration of harsh and unfriendly environment (Davis, 2012:13). Somalia is no stranger to poverty, but poverty coupled with high unemployment is double tragedy leading to fractionalization of its people resulting in state failure. Lastly religion; Somalia is dominated by Muslim devotees who are separated into two fundamental groups, Shia and Sunni. Regardless of being Muslim, denomination followers of either Islamic sect do not identify members of the other sect as fellow Muslims. There are constant clashes between these two sects, making the state to be ungovernable, contributing to state failure.

Lastly chapter five of the study looked at the responses by actors to contain the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab. Somali government has also demonstrated its preparedness to

fight Al-Shabaab. The Somali government has tried to rebuild its army and has since been working alongside AMISOM. AMISOM's presence in Somalia has been helpful; some strategic parts of the state have been liberated from Al-Shabaab. Kenya also responded by carrying out Operation Linda Nchi that launched an offensive action against Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The United Nations Security Council approved an African protection and training mission in Somalia. The U.N has been constantly amending AMISOM's mission extending their stay in Somalia. The United States of America wishes to stabilise the Horn of Africa more especially Somalia. The U.S adopted a "no-American-boots-on-the-ground" policy which required that they financially supported African forces fight Al-Shabaab without including their own troops. These responses from actors yielded both positive and negative results.

6.2 CONCLUSION

Somalia's struggle originated from the religious fundamentalism which is best understood from Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory. The clashes are between Islamic fanatics and the "infidels" who are pro West in East Africa (Hansen, 2013:4). The persistent failure of Somalia's state has been propagated by the presence of the Al-Shabaab. The attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and beyond its borders are typical examples of how civilizations can clash. Huntington stipulates that cultural as well as religious identities will constitute the prime source of post-cold war conflicts (Huntington, 1993:22). He illustrates that these conflicts will be more endemic amongst Islam and Christians, which has been witnessed in the incursions taking place in Kenya; when Al-Shabaab strikes it separates Muslims from Christians, for example

Westgate Mall and Garissa attack. Trying to advance democracy does not guarantee political stability as long as there are conflicts among civilizations, and this is the case faced by Somali people, further perpetuating state failure.

Somalia is nowhere near attaining stability as long as TFG is not yet ready to assume that leadership position expected of them. The SNA should up their game and try to fight Al-Shabaab without AMISOM's help. African Union should be in a position to deploy and sustain their own troops without reaching out to U.N. This would help them gain confidence of carrying out peacekeeping missions that would bring about peace in Africa. The U.S.A should refrain from doing peacekeeping missions with hidden agendas of pursuing their own interests. The interference by external actors in trying to bring peace in Somalia has actually added fuel to the fire instead of abating it. Al-Shabaab has proved beyond any reasonable doubt that they are willing and capable of striking even more within and beyond Somalia. Clash of Civilizations explained that conflicts will be characterised by clashes between neighbouring states or groups within a state that is home to populations of different civilizations. This claim has proved to be true in the case of Somalia as Al-Shabaab has clashed with Christians in neighbouring Kenya as well as fellow Muslims within Somalia who belong to different clans and are either devotees of Sunni or Shia. More needs to be done for Somalia to have peace, both the interim government and external actors should go back to their drawing boards and rethink other ways of saving the country and the innocent citizens. To a large extent terrorism has contributed to state failure in Somalia.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above conclusion, this study makes the following recommendations:

- Dialogue between warring factions is the most viable path to sustainable peace in Somalia. The TFG, Clan structures and Al-Shabaab should meet and possibly have a dialogue on how they can work together and restore order in Somalia. Since all factions are dominated by Muslims, they can reach a consensus on implementing Sharia law if that will make them live in harmony.
- Now that most parts of Somalia has been freed by AMISOM, TFG should take full responsibility of those liberated towns and rebuild the country, re-establish rule of law, build viable institutions, promote justice and uphold human rights by including clan structures as well, as this would help federate Somalia. TFG should be able to make up state-building policies and take responsibility for its future and deliver services that will bring noticeable change to the Somali people.
- The Somali National Army has to showcase that they are capable of fighting Al-Shabaab without the help of AMISOM. Such a move by SNA would help pave the way for AMISOM to exit. The money spent on sustaining AMISOM might be injected into Somali coffers and help rebuild the country.
- U.S.A's financial support to Somalia should be sustained as this would help in speeding up the process of rebuilding the country as well as foster economic development.
- African Union as Africa's guardian should come up with solutions that suit African problems. In the case of Somalia it is deeply rooted in clan structures, hence African solutions would be more applicable. The current approach used by the

A.U of relying on U.N which has a Western perspective is affecting the country and stalling it from achieving stability. Al-Shabaab will not stop attacking as long as they are aware that the Western nations are involved.

- United Nations support with regard to Somalia should constantly adapt to the new realities on the ground. It should be guided by the principles of Somalia's TFG. This would help in possibly reaching a workable solution, rather than them continuously dictating what they need Somalia to do.

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